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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the corporate governance affairs within the specific 
framework of the Greek market. Corporate governance has become a major 
topic of debate and policy development in the world of business, policy 
makers, and academics around the globe. The increased attention to 
corporate governance is due to its legal, economic, and institutional 
significance to the effective functioning of markets and corporations operating 
thereof Likewise in Greece, although the corporate governance discussion is 
at an infant stage, yet there are some reasonable signs showing that the issue 
escalates on the agenda of boardrooms and policy makers. Notwithstanding 
that the thesis is informed by the principal agent theory, a more 
contextualised approach to it is adopted. This is so for confirming a key 
proposition of the thesis in that the diversity of corporate arrangements, 
specific corporate governance patterns, and approaches are mediated by their 
fit or alignment with situational variables arising in diverse organisational, 
corporate, and legal environments. By applying this contextualised approach, 
the Greek corporate governance attributes are identified, showing that 
although the Greek system has been influenced by other paradigms, yet 
situational variables and adaptations to domestic attributes make it a distinct, 
hybrid rules based system. Using statistics from two corporate governance 
surveys that measure the level of corporate governance of Greek 
corporations, a discrepancy between the objectives of the corporate 
governance standards, compliance, and actual governance efficiency is 
established. In explaining such discrepancy, this thesis goes further on 
providing in-depth reasoning upon the specific situational variables of the 
Greek corporations and the market as a whole. It is admitted that the 
tendency of the Greek regulator to legislate on corporate governance matters 
rather the issuing principles, has created an overly bureaucratic, rigid, and 
inflexible legal framework. In addition, problems with implementation and 
enforcement of corporate governance requirements have been identified and 
their prevalence is explained by country-specific attributes. The overarching 
objective of this thesis is that the identification of those situational variables - 
that to some certain extent restrain the fulfilment of the corporate governance 
objectives- becomes a useful tool for policy makers and corporations' 
themselves in generating realistic and effective measures that need be taken if 
governance efficiency is to be strengthened. The establishment of a strong, 
efficient, honest governance system shall be an ongoing priorityfor both firms 
and the Greek market. Moving towards governance efficiency from the deeply 
rooted, country specific deficiencies of Greek corporations and the market, 
will inevitably be a long run, perhaps never ending process, in which both the 
substance and the sequencing of policies will be important. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is mainly concerned with those mechanisms and 
methods aiming to align the interests of managers (agents) with those of 
investors (principals). In this thesis, corporate governance is approached from 
the angle of its dual purpose, namely ensuring business development and 
protecting shareholders' rights. This study recognizes the increasing 
significance of legal foundations and the necessity for an effective corporate 
governance system. 
The thesis examines the Greek corporate governance framework and it 
claims that while a considerable amount of corporate governance rules exist, 
the achievement of its main objectives can be circumscribed not only by the 
tendency of the Greek regulators to legislate corporate governance rules, as 
opposed to voluntary Codes of Conduct and recommendations, but mainly by 
the moderate level of compliance with those rules, and the generally weak 
enforcement environment, as two strongly interrelated conditions. 
This claim is explored by examining three related issues. The first is 
the set of corporate governance rules that describes the Greek regulatory 
framework. A brief review of the evolution of corporate governance rules in 
the Greek market is undertaken, so as to reveal the alleged tendency of the 
Greek regulator to legislate corporate governance rules as opposed to 
developing best practices and/or recommendations. The second is the 
moderate level of compliance of Greek corporations with the corporate 
governance rules and recommendations, as recorded by the two recent Grant 
Thornton Corporate Governance Surveys conducted in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively. Finally, the third issue does not relate to the presence of the 
corporate governance laws but rather to the actions taken against violations of 
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those rules. Such legal actions determine not only the overall strength of the ° 
enforcement environment but also the extent to which corporate governance 
rules are enforceable. 
The argument presented is three-fold. First, that in the rather brief 
historic context, the binding effect of corporate governance rules in Greece 
was determined by the Greek regulator contrary to the intentions of interested 
groups and unions that had issued their own corporate governance principles 
and not binding ones. Such tendency on its own is not a problem, only to the 
extent that an overly bureaucratic framework is created, where rigid and 
inflexible rules dominate, restricting companies from effectively adapting to 
rules. 
Second, that the findings of the recent Grant Thornton Corporate 
Governance Surveys record moderate levels of compliance not only with the 
non-binding recommendations but also with the binding rules. The latter, 
particularly, is interesting to the extent that not only rejects our initial 
expectation that binding rules would be coupled with reasonably good levels 
of compliance, but also confirms that the specific corporate structures of 
Greek corporations have set corporate governance obligations as exogenous 
ones. 
Third, that the abovementioned moderate compliance of Greek 
corporations with the binding corporate governance rules is reckoned to be 
preserved, to a certain extent, on account of weak enforcement actions. More 
particularly, this is demonstrated by measuring the total number of non- 
compliant corporations with the total number of fines imposed. Although 
there are considerable limitations to data, an initial examination shows that 
there is a discrepancy between the total number of non-compliant companies 
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and the fines imposed. against those non-compliant behaviours. Such 
discrepancy implies an enforcement gap and lack of enforcement actions. 
Both implications support the main claim of this study that the objectives of 
corporate governance are not fully met, thereby the real benefits and positive 
effects from the existence of a good corporate governance framework seem 
not to be reaped. Following the above, as a conclusion, this study makes a 
case for increasing the focus of corporations themselves, the policy makers, 
and Greek regulators on finding ways to sharpen their understanding of 
corporate governance and enhancing governance efficiency. 
The methodology of the study is informed by the principal-agent 
theory, as expressed first by Berle and Means, reiterated by Coase; Jensen and 
Meckling; Fama and Jensen; Aghion and Bolton; and further clearly 
articulated by Hart. No attempt is made here to replicate the wide-ranging 
theoretical accounts of corporate governance written by the aforementioned 
distinguished scholars. Rather the study builds on the main elements of the 
theory provided by these scholars and develops arguments in favour of a more 
contextualised approach to explaining the key assumptions of this theory. 
Such an approach is unveiled around the proposition that the diversity of 
corporate arrangements and specific corporate governance patterns and 
approaches are mediated by their fit or alignment with situational variables 
arising in diverse organisational, corporate, and legal environments. 
In general terms, the significance of such approach is that it explains 
the specific corporate governance arrangements that are context-dependent. It 
follows that the variations of those arrangements make clear why corporate 
governance systems differ so much across countries. In its narrowest 
perspective, the benefits of such contextual view of the principal-agent theory 
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are to better capture and understand the Greek corporate governance 
arrangements. More particularly, it is shown that the corporate attributes of 
the Greek landscape, (e. g. civil law regime with family dominance in 
corporations), give rise to certain agency problems, not necessarily the same 
as those of other jurisdictions with different attributes, such as diffuse 
ownership and common law regimes, e. g. the Anglo-Saxon. In addition, 
building on that discussion, it is explained why specific disciplining 
mechanisms, such as fiduciary duties and executive compensation schemes, 
while key tools to alleviate agency problems in other jurisdictions, in the 
specific context of Greek corporations are not so widely used. 
For this purpose, and besides the focus of this thesis on the corporate 
governance state of affairs in the specific context of the Greek market, a brief 
reference to other jurisdictions (such as the USA, UK, Germany and Japan) is 
also made. This is important, first, because in the context of the increasing 
activism in the sphere of corporate governance around the globe, strong 
influence from the corporate governance practices of other countries and legal 
regimes can be observed. Additionally, such comparative analysis contributes 
to stressing that corporate governance research and discussion should progress 
to a more context-dependent understanding of corporate governance patterns. 
This will prove very useful for practitioners and policy makers interested in 
applying corporate governance in particular situations and regimes. Further, 
Greece can learn from other jurisdictions, in an effort to fulfil the objectives 
of its corporate governance system. 
The case of Greece is examined as a small stock market that operates 
among developed capital markets within Europe and more particularly within 
the area of Balkans, where Greece has a strong economic role to play. 
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Additionally, Greece is a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1960, a member of the 
European Union (EU) since 1981 and a member of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) since 2001. Those memberships not only place Greece among 
other developed countries but also demand for continuous efforts to sustain its 
development and competitiveness. The Greek corporate governance system 
emerged following a worldwide expansion in corporate governance activism, 
while in contrast with other jurisdictions the tendency of Greek regulators to 
legislate corporate governance issues is characteristic. Moreover, as 
demonstrated above, the moderate level of compliance with the corporate 
governance rules, mainly as a result of the generally weak enforcement 
environment, but also of a typical non-compliant corporate attitude of the 
Greek corporations, provide unique information. 
This thesis is a full-length study that discusses the relationship 
between Greek corporate governance rules and the extent to which those are 
implemented, as documented by recent Corporate Governance Surveys. Most 
importantly, it mainly attempts, for the first time, to explain such relationship 
on accounts of country-specific attributes that can restrain the achievement of 
the objectives and aims of the Greek corporate governance framework. 
Further, upon those country-specific variables, this is the first thesis that seeks 
to help to identify a series of priority actions required to execute effective 
corporate governance strategies. The study concludes by suggesting paths and 
ways that need be taken in order to overcome those country-specific elements 
that circumscribe the achievement of corporate governance objectives. 
Chapters one and two provide the theoretical base on which the later 
discussion of Greek corporate governance is built. Chapter One reviews the 
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literature on those reasons that illuminate the importance of good corporate 
governance and provide the basis for explaining why corporations are better 
off with the application of good corporate governance. Those reasons are 
explained by applying two different techniques of analysis. First, by focusing 
on the positive correlations of good corporate governance (positive analysis). 
That is to depict the benefits that can be recorded from the application of good 
corporate governance practices, as those are illustrated by numerous academic 
studies, some of which use empirical data to explain those positive 
correlations. Second, by focusing on the negative implications from the 
absence of good corporate governance structures (negative analysis). That is 
by briefly discussing the most recent corporate scandals in USA and Europe 
(e. g. Italy) that highlighted with the most prominent way how considerable 
weaknesses in corporate governance structures can have adverse effects both 
in business development and the protection of shareholders' rights. 
This chapter suggests that good corporate governance is a key element 
in ensuring business development and protecting shareholders rights, and it 
argues that good corporate governance is likewise crucial for Greek 
corporations (family firms in their majority) even though the latter do not 
heavily rely on external financing. More particularly, the above analysis, apart 
from contributing to the global corporate governance debate, serves the 
purposes of the present thesis for two main reasons. First, the negative 
analysis is significant because, for the first time in the literature on Greek 
corporate governance, an attempt is made to shed some light on the lessons 
that Greece can learn from those corporate scandals. Second, the positive 
analysis is important because it aims to provide a synthesis of those reasons 
that explain the importance of good governance. Such synthesis could be a 
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useful tool for the Greek corporations and public authorities, both for serving 
as a comprehensive, basic resource to consult in the context of future 
governance reforms, and as a means to place governance arrangements high 
up in the reform agenda. 
Chapter Two establishes the main theoretical context in which the 
corporate governance concepts evolved. It begins by developing arguments in 
favour of a more contextualised approach to the principal agent theory, on the 
key assumptions of which most corporate governance issues are described. 
Such an approach develops around the proposition that the diversity of 
corporate arrangements (mainly relating to the ownership and control of 
firms), specific corporate governance patterns (such as the financing of firms), 
and approaches (e. g. policy responses and disciplining mechanisms) are 
mediated by their fit or alignment with situational variables arising in diverse 
organisational, corporate, and legal environments. The significance of such 
approach is that it explains the reasons why corporate governance systems 
differ so much across countries. 
Chapters Three and Four return to examining the central proposition at 
the study's core in that while a considerable amount of corporate governance 
rules exist in Greece, their main objectives can be circumscribed not only by 
the tendency of the Greek regulators to legislate corporate governance rules as 
opposed to relying on voluntary codes or recommendations, but mainly by the 
moderate level of compliance in practice with those rules, and the generally 
weak enforcement environment. 
More particularly, Chapter Three explores the first branch of this 
proposition in that the current Greek corporate governance system, which 
entails a large amount of rules, contains rules that overlap with other 
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legislation. Such overlaps and the inherently rigid civil law system are 
reckoned to create an overly bureaucratic legal framework, which in turn 
restricts the achievement of the corporate governance objectives. 
To confirm such proposition, this chapter, first, describes the Greek 
corporate governance attributes applying the contextualised approach, as 
established in chapter two. It seeks to explain the specific patterns of the 
Greek corporate governance arrangements and to highlight that due to 
situational variables the Greek corporate governance system, though it follows 
closely the models of other jurisdictions, major adaptations to domestic 
attributes make it a distinct, `hybrid rule-based' system. 
It then tries to further understand those legal and economic 
assumptions that explain the shape of the existing corporate governance 
framework. To that end, it reviews the structure of the Greek capital and 
securities market in that the Greek capital market law and securities 
legislation has provided the legal background for defining numerous corporate 
governance principles, especially the introduction of the Corporate 
Governance Law in 2002, which applies to all listed companies. 
Furthermore, it presents the evolution of the corporate governance 
rules in an attempt to place the corporate governance activism in the Greek 
market after the year 1999, when the slowdown of the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE) revealed a number of irregularities that demanded prompt corrective 
actions. The study then goes through the main provisions of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, focusing on its interpretational ambiguities, its 
drafting generalities, and the unnecessary burden that it creates to listed firms. 
The objective is to establish the regulatory overlaps, the tendency of the 
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regulator to legislate on corporate governance matters (hard law approach), 
and the existence of a poorly drafted law. On those accounts it can be 
explained that the specific content of those provisions, alongside the 
implementation method through hard law, significantly determine the level of 
efficiency of the Greek corporate governance system. 
In further attesting the tendency of the Greek regulator to legislate and 
confirming the nature of the Greek rules-based corporate governance system, 
a review is undertaken on the legislative means by which the EU capital 
market law and the OECD Corporate Governance Principles are introduced in 
the Greek legal order. Such analysis serves to explain two facts. First, that 
these two sources of law are significant for determining the Greek corporate 
governance universe, given that, particularly with respect to the EU legal 
principles, the Greek regulator tends to closely follow the developments in the 
EU legislation. Second, that these two sources of law possess a prominent 
position in the Greek legal order since they are binding legal principles 
usually introduced by the enactment of legislation. 
Finally, the analysis of this chapter is important to the extent that it 
provides the building block for the analysis that follows in chapter four, in an 
attempt to show that the current, and rather rich (in terms of volumes of legal 
documents), legal framework governing the corporate governance practices of 
Greek corporations (mainly listed firms) is overly bureaucratic and rigid. In 
turn, obstacles are created in achieving satisfactory levels of compliance, 
dramatically undermining corporate governance system's efficiency. 
Building on the arguments of chapter three, the objective of Chapter 
Four is to discuss the recorded discrepancy between the objectives of the 
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corporate governance standards, compliance, and governance efficiency. For 
this purpose, the analysis takes place on two main dimensions. First, the study - 
of the level of compliance of Greek listed companies with the corporate 
governance standards, as documented by recent Corporate Governance 
Surveys. Second, upon discovery of an overall moderate level of compliance 
of Greek listed firms with the corporate governance requirements, the focus of 
the analysis shifts to further explore those country specific factors that have 
mainly contributed to such discrepancy. 
The analysis of chapter four goes beyond merely reviewing the 
contradiction, where Greece is a country, which besides the existence of a 
wide range of corporate governance obligations, its overall governance is not 
as efficient as the aims of the corporate governance rules, and best practice 
recommendations have designed it to be. It goes further by providing in-depth 
reasoning to explain this contradiction, which seems to be strongly associated 
with another paradox in that the Greek corporations fail to comply not only 
with the binding corporate governance requirements, but also with the non 
binding. 
Against this backdrop, chapter four attempts to shed some light on the 
overall performance and efficiency of the Greek corporate governance system 
based primarily on two recent Corporate Governance Surveys that examine 
the corporate governance compliance. The fundamental contribution of this 
analysis is twofold. First, it is a full-length analysis that discusses the 
relationship between Greek corporate governance rules and the extent to 
which those are implemented, as documented by recent Corporate 
Governance Surveys, but mainly attempting, for the first time, to explain such 
relationship on accounts of country-specific attributes. Second, by examining 
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those factors that can circumscribe the achievement of the objectives and aims 
of the Greek corporate governance framework, it facilitates the design of 
realistic and effective suggestions for improvement, in an attempt to mitigate 
the specific corporate governance weaknesses in the Greek corporate 
structures. 
Finally, Chapter Five discusses a wide range of proposals that could 
help overcome those country-specific obstacles in fulfilling the objectives of 
corporate governance and achieving greater efficiency. The key claim of this 
chapter is that the establishment of a strong, efficient, honest governance 
system is an ongoing priority both for firms and the Greek market, as a whole. 
It is admitted that the Greek corporate governance need be further improved 
through a number of mechanisms (internal to the firm and external). 
More particularly, given that a key precondition for ensuring greater 
firm transparency and accountability is firms' awareness of the importance of 
introducing and applying good corporate governance practices, the first 
recommendation covers mainly those steps in raising such awareness (such as 
the increased participation in international fora discussing corporate 
governance matters, the wider use and development of governance rating 
systems, and fostering corporate governance education). Furthermore, the role 
of internal auditors and the audit committee in improving the governance 
process are also discussed as important mechanisms to increase management's 
accountability and ensure transparent procedures. 
Moreover, a corporation receives a number of exogenous pressures to 
introduce and apply good corporate governance practices within the firm. In 
this vein, recommendations are advanced on five dimensions. First, from a 
supervisory point of view the focus relies on strengthening the supervisory 
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and monitoring "capacity of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
(HCMC), as the competent body that is empowered to monitor and check 
compliance with corporate governance rules. Second, from a legal review 
perspective, codification and review of existing corporate governance rules is 
discussed in an attempt to eliminate the overly bureaucratic legal framework, 
obscurity, and inefficiency of those rules. Third, from a regulatory point of 
view, the increasing involvement of the ASE in the corporate governance 
regulatory process (listing requirements) is discussed. Fourth, from an 
enforcement perspective, the discussion focuses on the possible reforms 
mainly for the improvement of the judicial system so that enforcement and 
implementation of rules is enhanced. Fifth, from the shareholders' view a 
discussion takes place on those measures that could ensure enhanced 
protection of shareholders' rights and increased activism. 
In addition, within the framework to promote the positive efficiencies 
of good governance and enhance governance efficiency, the following 
recommendations are also discussed as a means to further advance the 
potentials of the Greek corporate governance. First is the encouragement of 
the more active participation of business associations and unions. Second is 
the establishment of a Corporate Governance Association of Greece. Third is 
the consideration of establishing a shareholders' association. Fourth, it is 
recommended that an Institute of Directors be established. 
Overall, the above recommendations are intended to achieve a balance 
among company managers' need for flexibility to meet rapidly changing 
business conditions, companies' need for increasing their market value, 
investors' need to monitor what managers do with their money, and 
shareholders' need for protection. The range of recommendations discussed, 
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although adapted to the specific background of Greece's current conditions, 
go beyond help mitigating country-specific obstacles. This is so because it is 3 
our intention to stress that shifting from. governance weaknesses to 
governance efficiency, demands well-designed measures and appropriate 
actions to be taken within the framework of a comprehensive strategy for the 
reform of the corporate governance system, while a-la-carte solutions are 
finite and not viable. The success of such strategy demands political 
consensus and strong commitment of policy makers, the business world, and 
the society at large, to change deeply rooted decision making structures and 
societal balances favourable to a mere notional implementation of corporate 
governance rules. 
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PART ONE 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: REVIEWING 
THE CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE LITERA TURE 
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CHAPTER 1 
IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
EXPLAINING WHY CORPORATIONS ARE BETTER OFF 
WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Purposes and the Structure of this Chapter 
This first chapter seeks to provide an overview of those reasons that 
explain why good corporate governance makes sense, with an eye on those 
elements and indications that reflect its increasing importance and provide 
clear sight of the reasons that it matters both for business and economic 
development and the protection of shareholders' rights. It intends to add a 
core layer to the literature review and the discussion of the theoretical. 
background of corporate governance and how to measure its legal and 
institutional significance. One main question is, therefore, addressed: why 
care about good corporate governance? 
For the purposes of the present study, good corporate governance 
describes a system that assures that all those necessary checks and balances 
are in place, in an effort to achieve business development and protect 
shareholders' rights. Key aspects of such system of checks and balances are 
considered to be first, the existence of well-functioning laws, regulations, and 
business practices to govern and promote the corporate affairs, and second the 
proper implementation and compliance of such rules. More particularly, in 
this study, the effects of good corporate governance arrangements are 
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documented on a general framework and are not distinguished by the impact 
that each different corporate governance model, for instance insider versus 
outsider model, has on the corporate market and the economy. ' 
In an attempt to explain why corporations are better off with the 
application of good corporate governance, two different techniques of analysis 
are employed, the positive and the negative analysis. 2 The positive analysis 
focuses mainly on describing the positive correlations of strong corporate 
governance to business development and the protection of shareholders' 
rights. Although, in this study the corporate governance concept is approached 
from the angle of its dual purpose, namely ensuring business development and 
protecting shareholders' rights, for the sake of completion a brief reference to 
positive efficiencies on other parameters, such as growth and economic 
efficiency, is also made. The contribution of such analysis is that it can serve 
as a comprehensive synthesis of all those efficiencies that explain the heated 
debate around corporate governance and can urge Greek corporations to put 
this issue high up in their corporate agenda. 
In turn, the negative analysis discusses the implications of weak 
corporate governance structures using as case studies the negative effects of 
the most recent corporate scandals occurred in the US and Europe (e. g. Italy). 
The findings of the negative analysis show that it is proven to be difficult for a 
corporation to remain afloat and profitable if there are no, inter alia, concrete 
corporate governance arrangements in place. This is particularly illustrated by 
Such analysis has been conducted by Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny, `A Survey on 
Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737, who examine separately the impact of 
different corporate governance systems and document which of the models is most profitable 
and efficient for the economy. 
2 The naming and inception of those techniques is solely of the author and are employed for 
ease of convenience when describing the positive and negative correlations with regard to 
corporate governance. 
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the examination of the failure of the Parmalat in Italy. Therefore, the 
additional importance of the negative analysis rests on the fact that it serves as 'A 
a useful reference point, aiming to underline those indications that drive or 
will be able to drive governments, regulators, and policy makers, e. g. in 
Greece, to respond to demands for stronger corporate governance. Greece can 
learn significant lessons from those scandals in the US and Europe, 
respectively. 
Having thus far established the increased significance of strong 
corporate governance, both by using the positive and the negative analysis, for 
ensuring business development and protecting shareholders' rights, it is 
argued that likewise in the more specific context of Greece and in the case of 
family controlled firms strong corporate governance arrangements are equally 
beneficial. One could well argue that Greek corporations, as mainly family 
business that do not heavily rely on external finance, arguably the most 
decisive condition for the existence of corporate governance, would not be 
much interested in strong corporate governance. However, this is not the case. 
As is analysed, strong corporate governance structures in the case of family 
firms include at their core the agreement of solid succession plans, in the 
sense that family firms are interested in continuing their profitable operations 
for many more generations. Hence, the concept of the corporate governance is 
introduced and considered as important for family firms as well. 
Building on the above review of corporate scandals in the USA and 
Europe (e. g. Italy), this chapter then concludes with a brief analysis of three 
interrelated conditions that seemed to have adversely undermined, inter alia, 
the soundness of the corporate governance frameworks in the respective 
jurisdictions. These conditions have been identified to be, first, the 
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establishment of a corporate culture that is not corporate governance centred 
and therefore does not ensure proper corporate behaviours and actions; -' 
second, the failing role of gatekeepers; and third, the weak whistle-blowing 
mechanisms. The aim of this analysis is to highlight a number of conditions 
that were only recently understood as decisive corporate governance 
parameters. 
Recognising that these conditions can devalue and dramatically hinder the 
achievement of the dual scope of corporate governance (business development 
and the protection of shareholders' rights), the research focus shifts to 
examine the state of these conditions in the specific context of the Greek 
market and the Greek corporations operating thereof. The aim of this analysis 
is twofold. One, it is to show that although the above three conditions are not 
strictly speaking country specific factors (in relation to Greece), as the ones 
extensively discussed at the core of this thesis, they can nevertheless 
dramatically circumscribe the objectives of the Greek corporate governance 
system. Two, it is to demonstrate that there are important lessons for Greece 
to learn from those failures and that it is crucial that fundamental provisions 
are devised so as to address those weaknesses in an effort to secure the Greek 
corporate market and avert similar corporate failures. 
The Controversial Dimensions of the Corporate Governance Discussion 
Whereas a number of distinguished scholars have dealt with various 
issues falling in the broad sphere of corporate governance, such research 
entails three main controversial points. First, is the lack of consensus on the 
definition of corporate governance. The rapid adoption of the term `corporate 
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governance' has not been accompanied by a consistent and uniform usage. 
Different authors vary widely in where they draw the boundaries of the 
subject. In its narrowest sense, the term may describe the formal system of 
accountability of senior management to the shareholders. At its most 
expansive, the term is stretched to include the entire network of formal and 
informal relations involving the corporate sector and their consequences for 
society in general. 3 
For the purposes of the study, a general corporate governance 
definition is adopted in the sense that it includes all those mechanisms 
(internal and external) through which firms are operating when ownership is 
separated from management and the nexus of obligations, rights and controls, 
aiming to protect the interests of shareholders (as the financiers) and other 
stakeholders. Ultimately, corporate governance mechanisms aim to deal with 
the ways and the complex set of constraints with which suppliers of finance to 
corporations (i. e. shareholders) assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment, vis-a-vis money, and capital stock, by minimizing managerial 
opportunistic behaviours. 
Second, it is the broad nature of the subject of corporate governance 
that represents another problematic dimension of the term. In practice, 
corporate governance arrangements do not form a separate legal category but 
3 See, e. g., Keasey, K., S. Thompson, and M. Wright Corporate Governance, Economic, 
Management and Financial Issues (OUP, Oxford 1997). The decisive elements of the term 
corporate governance are defined also by the nature of the firm's activities. More specifically, 
in the context of the unique operation of financial institutions, the impetus of corporate 
governance laws and mechanisms is somehow broadened so as to explicitly include all those 
factors that underpin their unique operation due to their public purpose that could 
dramatically damage and threaten to destabilise the world economy. Therefore, the core 
dimension of banks' corporate governance is effective procedures and rules so as to protect 
the public (vis-ä-vis depositors and creditors) and maintain financial stability. See, e. g., 
Ciancanelli, P., and J. A. R. Gonzalez, `Corporate Governance in Banking: a Conceptual 
Framework' (European Financial Management Association Conference 2000, Athens). 
4 See, e. g., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, `A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) 
J Fin 737,737. 
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they rather fall under the scope of company law, commercial law, public law, 
capital markets law or to a combination of all these. Such broad nature gives 3 
rise to difficulties when conducting analysis of legal documents at a national 
level. 5 
Third, adjacent to the broad subject matter of the corporate governance 
is its interdisciplinary character, since it is not a purely legal term. Conversely, 
governance has strong social and economical extensions, which entail an 
interdisciplinary approach in order to fully capture most of its aspects. The 
most evident interaction of disciplines is that of law and economics, where the 
fundamental role of legal norms and foundations is reflected to the well 
functioning of market economies. 
The Limitations of this Study 
In seeking to discuss corporate governance issues, the study's purpose 
is constrained to preliminary and general judgments. This is because corporate 
governance as a concept is a dynamic and interdisciplinary one, which is 
constantly being developed and formed in a rapidly changing legal and 
financial environment where caution dictates that no single answer as to 
corporate governance concerns is available. 
Accordingly, the study primarily examines the current state of the law 
and institutions therein as to Greece. It, primarily, describes how these have 
s For instance, the Corporate Governance Law 3016/2002, as amended [hereinafter Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002] (See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, 
Board Remuneration and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as 
amended by Law 3091/2002, Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002) is not 
exclusively a capital market law statute, not least of the nature of its subject matter, but it also 
overlaps with company law. This duality is an obstacle to be negotiated ahead of its future 
company law or capital markets law codification projects. See, e. g., Athanassiou, P., `Recent 
Developments in Greek Capital Markets Law' (2005) 16 (4) EBLR 893,898. 
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been implemented and the extent to which they constrain or support the 
achievement of the corporate governance objectives, as defined by the local 1.1 
legal framework. Given that the experience of the corporate governance rules 
in Greece is at an infant stage, some of the conclusions are tentative and 
preliminary, although a strong case can be made that Greece follows closely 
with the increased international and European corporate governance activism. 
A Brief Historical Reference to the Emergence of the Corporate 
Governance Concept within a Global Theoretical Context 
. 
On the premises that the corporate governance concept relates to the 
organization of the production process, the first signs of adherence to 
corporate governance principles were witnessed parallel to the development of 
capitalism. Since ancient times, a number of countries had applied a sort of 
corporate governance practices, aiming, in particular, to maximize their profits 
and secure the return of their investment. Notwithstanding that the vocabulary 
may be new, the debate on corporate governance and its pursuit is quite old 
and may date back to the introduction of joint stock companies. 
Similarly, in the context of the organization of the ancient Greek 
public relations, the great philosopher Plato6 seems to have been the first to 
have identified the importance of profitability and optimization of the 
production process. 7. The quest for good corporate governance goes back in 
time with the participation of employees to the Town Council's meetings, i. e. 
6 In Plato's writings, see, e. g., `The Republic' (390 BC) and `The Laws' (347 BC), are debates 
concerning the best possible form of government, where he completes his sketch on the form 
and the institutions (constitution) of the state. 
7 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003). 
24 
the decision-making process, as the first aspect of corporate governance. 
Evidence suggests that as long as employees (at that time they were primarily 
land workers) participated in the decision making process they appeared to be 
more willing to take up new tasks and new posts. 8 
What is paradoxically interesting in the case of the Greek corporate 
governance affairs is the fact that although since the first signs of adherence to 
corporate governance principles were marked in the period of the great 
philosopher Plato, it was only after the late 1990s that the issue of corporate 
governance was formally launched in the Greek corporations. In practice, in 
1999 the recommendations of the Mertzanis Report9 introduced for the first 
time in a single legal document the corporate governance principles (which 
were, however, not binding) and urged Greek corporations to comply with 
such standards. Unfortunately, there are no adequate resources to explain why 
during such a historical leap no reference is made to corporate governance 
issues. However, a rough explanation that can partially clarify the initiation of 
the corporate governance debate in the late 1990s might be the existence of 
intensive competitive forces as a result of Greece's membership of 
international fora and cooperative organisations. More particularly, such 
forces were evident in the Greek market especially after the 1960s and 1980s, 
when Greece joined a number of significant international and European fora 
for international cooperation and the promotion of economic development. In 
1960, Greece became a founding member of the OECD1° and in 1981 became 
I See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003). 
9 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
1° Greece signed the OECD Convention founding the OECD on 14 December 1960, thereby 
pledged its full dedication to achieving the Organisation's fundamental aims. 
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the 10th EU" member state. As is mentioned in more detail below such 
memberships place Greece on a similar footing with other developed 
countries and consequently the pressures to stay competitive are intense. 
Therefore, Greece, as explored below, follows closely the OECD 
particularly in the area of corporate governance, which is evident from two 
interrelated facts. One, it is that the Mertzanis Report, as the first Greek 
corporate governance code, was published in 1999, which coincides with the 
year that the OECD Corporate Governance Principles were also introduced. 
Second, it is that the Mertzanis Report seems to resemble the contents of the 
OECD Corporate Governance principles to such an extent that the Mertzanis 
Report is regarded as a translation of those principles into Greek. The latter 
fact reflects an important intuition and quest of this thesis, which is not only to 
confirm a moderate level of internalisation of international corporate 
governance standards in the Greek corporate market, but significantly to 
explore those country-specific reasons that seem to constrain the full 
internalisation of the those corporate governance principles, which although 
rather new as formal principles, old in their inception. 
2. A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE IMPORTANCE 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Positive Analysis: Why Care about Corporate Governance? 
The reasons that make the debate on corporate governance a timely 
one rest primarily on the following reasons: (a) the liberalisation and 
deregulation of capital markets around the world; (b) the increased financial 
sophistication of capital markets; (c) the existence of more players in the 
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markets; (d) the complexity and interconnection of markets (cross-sector and ° 
cross-border); and (e) the subsequent increased volatility of the new world, 
which results in effects to be instantaneous both at cross-border and cross- 
l sector dimension visible. " 
Basically, the increased importance of good corporate governance has 
been marked by the work of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) that is significant in that area. Additionally, such 
importance has been documented by the examination of the positive 
relationship between good corporate governance and corporate efficiencies. 
Therefore, in order to fully capture the importance of corporate governance, a 
review of those positive efficiencies is undertaken, coupled with reference to 
the significant OECD work. 
This part of the study is to build on the overall debate on the added 
value of corporate governance for corporations and shareholders by showing 
how corporate governance norms help to make corporations and shareholders 
better off in terms of business development and adequate protection of their 
rights, respectively. Toward this end, the two equally important and 
indispensable objectives of corporate governance are described. First is the 
enhancement of the performance of corporations and business development, 
and second is the assurance of the `conformance' of firms towards protecting 
shareholders' interests. 12 
As to the first objective, good corporate governance facilitates and 
stimulates the better performance of public companies by creating and 
" See, e. g., Houben, A., J. Kakes, and G. Schinasi, `Toward a Framework for Safeguarding 
Financial Stability' (2004) IMF Working Paper 101, at 19-20. 
12 See, e. g., Oman, C. P., `Corporate Governance and National Development" 180 OECD 
Technical Paper (2001). 
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maintaining a business environment that motivates managers and financiers to 
maximise firms' operational efficiency; returns on investment; and long-term 3 
productivity growth. This can be the result of more efficient and better 
management practices; better asset allocation; better labour policies; higher 
degree of corporate responsibility; 13 or other efficiency improvements that 
good corporate governance promotes. 
Accordingly, the objective of ensuring the `conformance' of firms 
with investors' and society's interests and expectations can be in principle 
achieved by limiting the above power and the dramatic waste of corporate 
resources; the tunnelling of assets; 14 the moral hazard problems; the so-called 
`principal-agent' conflict and the self-serving behaviour of managers. '5 
Hence, the pursuing of the `conformance' end creates optimal conditions for 
sound and prudent operation of public companies. 
From a principal-agent theoretical perspective, if the separation of 
ownership from control creates agency problems, then the corporation finds in 
turn adaptive mechanisms to mitigate those agency costs. Corporate 
governance mechanisms are introduced to solve those problems. In turn, it is 
evidenced that the fittest organisational structures, e. g. strong corporate 
governance arrangements, make the modem corporation as efficient as it can 
be. 16 
13 A high degree of corporate responsibility can ensure good relationships with all the firm's 
stakeholders and thereby improve the firm's overall financial performance. See, e. g., 
Claessens, S., `Corporate Governance and Development: Review of the Literature and 
Outstanding Research Issues' (GCG Forum Donors Meeting, 13 March 2003, The Hague). 
14 See, e. g., Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, `Tunnelling' 
(2000) 90 (2) Am Econ Rev: Papers & Proceedings 22 (The authors describe the various 
forms of tunnelling on the basis of the legal principles of duty of care and duty of loyalty). 
15 See, e. g., Oman, C. P., `Corporate Governance and National Development' 180 OECD 
Technical Paper (2001). 
16 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) 
Colum L Rev 10,15. 
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Again, on the premises of the principal-agent theory, shareholders 
assume a `passive role' given that they do not participate in the corporate 
decision-making process. '7 Yet, since the ultimate concern of shareholders is 
the protection of their rights, solving the agency problem, they reasonably 
choose to invest their money in corporations that are known to have 
developed and have applied solid corporate governance rules. Such rules are 
believed to protect the interests and rights of shareholders and minimise 
managerial expropriation. Hence, the application of strong corporate 
governance reflects an important and effective mechanism for shareholders 
enabling them to be compensated and protected for their `passive role' in the 
corporate affairs. 
Therefore, the added value of corporate governance is linked with 
better corporate performance by preventing the expropriation of controlling 
shareholders and ensuring better decision-making. 18 Moreover, good 
corporate governance means little expropriation of corporate resources by 
managers, which contributes to better asset allocation and better performance. 
As investors and lenders will be more willing to put their money in firms with 
good corporate governance, those businesses will face lower costs of capital, 
which reflects another source of better performance. Implications for the 
economy as a whole will be witnessed: economic growth will be more 
sustainable, because the economy is less vulnerable to systemic risk. 
11 See, e. g., Millstein, I. M., `The Board - Governing Beyond Where the Law Ends' (address 
to the ICGN 2006 Annual Conference, Washington DC, 5 July 2006); and Shleifer, A., and R. 
W. Vishny, `A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737. 
18 The questionnaire survey conducted by S. W. Nam and I. C. Nam for companies in 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand for the period July-October 2003 
documented that for all companies surveyed, corporate governance scores were strongly 
associated with firm performance, as measured by Tobin's q (the ratio of market value to 
book value of a firm). See, e. g., Nam, S. W., and I. C. Nam, Corporate Governance in Asia: 
Recent Evidence from Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Asian 
Development Bank institute 2005), at 89-125. 
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Conversely, weak corporate governance rules provide fertile ground 
for corruption and fraud. 19 In a similar vein, Newell and Wilson suggest that 
in theory good corporate governance should increase the market valuation of 
companies by improving their financial performance, reducing risk that 
boards will make self-serving decisions and generally raising investor 
confidence. 20 
Significant empirical studies that measure the impact of the quality of 
corporate governance in firm's performance have been conducted, inter alia, 
by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang for nine East Asian countries, 21 
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman for 25 emerging markets; 22 Black for 
Russia; 23 Mitton for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand; 24 Campos, Newell and Wilson for six emerging markets; 25 Klapper 
and Love for 25 emerging markets in the region of Asia; 26 Black, Jang and 
19 See, e. g., Nam, S. W., and I. C. Nam, Corporate Governance in Asia: Recent Evidence from 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Asian Development Bank Institute 
2005), at 89-125. 
20 See, e. g., Newell, R., and G. Wilson, `A Premium for Good Governance' (2003) The 
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 3. 
21 The study shows that higher cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders are associated 
with higher market valuation, but higher voting rights of the controlling shareholders 
correspond to lower market valuation. See, e. g., Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan and L. 
H. P. Lang, `Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia' (1999) Wld 
Bank Working Paper 2088 at 15-21. 
22 The study finds that the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders in 25 
emerging markets explains more of the variation in exchange rated and stock market 
performance during the Asian crisis. See, e. g., Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach, and E. 
Friedman, `Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis' (2000) 58 (1-2) J Fin Econ 
141,150-151 and 171-178. 
2' See, e. g., Black, B. S., `Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian 
Data' (2001) 149 (2) U Pa L Rev 2131. 
24 The main finding of this study is that several firm-level variables related to corporate 
governance had a significant effect on firm performance during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. 
See, e. g., Mitton, T., `A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the 
East Asian Financial Crisis' (2002) 64 (2) J Fin Econ 215,227-234. 
25 See, e. g., Campos, C., R. Newell and G. Wilson, `Corporate Governance Develops in 
Emerging Markets', (2002) McKinsey on Finance (Winter) 15-18. 
26 See, e. g., Klapper L. F., and I. Love, 'Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and 
Performance in Emerging Markets' (2002) Wld Bank Pol Res Working Paper 2818. 
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Kim for the Republic of Korea; 27 and Baek, Kang and Park. 28 
Notwithstanding that each study has its own way of constructing corporate 
governance scores, all of them find that good corporate governance practices 
are strongly correlated with higher firm value. 
Furthermore, the literature documents also the increasing importance 
of corporate governance for capital and securities markets, evidencing good 
securities laws (e. g. extensive disclosure rules and strong legal enforcement) 
as most beneficial for market development. In more precise terms, a study 
shows that good securities laws and sound corporate governance rules 
influence the size of capital markets and the number of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO's). 29 Therefore, good corporate governance practices in public 
companies, followed by greater credibility and transparency can reflect an 
increase in IPO's. Additionally, in the same study, it is demonstrated that 
good corporate governance rules are not only linked with higher levels of a 
company's credibility, but also with increased and easier access to financing, 
with the latter relationship also supported by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny30 and Claessens 31 
27 See, e. g., Black, B. S., H. Jang, W. Kim, `Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence 
from the Korean Market' (2003) Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Stanford, CA Working Paper 209. 
28 The authors, in line with the findings of Mitton, T., `A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact 
of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis' (2002) 64 (2) J Fin Econ 215, 
227-234, find that corporate governance has a significant influence on firm-level performance 
in a crisis and further suggest that the negative impact is greater on firms in which controlling 
shareholders have stronger incentives and means to expropriate resources. See, e. g., Baek, J. 
S., J. K. Kang and K. S. Park, `Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the 
Korean Financial Crisis' (2004) 71 (2) J Fin Econ 265,270. 
29 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, `What Works in Securities 
Laws? ' (2006) 61 (1) J Fin 1. 
30 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, `Law and Finance' 
(1998) 106 J Pol Econ 1113. 
31 See, e. g., Claessens, S., 'Corporate Governance and Development: Review of the Literature 
and Outstanding Research Issues' (GCG Forum Donors Meeting, 13 March 2003, The 
Hague). 
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The literature, then, identifies a positive relationship between good 
corporate governance norms and the cost of capital and corporations' 
valuation. This additional channel through which corporate governance 
matters demonstrates that outsiders are less willing to provide financing and if 
they are less assured that they will get an adequate rate of return, they charge 
higher rates. Therefore, better corporate governance leads to lowering of the 
cost of capital and associated higher firm valuation. 32 In essence, when firms 
have greater and easier access to external financing, this in turn can lead to 
larger investments, lower capital cost, higher growth, greater employment 
creation and poverty reduction. 
Moreover, another dimension of the positive efficiencies of good 
corporate governance is framed within the context of Mergers and 
Acquisitions negotiations and the overall realisation of their strategy. More 
particularly, it has been argued that corporate governance considerations (e. g. 
the quality of the corporate governance systems of the acquired company) are 
taken into consideration from the acquirer company. This is particularly 
reflected in the words of Peter Clapman, former senior vice-president and 
chief counsel for corporate governance at TIAA-CREF, who argued that 
'when global investors look at deals, particularly cross-border deals, they will 
often factor corporate governance issues into the equation, and these may 
have a practical effect on price and value'. 33 
32 For the positive correlation of good corporate governance and lower cost of equity capital, 
see, e. g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W., Daniel, and R. LaFond, `Corporate Governance and the 
Cost of Equity Capital' (2004) SSRN, at 5, and the references contained. (The authors posit 
that better governance impacts a firm's cost of equity capital by mitigating agency risks 
driven by the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The results of the paper 
support the general hypothesis that firms with better governance present less agency risk to 
shareholders resulting in lower cost of equity capital). 
33 See, e. g., Bris, A., and C. Cabolis, `The Value of Investor Protection: Firm Evidence from 
Cross-Border Mergers' (2004) Yale International Centre for Finance, Working Paper 32; and 
32 
On the contrary, generally speaking, it is claimed that weak corporate 
governance arrangements can have an adverse impact on merger and 
acquisition activity. As Claessens notes, the volume of mergers and 
acquisitions activity and the premium paid are significantly larger in countries 
with better investor protection, which is supported through better corporate 
governance framework. Therefore, an active market for mergers and 
acquisitions, which is important for growth, innovation, and development, 
usually arises in countries with good corporate governance regimes and 
stronger investor protection. 34 
The importance of good corporate governance is also revealed by the 
McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey, which shows additional reasons 
for the increased interest on corporate governance. 35 The survey finds that the 
application of good corporate governance systems is a decisive parameter for 
institutional investors' decision and they put it on a par with financial 
indicators when evaluating investment decisions. Accordingly, an 
overwhelming majority of investors are prepared to pay a premium for 
Bris, A., and C. Cabolis, 'Integrating Corporate Governance Systems' Financial Times (5 
October 2006). 
34 See, e. g., Claessens, S., `Corporate Governance and Development: Review of the Literature 
and Outstanding Research Issues' (GCG Forum Donors Meeting, 13 March 2003, The 
Hague). It is important to note that one of the main arguments for carrying out mergers and 
acquisitions has been that they create synergies. However, there is growing literature that 
examines the extent to which companies have overestimated the 'potential of synergies and 
have underestimated the possible negative impact of mergers and acquisitions on the process 
of innovation and development. As this issue exceeds the scope of the present analysis, an 
important resource for further reflection on this dispute is that of Cassiman, B., and M. Ueda, 
`Mergers & Acquisition and Innovation: A Conceptual Framework' in Cassiman, B., and M. 
G. Colombo (eds. ), Mergers & Acquisition: The Innovation Impact (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
UK 2006). 
35 This survey confirms the findings of the 1996 McKinsey survey (See, e. g., Felton, R. F. A. 
Hudnut, and J. van Heeckeren, `Putting a Value on Corporate Governance' (1996) 4 The 
McKinsey Quarterly 170) on corporate governance, where the 2/3 of investors asked stated 
that: they would pay more for stock of companies that are well governed. Specifically, 
among those willing to pay more for good governance, the average premium specified was 
16%'. See, e. g., Newell, R., and G. Wilson, 'A Premium for Good Governance' (2003) The 
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 3. 
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companies exhibiting high governance standards. 36 Finally, several studies 
document that better corporate governance can lead not only to improved rates 3 
of return on equity and higher firm valuation but also to higher profits, 
stronger sales growth and thus generally creating more wealth. 37 
In the context of further measuring the positive effects of corporate 
governance arrangements the work of the OECD is significant. Therefore, for 
the sake of completeness, in the following lines reference to the important 
OECD work is made, in an attempt to discuss those positive corporate 
governance efficiencies that the OECD has identified. The importance of such 
analysis rests on two vital and interrelated issues. One, it is on illustrating the 
set of the reasons that make corporations, vis-a-vis Greek companies, to have 
a strong interest in solid corporate governance arrangements. Two, it is to 
define that for the purposes of the present research the OECD corporate 
governance principles are recognised as benchmarks in that area. 38 
The OECD, as the international organisation that has extensively 
reviewed and examined corporate governance issues, has raised awareness of 
the importance of corporate governance for public companies and the 
economy at large. 39 In this context, the OECD Corporate Governance 
36 Premiums averaged 12-14% in North America and Western Europe; 20-25% in Asia and 
Latin America; and over 30% in Eastern Europe and Africa. See, e. g., Newell, R., and G. 
Wilson, `A Premium for Good Governance' (2003) The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 3. 
;' See, e. g., Joh, S. W., `Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea 
before the Economic Crisis' (2003) 68 (2) J Fin Econ 287 (the work addresses the issue of 
how the corporate governance structure affected firm profitability before the Asian financial 
crisis. It was found that firm performance had been deteriorating even before the crisis 
occurred. The work concludes that if more studies evidence the adverse effects of poor 
corporate governance, then policies that improve a country's corporate governance can 
support its aggregate economic growth and stability. ), and Black, B. S., H. Jang, W. Kim, 
`Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence from the Korean Market' (2003) Stanford 
Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford, CA Working Paper 
209. 
38 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' [hereinafter the 
OECD Principles]. 
39 Id. 
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Principles stress the importance for corporations to apply basic principles of 
good corporate governance. 40 
Corporate governance is recognised as a key element in improving 
economic efficiency and growth, as well as enhancing investor confidence. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The 
introduction of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual 
company and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. 
As a result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use 
resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth 
41 
Furthermore, the OECD considers the application of good corporate 
governance principles as a decisive factor for investment decisions. In line 
with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny42 and Claessens, 
43 who 
document the positive correlation between good corporate governance and 
access to financing, the OECD work supports this relationship in its 
international dimension. If corporations are to reap the full benefits of the 
global capital market, where a larger pool of investors is available, corporate 
governance arrangements must be credible, well understood across borders 
and in conformity with internationally accepted principles. 4 
40 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
41 Id 
42 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, `Law and Finance' 
(1998) 106 J Pol Econ 1113. 
43 See, e. g., Claessens, S., `Corporate Governance and Development: Review of the Literature 
and Outstanding Research Issues' (GCG Forum Donors Meeting, 13 March 2003, The 
Hague). 
44 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
ýý. 
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In conjunction with the above, an OECD study documents strong 
correlation between sound macroeconomic policies and robust microeconomic 
foundations. Countries seem to have shifted their attention towards the micro- 
economic foundations and structures, vis-a-vis corporate governance, in order 
to enhance their economic performance. 45 
The OECD Corporate Governance Principles and, more particularly, 
the one that refers to the disclosure of information and transparency, 
contribute to the debate on the positive relationship between good corporate 
governance and credibility of a company. According to that principle, it is 
vital that shareholders and creditors have access to important information on 
key aspects of the business, so as to significantly reduce their information 
uncertainties. 46 Against this backdrop, increased transparency, accountability 
and credibility can lead not only to a better flow of external finance vis-a-vis 
foreign direct investment but can also enhance the stability of financial 
markets. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny provide further evidence towards 
this argument, who document that undeveloped corporate governance 
mechanisms can substantially retard the flow of external capital to firms. 7 
Overall, the contribution of the OECD as a supporter of the benefits of 
the good corporate governance is reflected for the first time with the release of 
the `Corporate Governance Principles' in 1999.48 Since then, these Principles 
as See, e. g., Maher, M., and T. Andersson, `Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm 
Performance and Economic Growth' (1999) OECD. 
46 `Corporate governance framework should ensure the full, timely and detailed disclosure of 
information on all material matters, including financial situation, performance, ownership 
structure and governance of a corporation. See, e. g., OECD, (2004), 'OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance'. 
" See, e. g., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, `A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 
(2) J Fin 737,738 citing Barca, F., `On Corporate Governance in Italy: Issues, Facts and 
Agency' (1995) Bank of Italy (manuscript) on the Italian corporate governance mechanism. 
Also, see, e. g., Pagano, M., F. Panetta, and L. Zingales, `Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis' (1998) 53 (1) J Fin 27. 
48 See, e. g., OECD, (1999), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
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have become the international benchmark for policy makers, investors, 
corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the 
corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative 
and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries, forming 
the basis for a number of reform initiatives, both by governments and the 
private sector. 
In view of corporate scandals, failures and wrongdoings, the OECD 
Council Meeting at Ministerial Level in 2002 agreed to survey the 
developments in OECD countries and to assess the 1999 Principles in light of 
developments in corporate governance. It was concluded that the 1999 
Principles should be revised to take into account new developments and 
concerns. Therefore, on 22 April 2004, the OECD governments approved a 
revised version of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 49 
The OECD Principles, as amended, focus on publicly traded 
companies and intend to assist governments in improving the legal, 
institutional, and regulatory framework that underpins corporate governance. 
They also provide practical guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, 
investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of 
developing good corporate governance. 
The OECD Principles are not prescriptive or binding, but take the 
form of recommendations that each country can respond to as best fits its own 
traditions and market conditions. They aim at the development of best 
practices in corporate governance since they constitute a fundamental factor in 
enhancing economic growth partially through the consolidation of domestic 
49 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
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and international investors' confidence. Hence, they provide a spectrum of 
directions, not only of micro- but also of macro-economic value, concerning 
the relationships between a company's shareholders, its board of directors, its 
management and its other stakeholders, meaning the parties maintaining a 
broader interest and confidence in company's overall performance, since the 
objective of a corporation should be defined more widely than shareholders' 
profit-maximisation. 50 
Overall, since 1999, the OECD Principles have been widely adopted 
as a benchmark for good practice in corporate governance. The Financial 
Stability Forum has designated the OECD Principles as one of the 12 key 
standards for sound financial systems. 51 The OECD Principles also provide 
the basis for an extensive program of cooperation between OECD and non- 
OECD countries and underpin the corporate governance component of World 
Bank/ International Monetary Fund (IMF) Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC). 52 
Significantly, the aforementioned findings document the importance of 
good corporate governance for public companies, which also abide by specific 
listing requirements and other securities regulations with the emphasis on 
increased transparency. Although it well exceeds the scope of the present 
research, an interesting issue for further elaboration is the review of the 
importance of strong corporate governance arrangements with regard to 
financial and credit institutions. 
51 See, e. g., Alexakis, S., `Incorporation of OECD Principle of Corporate Governance in 
Greek Securities Legislation' (2005) LawNet. gr (e-report). 
51 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
52 Id. 
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Such importance has come to the fore by recent banking and financial 
scandals. 53 Such scandals have crystallised not only the important role that 
banks play in the economy, since they are placed at the heart of financial 
systems, but also that they are different from other public companies on 
account of their public purpose54 and their risk shifting ability. A testament of 
the importance of corporate governance rules in banks is the publication of the 
Basel work on `Enhancing Corporate Governance in Banking 
Organisations', 55 which mainly draws on recommendations based on the 
OECD Principles. 56 
Finally, the importance of good corporate governance is particularly 
highlighted and more attention is now directed to the application of concrete 
corporate governance principles into new domains, such as on banks, bank 
holding companies, and conglomerates. 57 
Negative Analysis: Explaining the Implications 
One building block beyond the focus on the importance of good 
corporate governance arrangements, the analysis now shifts to discuss the 
implications of inadequate and weak corporate governance structures. In 
essence, the objective of this negative analysis is twofold. First, it is proposed 
S' By way of example, the UK banking scandals in the 1990s, such as that of the British and 
Commonwealth Bank in 1990; the Bank of Credit and Commerce International in 1992-1993; 
and the collapse of the Barings Bank in 1995; provide unique insight. 
54 Banks typically receive approximately 90 percent of their financing through debt, which 
tends to be in the form of deposits from multiple depositors usually lacking financial literacy. 
See, e. g., Macey, R. J., and M. 0' Hara, `The Corporate Governance of Banks' (2003) 9 (1) 
FRBNY Econ Pol Rev 91,97. 
55 See, e. g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, `Enhancing Corporate Governance for 
Banking Organizations' (1999) Basel. 
s6 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
57 See, e. g., Adams, R., and H. Mehran, `Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies? ' (2003) 9 (1) FRBNY Econ Pol Rev 123; and Walker, G. A., International 
Banking Regulation Law, Policy and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001). 
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to discuss the implications of corporate failures as a result of weak corporate 
governance structures and the responses to them using as case studies the 
most recent corporate scandals occurred in the US and Europe. Second, it is 
proposed to try to identify some of the factors that contributed to those 
failures. 
Apparently, these scandals had dramatic effects for the organisation of 
modem corporations and showed that every one of the mechanisms set up to 
provide checks and balances failed at the same time. The findings of this 
negative analysis show, inter alia, that it is difficult for corporations to remain 
afloat and profitable if there are no concrete corporate governance 
arrangements in place. Against this backdrop, attention is placed on the 
corporate scandals in the USA and Europe and the prompt regulatory reforms 
that were effectuated. In addition, reference to the OECD initiatives is made 
in an effort to unveil the increased importance of corporate governance, 
especially after the revelations of corporate scandals amid corporate 
governance weaknesses. The main purpose of that discussion is dual. First, it 
is to further explain the significance of good corporate governance 
arrangements, as marked by the implications of those corporate failures. 
Second, the brief description of the prompt regulatory reforms that followed 
provides additional testament to the fact that corporate governance matters for 
both corporations and the economy at large. 
In a narrower context of family firms, any corporate governance 
arrangements must include also the concrete succession plans, as will be 
analysed in more detail. The latter is particularly illustrated by the analysis of 
the family fines' failure of the Parmalat in Italy and of Adelphia in the USA. 
40 
Furthermore, the significance of this negative analysis rests on the fact 
that it serves as a useful reference point, aiming to underline those indications 
that drive or will be able to drive govermnents, regulators, and policy makers, 
including Greece, to respond to demands for stronger corporate governance. 
Greece can learn significant lessons from those scandals occurred in the US 
and Europe, respectively. 
More specifically, the recent corporate scandals in the USA and in 
Europe (e. g. Italy) revealed a number of important conditions necessary for a 
strong corporate governance framework. Absent those conditions, defaults 
were unable to be averted. Those critical- components are considered, inter 
alia, to be the specific corporate culture that was characterised by corruption, 
and the weak role of gatekeepers, coupled with the lack of whistle-blowing 
mechanisms to facilitate making their voices heard. 
The importance of corporate governance became dramatically clear in 
2001 as a series of corporate breakdowns, frauds and other allegations about 
negligence and abuse, from accounting fraud to embezzlement, resulted in the 
loss of billions of dollars of shareholders wealth. 58 The revelation of corporate 
wrongdoings in companies like Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, Parmalat 
and Royal Dutch/Shell, was shocking due to the fact that these companies had 
got high marks -from almost all commentators and regulators- for good 
corporate governance practices. 59 Hence, those corporate governance failures 
in the USA and Europe led to drastic reforms not only in the directly affected 
58 Professor Paul Tiffany compared the top managers of these corporations with the so-called 
`robber barons' of the 19th century. See, e. g., Tiffany, P., `History of Corporate Scandals' 
(Interview) The Washington Post (31 July 2002). 
9 The description of the facts of those scandals exceeds the scope of the present research. For 
a comprehensive deposition of the facts, see, e. g., Monks, R. A. G., and N. Minow, Corporate 
Governance (3'd edn, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004), at 489-493,501-511. 
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financial markets but rather to a worldwide scale, aiming to offer ostensible 
remedies for future `Enronesque behaviours'. 
The need for legal and institutional reform to restore and enhance 
confidence in the sound function of corporations brought good corporate 
governance to the fore of the discussion. Such reforms will eventually 
establish better international standards, thereby enhancing corporate 
governance norms around the globe. 
In the USA, the most important step was the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act60 that reflected US. Congress's attempt to address, inter 
alia, the gatekeeping concerns, with particular emphasis on the audit 
profession and on other main corporate governance mandates. 
61 On reflection, 
it is evident that the failure of gatekeepers, audit firms, some consultants, 
members of the corporate board, Wall Street banks, some law firms, and 
regulatory agencies shaped such malfeasance. At its core, the Enron failure, 
for example, demonstrated corporate governance deficiencies in that the 
internal control mechanisms were short-circuited by conflicts of interests that 
enriched certain managers at the expense of shareholders. 2 
Just as the Great Depression ushered in a period of intense reform, 
when the US companies collapsed, congressional, state attorney general, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Grand jury investigations took 
place. The SEC became more vigilant, arrests, indictments, fines and jail 
60 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, `Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002). 
61 Due to space limitations, the present analysis does not include other specific reforms 
addressing the various gatekeepers' concerns, such as for instance, the audit profession; the 
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB); the lawyers' new 
reporting obligations; or the new director independence requirements. 
62 See, e. g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association, `Enron: Corporate Failure, 
Market Success' 17`h Annual General Meeting (17 April 2002). 
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sentences followed, but most importantly the US President demanded 
changes. Against this background, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
adopted new corporate governance rules, 63 the SEC adopted new disclosure 
requirements and finally, the US Congress, under enormous pressure to 
respond to the domino-like effects of American corporations amid allegations 
of corruption of unprecedented scope, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002.64 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was US Congress's attempt to address, inter 
alia, the gatekeeping concerns with particular emphasis on the role of 
auditors. Against this objective, its principal reform includes the auditor 
independence provisions that restrict the provision of non-audit services to 
public audit clients. 65 In principle, the underlying rationale for banning that 
63 Among the most important changes that the NYSE listing standards proposed in June 2002 
were: 1. the increase of the role and authority of independent directors; 2. the clarification of 
the definition of `independent' director, the addition of new audit committee qualification 
requirements; 3. raising the awareness and focus on good corporate governance, 4. disclosure 
of a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees, and 5. 
promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors or executive officers. See, e. g., New 
York Stock Exchange, `Corporate Governance Rules, as codified in s. 303A of the NYSE's 
Listed Company Manual' (2002). 
6' President George W. Bush when signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the most radical 
redesign of federal securities laws since the 1930s (see, e. g., Lipton, M., `Bubbles and their 
Aftermath', address to the Commercial Club of Chicago, Illinois, November 2002 
http: //www. thecorporatelibrary. com/special/misc/700626 4. pdf) and advanced the disclosure 
requirements to substantive corporate governance mandates (see, e. g., Romano, R., `The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 
1521). For a critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act corporate governance provisions (the 
principal argument rests on the assertion that the SOX corporate governance mandates were 
not carefully considered by Congress, and in particular, they were not evaluated in light of the 
empirical literature questioning their efficacy. Accordingly, the central policy 
recommendation is that the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional for registrants. Such finding 
is consistent with empirical studies that view efficacious corporate and securities laws as the 
product of competitive legal systems. Notably, many of the substantive corporate governance 
provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were not in fact regulatory innovations devised by 
Congress to cope with deficiencies in the business environment in which Enron and 
WorldCom failed. Rather, they may more accurately be characterised as recycled ideas 
advocated for quite some time by corporate governance entrepreneurs. See, e. g., Romano, R., 
`The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale 
LJ 1521,1523; and Bainbridge, S. M., `A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence 
Listing Standards' (2002) 30 Sec Reg LJ 370. 
65 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, `Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
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.r; 
practice was advanced on the premises that the provision of non audit services 
compromises auditor's independence and therefore prohibited. 66 Additionally, 
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creates specific structure and roles for 
audit committee by requiring all listed companies to have audit committees 
composed entirely of independent directors. 67 
Apart from aiming to enforce the independence of external auditors, 
the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is also to reinforce the duties of the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) by 
imposing strict penalties for misrepresenting the financial position of their 
companies in quarterly and annual reports. More particularly, Section 302 
requires the CEO and CFO to certify that the company's periodic reports do 
not contain material misstatements or omissions and `fairly represent' the 
firm's financial conditions and results of operations. By way of executive 
certification of financial statements, CEO and CFO are held responsible for 
establishing, maintaining, and evaluating an effective system of internal 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002), s. 103: `Auditing, Quality Control and Independence Standards and 
Rules' and s. 201: `Services outside the Scope of Practice of Auditors; Prohibited Activities' 
that prohibit accounting firms from providing a list of specified non audit services to firms 
that they audit. In retrospect, Arthur Levitt, then SEC chairman, is recognised as the driving 
force behind the total ban on the provision of non-audit services by auditing firms, who after a 
multi-year effort and in midst of the Enron and WorldCom failures, he gathered political 
support for the enactment of this provision. See, e. g., Romano, R., `The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521,1562-1564. 
66 On the grounds of a review of the findings of studies that examine the extent to which non 
audit services by the external auditor compromises audit quality, id. at 1565-1607, criticises 
the underlying rationale that was advanced for banning the practice. Overall, the findings do 
not support a positive correlation between non audit services and audit quality. 
67 Romano reviews the empirical literature on the composition of audit committees to 
conclude that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act proposition requiring audit committees to consist solely 
of independent directors is not supported that it will reduce the probability of financial 
statement wrongdoing. On the contrary, some data suggest that it might be more efficacious to 
have a committee with members with financial or accounting expertise rather than 
independent members. In this setting, Romano criticises the path that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
followed to mandate independence instead of expertise. Id. at 1537-1561. 
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controls and for disclosing to the audit committee any deficiencies or fraud 
instances. 68 
To continue with Section 402 (a), it prohibits corporations from 
arranging or extending credit to executive officers or directors. Such absolute 
prohibition of executive loans is new to corporate law America, to the extent 
that state codes vary with respect to the ease with which corporations. can 
extend credit to executives, yet total forbid conflicts with the state law 
approach. 69 
Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes provisions for 
whistleblowers70 and legal counsel and attempts to decrease the conflicts 
between auditing and other services from auditors, thus addressing 
management/auditor capture issues. 71 
Responding to the problems with both auditors and analysts, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act sought to restore the independence of `gatekeepers' by 
68 Breach of this corporate responsibility can give rise to criminal penalties according to s. 
906 (c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: `Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports'. For a 
discussion on the dimension of corporate responsibility as a component of fiduciary duties. 
See, e. g., Romano, R., `The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521,1616. 
69 Id. at 1538-1539. Accordingly, the Hellenic Law 2190/1920, as amended, by virtue of' 
Article 23a (par. a and b) stipulates a similar absolute prohibition of extending credit or 
providing loans to executive officers, members of the Board and close relatives up to third 
grade (See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtes 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified - [hereinafter the Corporations 
Law]). Such prohibition can not be waived and has been confirmed by numerous judicial 
cases, such as for instance Case Decisions 452/2005 and 2881/2004. 
70 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act included a groundbreaking provision protecting employees, who 
blow the whistle on corporate fraud, ä la Sherron Watkins of Enron or Cynthia Cooper of 
WorldCom. These whistle-blower provisions provide broader remedies for employees than do 
other whistle-blower protection laws, such as those protecting employees, who face retaliation 
for reporting environmental or health and safety offences. See, e. g., Ebeling, A., `Blowing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle' Forbes. Com (18 June 2003). 
" The `capture' problem arises when a monitor becomes too close to the managers of the firm 
it is supposed to be monitoring; therefore they risk losing their objectivity. See, e. g., Macey, 
R. J., `A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the 
Relative Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules' (2003) 81 Wash ULQ 329. `Agent 
capture' is also revealed in the business relationship between Arthur Andersen and Enron, 
where the auditors were too close to the Enron corporation that it was easy for Enron to 
capture Arthur Andersen auditors to the point that they were, basically, working for Enron 
rather than Arthur Andersen. See, e. g., Coffee, J. C., `Why Didn't the Watchdogs Bark? ' 
(2007) The Conference Board Review (an interview by A. J. Vogl). 
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various strategies. The importance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act lies precisely in 
the creation of an entirely new structure for regulating accountants by 
eliminating the form of self-regulation that existed in the past and by creating 
new corporate governance structures. 72 The ultimate success of the Act is still 
to be seen, although there are empirical studies that do not fully support the 
underlying rationale for the enactment of the Act. 3 Certainly, the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act needs further work and refinements to encapsulate specific 
dimensions of corporate governance problems and alleviate the compliance 
cost imposed on specific type of corporations, e. g. small firms. 
It follows that the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, inter alia, have 
proven to be valuable wake-up calls with important reforms to take place, 
which were certainly needed for some time. 74 However, besides regulatory 
reforms, another important dimension of the magnitude of the American 
corporate scandals is marked by the recent Enron trial, which appears to bring 
a change in the rules of the game. The climax of the most notorious scandal in 
corporate America is the announcement of the verdict of the jury that found 
guilty the two former Enron CEOs. 75 Notably, the terms of the settlements and 
72 See, e. g., Sale, H. A., `Gatekeepers, Disclosure and Issuer Choice' (2003) 81 Wash ULQ 
403,408. The federal regime had until then considered disclosure requirements rather than 
substantive corporate governance mandates, which were traditionally left to state corporate 
law and were not part of the federal securities regime. Importantly, the SOX altered the 
division of authority by providing explicit legislative directives for SEC regulation of what 
was previously perceived as the states' exclusive jurisdiction. See, e. g., Romano, R., `The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 
1521,1523. 
" Such studies are reviewed by Romano, R., `The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521. 
74 Several authors have argued that the US Congress should `shoulder some of the blame' for 
the Enron mess, because of its repeated refusal to respond to attempts by SEC and others to 
improve accounting regulation. See, e. g., Schroeder, M., and G. Hitt, `Congress Fought 
Changes to Accounting Rules over Past Decade' Wall Street Journal (New York, 20 January 
2002) A20. 
75 Former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling was sentenced to 24 years and four months in the 
harshest sentence yet in the case that arose from the energy trading giant's collapse. 
Accordingly, Andrew Fastow, Enron's former CFO, was sentenced to serve a 10-year prison 
term and help prosecutors in their investigation of other Enron executives. On 26 September 
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the charges were unusual to the extent that the directors involved were held 
personally liable, therefore they had to make some payments out of their own 
pockets and their personal assets were at stake. Although one can argue that 
such ruling is paradigmatic and exceptional, yet it is not unprecedented. 6 
Hence, in such state of affairs, one has to reflect on the implications of Enron 
not only in terms of production of emergency regulation but also from the 
angle of application of corporate law. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, in Europe, a number of initiatives to 
strengthen corporate governance arrangements were already in the pipeline 
before the revelations of the so-called `European Enron', i. e. the Parmalat in 
Italy. Yet, the Parmalat affair crystallised the importance of intensive and 
timely implementation of the new corporate governance measures, especially 
in the fear that such corporate failure may have major spill over effect to the 
EU market as a whole. 
Similarly, the failure of Parmalat, in Italy, shed light on the 
weaknesses in the Italian system of corporate governance. The Italian 
government, and the then Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, promised at that 
time rapid and far-reaching reforms of Italy's financial regulatory system. The 
then Finance Minister, Giulio Tremonti, outlined proposals to create a super- 
agency to coordinate the government bodies that regulate banking, business 
and investing, and to give more power to regulators. 77 
2006, he received a lighter sentence of six years. See, e. g., Pasha, S., `Skilling Gets 24 Years: 
Ex-Enron CEO Sentenced for his Role in the Grand-Daddy of Corporate Frauds' 
CNNMoney. com (24 October 2006). 
76 On the prospect of personal liability for directors and its implications for the market of 
directors, see, e. g., Harvard Law School, `Symposium on Director Liability', John M. Olin 
Centre for Law, Economics and Business, (4 November 2005), Discussion Paper 547. 
" See, e. g., Delaney, S., `Parmalat Spurs Call for Reform in Business. Italian Government 
Plans to Strengthen Oversight' The Washington Post (20 January 2002) E01. 
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Whereas many analysts have long argued that major reforms have 
been necessary and that accountability must be increased at every level 
(company administrators, auditors and the regulatory agencies) it was only 
after the revelation of the Parmalat scandal that the Italian political and 
regulatory authorities started seriously talking about vital corporate 
governance reforms and strategies to enhance the current corporate 
environment. 
At EU level, the Parmalat case was of particular importance and has 
inspired an intense debate in the EU about the possible needs for further 
regulation in the area of company law and corporate governance. In this 
context, an important EU initiative in the area of company law and corporate 
governance was the Action Plan in the form of Communication. 
78 The Action 
Plan was the Commission's response to the Final Report on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe by the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts, which was set up by the European Commission to 
prepare recommendations in this area. 
9 In practice, the extended mandate of 
the Group focused on the issues of disclosure; the role of shareholders; on the 
Board of Directors; auditing practices; remuneration of directors; and 
corporate governance regulation in Europe. 
In essence, the Action Plan, which is based on a comprehensive set of 
legislative and non-legislative measures, aims to be flexible in its application, 
78 See, e. g., Commission Communication COM(2003)284final of 21 May 2003 on 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - 
A Plan to Move Forward (The Action Plan). As with many of the national law reforms, this 
EC initiative was the outcome of prior advice provided by a High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts, which had been set up prior to the Enron scandal, yet completed its report after 
the scandal's occurrence. - 79 See, e. g., High Level Group of Company Law Experts, `Final Report of the Group on 
Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe' (2002) 4 November, Press 
Release (IP/02/1600); and European Commission, `Company Law: Commission Creates High 
Level Group of Experts' (2001) 4 September, Press Release (IP/01/1237). 
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but firm on principles'. Briefly, it aims to: (a) strengthen shareholders' rights 
and protection for employees, creditors and the other third parties with which 
companies deal, while adopting company law and corporate governance rules 
appropriately for different categories of company; (b) foster the efficiency and 
competitiveness of business in EU, with special attention to some specific 
cross-border issues; and (c) contribute to rebuilding European investor 
confidence. 
In the context of the realisation of the objectives envisaged in the 
Action Plan, the European Commission conducted four public consultations 
seeking to receive the views of interested parties with respect to issues of 
shareholders' rights; 80 the role of the independent, non-executive or 
supervisory director; 81 the modernisation of board structures, board 
responsibilities and improvement of dissemination of financial information; 82 
80 The European Commission launched on 16 September 2004 the first public consultation on 
facilitating the exercise of basic shareholders' rights in company's general meetings and 
solving problems in the cross border exercise of such rights, particularly voting rights. See, 
e. g., European Commission, 'Corporate Governance: Commission Consults on Shareholders' 
Rights' (2004) 16 September, Press Release (IP/04/1107); and European Commission, DG 
Internal Market, `Fostering an appropriate regime for shareholders' rights' Consultation 
Document of the Service of the Internal Market Directorate General (2004) 16 September. On 
13 May 2005 the second public consultation took place. See, e. g., European Commission, 
`Corporate Governance: Commission Consults on Minimum Standards that Should Apply to 
Shareholders' Rights' (2005) 13 May, Press Release (IP/05/561). Following those 
consultations, on 5 January 2006, the European Commission published the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of voting rights by 
shareholders of companies having their registered office in a Member State and whose shares 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2004/109/EC 
(COM(2005)685final), and on 11 July 2007 the Directive on Shareholders' Rights was 
adopted (see, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of 
Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies [2007] OJ L184/17). 
81 See, e. g., Commission Recommendation COM(2005)162 final of 15 February 2005 on the 
role of non executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of 
the (supervisory) board [2005] OJ L52/51. The European Commission launched on 5 May 
2004 a consultation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors, focusing in 
particular on those who may be considered as independent. The responses to this consultation 
were taken into account for the preparation of the Commission's Recommendation to Member 
States on this issue. 
82 See, e. g., European Commission, `Company Law: Consultation on Board Responsibilities 
and Improving Financial and Corporate Governance Information' (2004) 26 April, Press 
Release (IP/04/538). On 26 April 2004, the Services of the DG Internal Market launched an 
on-line consultation. In this setup, the Commission intended to put forward one proposal 
covering these three issues (namely, responsibility of board members for financial statements 
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and the remuneration of directors, 83 respectively. The outcome of most of the 
above consultations was either the adoption of recommendation or directive. 
The aforementioned legislative initiatives were proposed and adopted 
after the revelation of the Parmalat affair, but prior to that scandal some other 
legislative initiatives were already in the pipeline. Basically, apart from the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), 84 the European Commission in order 
to address the failure of external auditors proposed a new legislative action 
with the publication of the Communication on `Reinforcing Statutory Audit in 
the EU'. 85 In addition, several EU Directives, namely the `Transparency 
and key non financial information; intra-group transparency; and disclosure about corporate 
governance practices), implying at the same time the need to amend the fourth and seventh 
Company Law Directives (known as the 'Accounting Directives'. See, e. g., Fourth Council 
Directive (EEC) 1978/660 of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the 
annual accounts of certain types of companies, as last amended by Council Directive (EC) 
2003/51 (OJ L178/16) [1978] OJ L222/11; and Seventh Council Directive (EEC) 1983/349 of 
13 June 1983 based on Article 54(4)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, as last 
amended by Council Directive (EC) 2003/51 (OJ L178/16) [1983] OJ L211/31). For the 
proposal see, e. g., European Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 
concerning the annual accounts of certain types of companies and consolidated accounts' 
(2004) 28 October. On 14 June 2006, the Council adopted the Directive on board 
responsibilities (see, e. g., Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC 
on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings [2006] OJ 
L224/1). 
83 See, e. g., European Commission, `Corporate Governance: Commission Consults on 
Directors' Remuneration' (2004) 23 February, Press Release (IP/04/252). On 23 February 
2004, the European Commission launched a consultation on fostering an appropriate regime 
for directors' remuneration. The outcome of the public consultation was the Commission 
Recommendation of 6 October 2004 on fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration 
of listed company directors. Also, see, e. g., European Commission, 'Draft Commission 
Recommendation on fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of 
listed companies' (2004) 6 October; and European Commission, `Director's Pay-Commission 
Sets Out Guidance on Disclosure and Shareholder Control' (2004) 6 October, Press Release 
(IP/04/1183). 
84 See, e. g., Commission Communication COM(1999)232final of 11 May 1999 on 
Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan. 
85 See, e. g., Commission Communication COM(2003)286final of 21 May 2003 on 
Reinforcing the Statutory Audit in the EU [2003] OJ C236/3. The main legislative document 
on statutory audits is the Eight Council Directive (EEC) 1984/253 of 10 April 1984 based on 
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the 
statutory audits of accounting documents [1984] OJ L126/20. Additionally, the statutory 
audits legal framework is supplemented by Commission Recommendation 2002/590/EC of 16 
May 2002 on Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: a Set of Fundamental Principles 
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Directive, 86 the 'Market Abuse Directive'87 and the `Prospectus Directive, " 
have already been adopted or they are in the process of the final 
implementation by EU Member States and are expected to provide solutions 
with regard to financial accounting and disclosure of information. In more 
precise terms, the Market Abuse Directive addresses, inter alia, issues of 
market manipulation and insider dealing, referring also to the role of financial 
and reputational intermediaries to work as gatekeepers in a system of external 
checks and balances on corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the protection of investors and the maintenance of 
confidence in financial markets, as an important aspect of the completion of 
the internal market, are achieved by the Council Regulation on the application 
of International Accounting Standards. 89 The application of IAS by January 1, 
2005 is important for the competitiveness of Community capital markets to 
achieve convergence of the standards used in Europe for preparing financial 
statements, with international accounting standards that can be used globally, 
for cross-border transactions or listing anywhere in the world. 90 
(OJ L191/22); and Commission Recommendation 2001/256/EC of 15 November 2000 on 
Quality Assurance for the Statutory Audit in the EU: Minimum Requirements (OJ L91/91). 
86 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2004/109 of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Council Directive (EC) 2001/34 
[2004] OJ L390/38 (the Transparency Directive). 
87 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 (the Market Abuse Directive). 
88 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Council Directive (EC) 2001/34 [2003] OJ L345/64 (the Prospectus Directive). 
89 See, e. g., Council Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) [2002] OJ L243/1 (the IAS Regulation). The IAS is 
adopted by the London-based International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), with the 
participation of the European Commission. These common rules will be known in the future 
as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
90 See, e. g., Council Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) [2002] OJ L243/1 (the IAS Regulation). 
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Finally, the initiative of the Katiforis Report 91 that deals with the role 
of credit rating agencies in the EU context is recognised as an important step 
at EU level to enhance the company law and corporate governance 
arrangements. 
From the angle of the OECD initiatives, it is important to note that 
since the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were first published in 
1999, a number of corporate scandals have undermined the confidence of 
investors in financial markets and company boards. 92 Therefore, in 2002, the 
OECD governments called for a review of the Principles to take account of 
these developments. On 22 April 2004, OECD governments approved a 
revised version of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance adding a 
series of new recommendations and modifying others. 93 The revised OECD 
Principles are designed to assist policy makers in both developed and 
emerging markets in improving corporate governance in their jurisdictions, as 
a vital step in rebuilding public trust in companies and financial markets. 
In brief, the new OECD Principles call for a stronger role for 
shareholders in a number of important areas, including executive 
remuneration and the appointment of board members; call on companies to 
make sure that they have mechanisms to address possible conflicts of interest; 
to recognise and safeguard the rights of stakeholders and build a framework in 
which internal complaints can be heard, with adequate protection for 
individual whistleblowers. Furthermore, they stress the responsibilities of 
auditors to shareholders and the need for institutional investors acting in a 
91 See, e. g., Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, `Report on the Role and Methods 
of Rating Agencies' (2004) Rapporteur Giorgios Katiforis, 29 January, (2003/2081([M)), 
[A5-0040/2004]. 
92 See, e. g., OECD, (1999), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
93 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
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fiduciary capacity, such as pension funds and collective investment schemes 
to be transparent and open about how they exercise their ownership rights 94 
Additionally, they call on company boards to be truly accountable to 
shareholders and to take ultimate responsibility for their firm's adherence to a 
high standard of corporate behaviour and ethics. 95 For board members, this 
means fostering the best interests of the company and the shareholders who 
have invested their money in the company, which they oversee. But it also 
involves establishing productive relationships with other stakeholders such as 
employees and balancing their interests with others. 96 
Recent history has shown that boards in some cases have failed to play 
this role, condoning remuneration packages that have no true link to 
performance, for example, and approving excessively ambitious expansion 
projects that have undermined a company's stability. To guard against such 
practices, the OECD Principles call for directors `capable of exercising 
independent judgement' and for boards able to `exercise objective 
independent judgement on corporate affairs', independent, in particular from 
management and in many cases from controlling shareholders and others in a 
position to control the company. 97 
The OECD Principles also address the issues relating to transparency 
and disclosure, ranging from the internal preparation of financial reports and 
internal controls through to the role of the board in approving the disclosure, 
the accounting standards being used and the integrity of the external audit 
94 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance', at 3 and 37. 
95 ld at 58. 
96 Id. at 60. 
97 See, e. g., OECD, `Improving Business Behaviour: Why We Need Corporate Governance? ' 
(Speech on the OECD) 25 May 2004. 
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process. 98 Notably, a number of countries have introduced public oversight of 
the setting of accounting and audit standards, while a growing number of 
countries restrict the non-audit services that auditors can offer their clients, so 
as to avoid creating business interests that might undermine the independence 
of the audit process. These are areas covered by recommendations in the 
revised OECD Principles. 
Finally, the OECD Principles emphasise the need for effective 
regulatory systems ensuring that the potential for damaging conflicts of 
interest remains limited and that there is a level playing field among the major 
- participants in corporate governance, for example, through protection of 
minority shareholders. 99 Effective implementation and enforcement require 
that laws and regulations are designed in such a way so as to make them 
possible to implement and enforce in an efficient and credible fashion. 
Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the power, 
integrity, and resources to act professionally and objectively. '00 
By and large, by agreeing on these Principles, the OECD governments 
have set the broad foundations for high standards of corporate governance. 
The legislation needed to enforce those standards is the responsibility of 
individual governments, and in enacting it, governments, and policy makers 
need to find a balance between rules and regulations on one hand and 
flexibility on the other. In the future, the governments of OECD countries are 
committed to maintaining an open dialogue with all the parties involved so 
that everyone can learn and benefit from the shared experiences of putting 
98 See, e. g., OECD, `Improving Business Behaviour: Why We Need Corporate Governance? ' 
(Speech on the OECD) 25 May 2004. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.. 
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these Principles into practice. This is vital to ensuring that the OECD 
Principles remain relevant and effective, evolving as new issues arise. '0' 
The analysis thus far has demonstrated that appropriate corporate 
governance structures are necessary conditions, inter alia, for corporations to 
stay afloat and remain profitable. This was achieved by not only outlining its 
positive impact on business development and the protection of shareholders 
but also by highlighting the magnitude of recent corporate scandals. Although 
it would be a groundless generalization to claim that corporate governance 
weaknesses were alone the critical reasons for those failures, it is rather 
supported that such weaknesses seem to have dramatically deepened the scope 
of those failures. The importance of those failures, which as analysed above, 
was due to, inter alia, corporate governance weaknesses, is mainly raised by 
the prompt regulatory reforms that followed. Immediately after those 
collapses, regulators' concerns were centred on avoiding similar failures in the 
future, aiming to create a stronger corporate governance framework that 
would ensure greater business development and better shareholders' 
protection. The call for reforms was not only evidenced by the regulators of 
the directly affected countries, vis-a-vis the USA and EU, but importantly also 
by the OECD governments. The revised OECD Corporate Governance 
Principles reflect a milestone development in the corporate governance 
domain, since they are the international benchmarks. The Principles are now 
better able to capture the modern aspects of corporate governance weaknesses 
and problems, therefore further ensuring that corporations and shareholders 
101 See, e. g., OECD, `Improving Business Behaviour: Why We Need Corporate Governance? ' 
(Speech on the OECD) 25 May 2004. 
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better off with the application of more modernized corporate governance 
principles. 
3. DISCUSSING THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN A SPECIFIC CONTEXT: FAMILY 
FIRMS AND GREECE 
Having thus far established, by using both the positive and the 
negative analysis, the increased significance of strong corporate governance, 
for ensuring business development and protecting shareholders' rights, the 
focus of the analysis now shifts to discuss the importance of corporate 
governance in the specific context of the Greek corporate affairs with special 
attention to family firms. Therefore, an important question is addressed. Is 
corporate governance of importance also in the case of the operation of family 
firms? In the analysis that follows the main argument stressed is that likewise 
in the more specific context of Greece and in the case of family controlled 
firms, as the most dominant type of business formation, strong and 
appropriate corporate governance arrangements are equally beneficial. 
Although, in the context of the positive and the negative analysis the 
common assumption taken on examining the importance of good corporate 
governance was the reliance on external finance, as a basic parameter for 
corporate governance considerations, vis-a-vis principal-agent concerns, yet, 
even if corporations do not rely primarily on foreign sources of capital or 
external financing, such as in the case of family controlled firms, adherence to 
good corporate governance practices is equally important. Even in family 
firms' affairs, there are agency concerns, though on a different perspective. In 
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this setup, the importance of corporate governance is directed on 
strengthening the confidence of domestic investors; reducing the cost of 
capital; and ultimately inducing more stable sources of financing through 
bank loans. '02 
Furthermore, one could well argue that Greek corporations, as family 
firms that do not heavily rely on external finance would not be that much 
interested in strong corporate governance structures. However, this is not the 
case. At this point of the analysis, the issue is tackled from the corporations' 
succession point of view, in the sense that family firms are interested in 
continuing their profitable operations for many more generations. In doing so 
at some point of the firm's evolution, external capital is to be needed, 103 which 
in order to secure a decisive condition for external financiers will be the 
existence of corporate governance structures, as shown above. Hence, the 
concept of the corporate governance becomes relevant for family firms as 
well. 
Complementary to the theoretical analysis on those specific elements 
that advance good corporate governance as an important determinant for 
family firms, a testament to its added value is primarily provided from two 
recent family firms' failure experiences: Adelphia and Parmalat. 
In 2002, Adelphia was the sixth largest cable television company in 
the USA founded by John Rigas. 104 On 25 June 2002, the company filed for 
bankruptcy saying that it could not meet the $7 billion in outstanding loans. A 
102 See, e. g., OECD, (2004), `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
X03 Such external capital can be either in the form of a bank loan or by listing their shares in 
the Athens Stock Exchange. 
104 See, e. g., SEC News Digest, `SEC and US Attorney Settle Massive Financial Fraud Case 
against Adelphia and Rigas Family for $715 Million', Commission Announcements, Issue 
2005-79,26 April 2005. 
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month after the bankruptcy five executives (including three members of the 
Rigas family) were arrested charged with looting. '05 The indictment charged 
that the Rigas family used billions of dollars in Adelphia's funds and assets 
for their own benefit. '06 Such uses of Adelphia's funds and assets by the Rigas 
family were not presented to or authorised by the Adelphia's Board of 
Directors and were not disclosed to the non family members of the board or to 
the public. 
Although Adelphia was a publicly held company, its management was 
almost entirely controlled by the founding Rigas family. In practice, the 
family controlled the board with Rigas, his sons and his son-in-law holding 
five of the nine seats of the board. The other four were held by friends and 
business associates, who knew that if they rocked the boat they would be 
replaced. 107 As the Fortune magazine quoted `Decisions were made at the 
dinner table rather than in a boardroom'. '°8 
Similarly, the recent collapse of the Parmalat in Italy is another bold 
revelation of the importance of good corporate governance mechanisms, and 
the absence thereof, in family firms. 109 Parmalat represented a close-knit 
family model, which appears to have kept its financial problems 'a secret, 
105 See, e. g., Markon, J., and R. Frank, `Adelphia Officials Are Arrested, Charged with 
Massive Fraud' Wall Street Journal (25 July 2002). 
106 Among other things, the defendants allegedly caused Adelphia to pay more than $250 
million in connection with personal loans to the Rigas family. From 1999 through April 2002, 
members of the Rigas family allegedly took unauthorised and undisclosed cash advances from 
Adelphia, totalling more than $50 million. See, e. g., Monks, R. A. G., and N. Minow, 
Corporate Governance (3`d edition, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004), at 489-493. 
107 See, e. g., Monks, R. A. G., and N. Minow, Corporate Governance (3`d edition, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd 2004), at 489-493. 
108 See, e. g., Devin, L., `The Adelphia Story: the Sixth Largest Cable Company Might as Well 
Have Been Called John Rigas & Sons. It's Rise and Fall Was a Small Town Saga of Epic 
Dimensions' Fortune Magazine (12 August 2002). 
109 Parmalat was like most Italian firms launched as a family business founded by Calisto 
Tanzi. The Tanzi family owned 51% of the shares and the company's board was made up 
mainly of family and friends (such as Tanzi's brother; his son and his niece), who all held 
senior positions. See, e. g., Arie, S., `Time for a Break in the Family Circle' The Guardian 
Unlimited (15 January 2004). 
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since its family-dominated board waived its oversight responsibilities to the 
detriment of the company and its stakeholders. ' 10 
Therefore, good corporate governance arrangements seem to be 
needed in family firms as in other types of corporations in order to ensure, 
inter alia, transparency of transactions and the presence of independent board 
members. Such need is underlined by the closely held ownership structures; 
the leadership; and the evolutionary dynamics, as the distinct features of 
family owned firms. More particularly, good corporate governance 
arrangements address three organisational requirements, which need to be 
taken into account if family firms are to manage successfully the 
consequences of growth. " They need to be able to (i) recruit and retain the 
very best people for the business; 112 (ii) develop a culture of trust and 
transparency; 113 and (iii) define logical and efficient organisational 
structures. 114 The added complexity of the family factor puts extra challenges 
on the company's corporate governance and makes the latter a crucial element 
for addressing those challenges and, likewise, creating a more formal pattern 
of organisation. "5 
10 See, e. g., Galloni, A., and Y. Trofimov, `Behind Parmalat Chief's Rise: Ties to Italian 
Power Structure' Wall Street Journal (8 March 2004). 
"' See, e. g., Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's 
Company from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International, at 13. 
112 The family firm's policy on recruitment and promotion is crucial to its continued success. 
The future of a family firm depends on its ability to pick and promote the right members of 
the family and equally to provide attractive opportunities to managers from outside the 
family. Id at 13-14. 
13 For instance, for both family and non-family members, it is essential that rewards, whether 
financial or non-financial, are distributed fairly and transparently and accounted for in a clear 
and precise way. Id at 18. 
114 If family firms are to manage their growth successfully, they have to adapt their structure 
to cope with it. When the firm becomes larger, a more formal of organisation is required, 
followed by clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Id. at 20. 
115 See, e. g., Van de Berghe, L. A. A., and S. Carchon (2002) `Corporate Governance 
Practices in Flemish Family Businesses' 10 (3) CG 225,242. 
59 
ý `iý 
M 
Particularly with regard to family firms, the concern of succession is 
typically a problematic issue. Although failures of family firms to make the 
transition to the second or third generation are often accounted for by the 
founder's / owner's personality or on the problematic relationship with the 
parents, very often the lack of a concrete succession plan, as part of a 
corporate governance framework, can be also a decisive element in a firm's 
financial and operational sustainability. 116 Basically, as a business grows, it 
becomes increasingly complex, creating its own demands for a more formal 
organizational structure, vis-a-vis corporate governance arrangements. 
Therefore, it appears that good corporate governance can answer both 
succession issues and change in business scale plans. 117 
Furthermore, in terms of reliance on external finance, even though 
traditional privately held family firms may not heavily rely on financial 
markets for capital, (which might to a certain extent excuse their poor 
corporate governance mechanisms) there are situations where external capital 
is important for the continuation of their operations. Although, as 
aforementioned, typically the principal capital of family firms is a large 
percentage of the available wealth of the family, in the wake of global 
competitiveness forces, family firms are confronted with new challenges to 
stay competitive. In doing so, they have to expand their operations and the 
range of services offered, which inevitably entails financing concerns. In this 
setup, financial markets become fertile ground for those families that wish to 
116 Companies with strong corporate governance system presented higher standards of 
activism among the top companies. See, e. g., London Business School, 'Corporate 
Governance for Corporate Sustainability: The Greek Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) 
Greek Alumni Association (Kantor: Genesis Pharma SA), at 5. 
117 See, e. g., Van de Berghe, L. A. A., and S. Carchon (2002) `Corporate Governance 
Practices in Flemish Family Businesses' 10 (3) CG 225,243; and Ward, J. L., `Governing 
Family Business' (2005) 10 (1) Economic Perspectives 38,41. 
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sacrifice family control and presence in the board for competitiveness, growth 
and expansion. Yet, investors, as revealed by the McKinsey survey, 118 are not 
willing to be exposed to risks, mainly deriving from poor monitoring 
mechanisms and on the contrary are willing to pay a premium for good 
corporate governance institutions. All the above justify the deposition that 
sooner or later, corporate governance concerns will be important agenda items 
in the family board meetings. 
When it comes to the Greek family firms, the above discussion does 
not change substantially. Greek family firms face similar concerns and 
corporate governance needs are to be up in their agenda. Succession concerns 
and profitability issues are at the core of Greek family firms' operation plans. 
As demonstrated by the recent survey undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) in 2006, the issues of concerns of family firms, such as succession, 
expansion, development, financing, ' strategic planning, could be well dealt if 
management focused on establishing appropriate corporate governance 
arrangements. 119 
Overall the discussion on corporate governance arrangements in 
Greece is equally important. More particularly, according to the Principles of 
Corporate Governance in Greece, 120 the success of the Greek economy 
depends on good performance and efficient growth of the Greek companies. 
The achievement and preservation of satisfactory corporate and national 
economy efficiency levels in Greece requires the reduction in the cost of 
equity capital. If Greece wishes to remain the centre of decision-making in the 
118 See, e. g., Campos, C., R. Newell and G. Wilson, `Corporate Governance Develops in 
Emerging Markets', (2002) McKinsey on Finance (Winter) 15-18. 
"9 See, e. g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, `Survey on Family Firms' (in Greek) (2006). 
120 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
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Balkan region with the ultimate mandate of sustaining its long-term economic 
growth, it should proceed with the undertaking of strong initiatives for its 
competitive restructuring of the regulatory framework conditioning the 
operation of financial markets. The adoption of a transparent and 
internationally recognised business regulation framework is imperative so as 
to enable the Greek corporate market to sustain its competitiveness. 121 
Especially, in light of Greece's membership to the EU, since 1981, 
failure to develop and adopt a robust and strong institutional and regulatory 
framework may place Greece at a competitive disadvantage, since 
corporations might choose to move away from Greece and rather develop 
their business activities in countries that offer more properly supervised and 
business-oriented environments. Additionally, such failure might dramatically 
damage the ability to attract more foreign investments. 
Against these considerations, the corporate governance debate is 
paramount to the Greek corporate market. The focus is on the design and 
effective implementation of appropriate mechanisms for the management, 
monitoring, and control of operation of mainly family firms. The particular 
structure of ownership of Greek corporations, characterised by high levels of 
concentration and the dominance of family firms further confirms the 
importance of good corporate governance. As above analysed, such good 
corporate governance arrangements are vital for the succession and survival of 
family firms. 
The moderated agency problems of family firms (vis-a-vis Greek 
corporations), largely deviating from the dominant Anglo-Saxon ones, does 
121 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
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not erase the importance of a good corporate governance policy of such firms. 
On the contrary, as aforementioned, the use of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPO's), as a means for raising external finance and for family-owned firms to 
go public, brings good corporate governance to the fore. As the business 
grows and markets evolve, finding sufficient managerial experience within the 
family becomes harder, therefore management succession plans form part of a 
good corporate governance policy. Hence, the establishment of a modem 
corporate governance framework is considered as an essential prerequisite for 
the competitive transformation of the Greek capital market and economy. 
4. CRITICAL FACTORS UNDERMINING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EFFICIENCIES 
Introduction 
As aforementioned, the existence of appropriate corporate governance 
standards is linked with positive effects for the operation of public companies 
and significant added value for the profitable continuation of activities of 
family firms. Yet, it is important to stress that a less than appropriate 
introduction and implementation of good corporate governance rules is not 
sufficient to bring integrity to both types of business organisations. Rather, in 
order for public companies to reap the full range of benefits of good corporate 
governance norms, it is of utmost importance that their directors and senior 
management have rules that are capable of being appropriately implemented 
to serve economically efficient ends as well as the achievement of certain 
special purposes. Similarly, directors and senior management of family firms 
are called to apply the standard set of corporate governance rules, provided 
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that it follows the pace of the rapid development of stock exchanges and 
corporate markets in Europe and worldwide and the strengthening of the role 
and importance of shareholders. All these factors demand continuous review 
and updating of corporate governance rules. 
Notwithstanding that it is very positive that policy makers are now 
more aware of the contribution that good corporate governance makes -inter 
alia- to business development and the protection of shareholders' rights, this 
chapter concludes with an analysis of a number of conditions that have 
significantly affected the overall effectiveness and success of corporate 
governance framework. More particularly, the aim of this analysis is to 
highlight a number of conditions that were only recently understood as 
decisive corporate governance parameters. 
Unarguably, public companies now better understand the added value 
of good corporate governance to their competitiveness; investors, (especially 
collective investment institutions and pension funds acting in a fiduciary 
capacity) realise their central role in ensuring good corporate governance 
practices, thereby boosting the value of their investments. 122 However, even if 
good corporate governance achieves positive efficiencies and more actors pay 
attention to applying corporate governance principles, these are hardly a 
122 Although it exceeds the scope of the present focus, it is important to note that the duty and 
power of institutional investors to promote good corporate governance is been blocked by 
specific barriers, as these have been addressed by a recent speech by Ira Millstein in the 
ICGN 2006 Annual Conference. Briefly, Millstein stated that 'institutional investors, under 
any corporate governance system, are not choosing directors very well due to various matters, 
which tip the scale in favour of management interest. Institutional investors should have 
greater impact on the selection and dismissal of directors. Instead, in too many cases, they 
abjure the hard work of using their own heads and judgment in individual situations'. 
Millstein concludes that it is important to identify `the degree to which the system causes 
institutional investors to leave the scale tipped in favour of management. To restore balance 
means dealing with all the vested interests at both ends of the scales and it may well mean 
serious changes in the governance of some of institutional investors'. See, e. g., Millstein, I. 
M., `The Board - Governing Beyond Where the Law Ends', Washington DC, (5 July 2006) at 
5-10. 
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guarantee for business development and the protection of shareholders' rights 
if not coupled with a number of decisive conditions. For the achievement of 
those objectives, it is important that such a corporate culture is in place, so as 
to ensure the strong role of gatekeepers and that an effective whistle-blowing 
mechanism is established. These conditions have been marked as important 
for any corporate governance framework amid the recent corporate scandals in 
the USA and Europe, as analysed above. 
More particularly, the above review of the corporate scandals in the 
USA and Europe that were followed by significant regulatory reforms 
explains that corporate governance matters, since weak corporate governance 
arrangements can have adverse effects on the sound operation and business 
development of corporations. Since then, corporate governance is properly 
understood as an element of managing risk -risk for investors and 
shareholders, whose interests may not be protected by ineffectual or corrupt 
managers and directors, and also risk for employees, communities, lenders, 
suppliers and customers'. 123 
Furthermore, as companies play a pivotal role in economies, good 
corporate governance is important for the economy at large. A legal 
manifestation of that is the prompt corrective action that was initiated after the 
revelations of the aforementioned corporate failures, as analysed. Corporate 
America and Europe were dramatically concerned by those revelations and in 
order to avert potential corporate failures, 124 they introduced improved 
'2' See, e. g., Monks, R. A. G., and N. Minow, Corporate Governance (3`' edn, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd 2004). 
124 See, e. g., Niskanen, W. A., `A Preliminary Perspective on the Major Policy Lessons from 
the Collapse of Enron' (2002) Cato Institute. 
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regulations and enhanced the existing legal framework, aiming to create a 
robust corporate environment. 
More particularly, a new era of a genuinely democratised corporate 
governance process evolves with investors' attention to be directed, inter alia, 
towards independence in the audit process, the introduction of stringent 
compliance and monitoring standards in the company, the development of 
enhanced rules with regard to disclosure and the imposition of penalties in the 
event of non-compliance. 
Furthermore, those collapses and the legal reforms that followed 
revealed not only the importance of good corporate governance but also raised 
the increasing need and priority to restore confidence in the gatekeeping 
professions and promote good ethical governance. The review of those 
wrongdoings demonstrated conduct that severely undermined confidence in 
the democracy of companies and the transparency expected from good ethical 
governance. 125 Therefore, in the context of those scandals, the detrimental 
consequences of weak internal auditing structures, financial reporting fraud 
and overall inadequate internal control systems were revealed by the demise 
of the corporations concerned. 
Taking into account those critical elements, the focus now shifts to 
those factors that seem to have threatened the realisation of good corporate 
governance and the achievement of its dual scope (i. e. business development 
and the protection of shareholders' rights). In this setup, the discussion is 
centred on the existence of a corporate culture focusing on setting professional 
corporate values and targets and ensuring a strong voice for gatekeepers as a 
lu See, e. g., Kirkbride, J., and S. Letza, `Corporate Governance and Gatekeeper Liability: the 
Lessons from Public Authorities' (2003) 11(3) CG 262,263. 
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means of checks and balances that is coupled with effective whistle-blowing 
mechanisms. 
Understanding the Gatekeeping Rationale upon Which the Gatekeepers' 
Role Rests 
Significantly, whereas Enron's failure was primarily perceived as an 
unprecedented accounting scandal, it is argued that Enron is more a 
demonstration of gatekeeper failure than just simply an accounting fraud and 
embezzlement. 126 In other words, gatekeepers (as the reputational 
intermediaries responsible for confirming the prudent and transparent 
operation of the organization) let the market down, failing in their monitoring 
role. In practice, as the independence and objectivity of gatekeepers is eroded, 
externalities are likely to follow, namely, the cost of capital may rise slightly; 
the market efficiency should suffer; and the corporate governance will 
increasingly be distorted by inaccurate informational inputs. Therefore, 
corporate governance depends upon gatekeepers to protect the interests of 
investors by monitoring the behaviour of corporate insiders and by reporting 
the financial results of corporate performance in an accurate and unbiased 
fashion that permits objective valuation of the firm. 127 Additionally, American 
corporate directors depend upon their gatekeepers to a certain point that even 
a strongly competent board of directors is a prisoner of its gatekeepers. 128 
126 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `Understanding Enron: It's about the Gatekeepers, Stupid' 
(2002) 57 Bus Law 1403,1405. 
'27 Id. at 1406. 
128 It is important to distinguish the case of corporate directors in Europe, since it is 
substantially different given the fact that ownership is more concentrated, contrary to the 
dispersed ownership of most US corporations, therefore the controlling shareholder in most 
cases has sufficient information about the company and its management. See, e. g., Coffee, J. 
C., `Why Didn't the Watchdogs Bark? ' (2007) The Conference Board Review (an interview 
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It follows that addressing the question `why did gatekeepers let 
management engage in fraud' is critical in order to unravel, inter alia, the"'. 
Enron debacle129 and capture more on their role. To that end, gatekeepers' 
scope of liability, duties, and importance of their profession is discussed upon 
which the later analysis takes place. A cross examination of the role of 
gatekeepers in theory and in practice within the context of the corporate 
scandals reveals in the most prominent way their failing role. 
To start with, the gatekeepers' role and its theoretical underpinnings 
can be best understood within the context of Kraakman's work that touches 
upon, for the first time, the issue of gatekeepers' liability. 130 In more precise 
terms, the author describes this notion as `the attempts to force a portion of the 
enforcement burden onto firm participants, who are not themselves the 
initiators of corporate delicts'. For instance, in some firms, sometimes top 
managers-executives choose to gamble personal liability against the returns of 
bribery, price fixing or even third party fraud. These executives may simply 
be risk lovers or they may simply chance upon particularly illegal 
opportunities. But whatever the circumstances and motivation, it is certain 
that they do not gamble their careers and personal freedom expecting to be 
caught. Evidently, the problem rests both on the lack of adequate sanctions 
and the inefficient means of deterrence and detection, with emphasis on the 
by A. J. Vogl), at 1. The latter state of affairs can be to a larger extent found in the case of 
family firms, where the owner usually is member of the family board (and can be argued that 
gatekeepers have limited role to play). 
129 See, e. g., Coffee, J. C., `Why Didn't the Watchdogs Bark? ' (2007) The Conference Board 
Review (an interview by A. J. Vogl), at 1. 
130 See, e. g., Kraakman, R., `Corporate Liability, Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls' 
(1984) 93 Yale LJ 857. 
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later. Precisely, this deficiency is termed by Kraakman `enforcement 
insufficiency'. 131 
It was this `enforcement insufficiency' that led Kraakman to put 
forward the so-called gatekeepers approach as an alternative strategy to deal 
with this deficiency. The gatekeepers approach is a third party enforcement 
strategy that relies on the fact that it may be easier to deter a third party, who 
has less to gain than an entrepreneur, who has a significant stake in a 
questionable transaction. 132 Hence, there is a possibility that civil or criminal 
liability can induce firm participants outside the circle of controlling managers 
to discover and prevent offences. These outsiders are potentially gatekeepers. 
Interestingly, the liability is imposed on an entirely new class of 
innocent gatekeepers (along with, of course, controlling managers) to reduce 
enforcement costs, the frequency of offences or even both. In other words, the 
gatekeepers are there because managers and the board of directors need to be 
checked. 133 Additionally, true gatekeeper liability is designed to enlist the 
support of outside participants in the firm when controlling managers commit 
offences, i. e. when the firm's internal monitors and checks have failed. 
Inherently, gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries, who provide 
verification, certification services to investors and they assess the disclosures 
that they receive. 134 Corporations have hired these independent professionals 
131 See, e. g., Kraakman, R., `Corporate Liability, Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls' 
(1984) 93 Yale LJ 857,858 and 867. ' 
132 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting' (2001) Centre of Law and 
Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 191. 
133 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance' in J. 
W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American Business (MIT 
Press 2005), at 9-33. 
134 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting' (2001) Centre of Law and 
Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 191. Gilson and Kraakman were 
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to add credibility to financial statements that corporate managers prepare, to 
reduce financial misstatement risk for investors, and to certify that financial 
statements are fairly presented in all material respects. 135 Specifically, these 
professionals are: (a) the auditor, who has a responsibility to limit some types 
of corporate misconduct risk by searching for possible financial statement 
fraud on the part of management and for extreme self-serving biases in the 
corporations' accounting choices and by disclosing known material illegal 
acts by the corporation; 136 (b) the debt-rating agency that evaluates the 
issuer's creditworthiness; (c) the securities analyst, who communicates an 
assessment of the corporation's competitiveness or earnings prospects; (d) the 
investment banker, who furnishes its fairness opinion as to the pricing of a 
merger 137; (e) the securities lawyer for the issuer, who delivers an opinion to 
the underwriters that all material information of which the lawyer is aware 
concerning the issuer has been disclosed properly and writes a report that 
raises questions about the company's performance; 138 and (0 the press (vis-a- 
probably the first to employ the concept, without then naming it, when they described 
underwriters as `reputational intermediaries'. See, e. g., Gilson, R. J., and R. H. Kraakman, 
`The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency' (1984) 70 Va L Rev 549. 
135 See, e. g., Kinney Jr., W. R., `The Auditor as Gatekeeper: a Perilous Expectations Gap' in 
J. W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American Business (MIT 
Press 2005), at 99-107. 
136 Kinney's analysis touches upon three fundamental categories of risks that auditors are 
expected to tackle: (i) financial misstatement risk; (ii) corporate business risk; and (iii) 
corporate misconduct risk. Id. 
137 For instance, in the case of a public offering although sometimes the company is not 
widely-known, yet the fact that a top-tier investment company is underwriting it, amounts to 
the fact that the company is certified by the top-tier investment company and the latter has 
investigated the company and conducted due diligence on it, found it to be sound. See, e. g., 
Coffee, J. C., `Why Didn't the Watchdogs Bark? ' (2007) The Conference Board Review (an 
interview by A. J. Vogl), at 1. 
138 There is an open debate on whether attorneys can be potential gatekeepers. Sceptics of any 
gatekeeper role for attorneys have long argued that such a role (1) conflicts with the 
traditional obligations of loyalty that attorneys owe their clients, and (2) will chill attorney- 
client communications. See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda 
for the SEC' (2003) 103 Colum L Rev 1293,1293. 
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vis business journalism) that has an acknowledged responsibility to protect the 
public interest by reviewing and disclosing corporate misconduct. 139 
By and large, gatekeepers can be drafted from among the many 
outsiders, who supply specialised expertise to the managers of corporations 
and facilitate their relations with constituencies outside the firm. Despite their 
disparate role, it is easy to see why the aforementioned professionals are likely 
targets for a gatekeeper liability strategy. Each has or might have low cost 
access to information about wrongdoing within the company. Contractually or 
informally, each already performs a private monitoring service on behalf of 
the capital markets. But most importantly, each is an outsider with a career 
and assets beyond the firm, namely each is an independent professional. At 
the very least, each of these potential gatekeepers face incentives that differ 
systematically from those of inside managers; in the usual case, they are likely 
to have less to gain and more to lose from such wrongdoing than inside 
managers. 140 Hence, theoretically, the existence of the gatekeeper offers an 
effective deterrence strategy. 
On the theory that the gatekeeper will receive little, if anything, from 
corporate involvement in crime or misconduct, it may be assumed that they 
can be deterred more easily than the corporation or its managers, who may 
profit handsomely from crime and wrongdoing. Indeed, gatekeepers' liability 
can jeopardize not only the personal interests of individual lawyers and 
accountants, but also the ' larger interests and reputations of their respective 
firms or even their entire professions. In fact, gatekeepers' relative credibility 
139 See, e. g., Overholser, G., 'Journalists and the Corporate Scandals: What Happened to the 
Watchdog? ' in J. W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American 
Business (MIT Press 2005) 145-155. 
140 See, e. g., Kraakman, R., 'Corporate Liability, Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls' 
(1984) 93 Yale LJ 857,891. 
71 
M, 
stems from the fact that, in theory, the reputational capital that they have built 
up over many years of performing similar services for numerous clients will 
not be sacrificed for a single client and a modest fee. Thus, the gatekeeper, in 
effect, pledges reputational capital, which they would not rationally sacrifice, 
and that is the rationale behind their key role in maintaining the integrity of a 
firm'4' 
If these gatekeepers can detect offences, it will be difficult -or at least 
very costly- to entice them into a conspiracy. Many offences will fail because 
some of these outsiders will prove impossible to corrupt, other will fail 
because the_ price of corruption exceeds its potential benefits, and still others 
will never be attempted in the expectation that they would fail for either 
reason. Therefore, the primary aim is for gatekeeper liability theory to stop a 
class of offences that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial 
sanction. '42 
Yet, the theory that envisages all the aforementioned assumptions has 
been dramatically challenged by the recent corporate governance collapses. 143 
It has been argued that during the 1990s auditors became compromised both 
by a combination of reduced legal risks for acquiescing in financial 
141 Essentially, these gatekeepers are meant to vet offerings and their reputations are supposed 
to serve as the check on their thoroughness. See, e. g., Sale, H. A., `Gatekeepers, Disclosure 
and Issuer Choice' (2003) 81 Wash ULQ 403,403. Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
motivations for gatekeepers are not only their reputational capital but also the possibility of 
facing legal liability that significantly exceeds the benefits from acquiescence. See, e. g., 
Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor 
Independence and the Governance of Accounting' (2001) Centre of Law and Economic 
Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 191. 
142 See, e. g., Kraakman, R., `Corporate Liability, Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls' 
(1984) 93 Yale LJ 857,891. 
143 On the gatekeepers' failure, see, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., 'Understanding Enron: It's about the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid' (2002) 57 Bus Law 1403,1405. In brief, the failure of Gatekeepers can 
be explained on the basis of three different approaches. Whereas the first one considers that 
gatekeepers have lost their independence for reasons tied to the fact that acquiescence in 
wrongdoings favoured by management significantly exceeds the benefits from reporting 
them; the second approach points to the corporate culture as being the underlying reason for 
such misconduct; and finally, the third approach considers the lack of an effective system of 
protecting potential whistle blowers. 
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irregularities and heightened benefits that corporate management could 
bestow on acquiescent auditors in the form of highly lucrative consulting 
work. In recent years, auditors have been criticised for allowing excessive 
misconduct risk by not correcting small biases in managers' accounting 
choices and for failing to warn investors about corporate business risk, poor 
decisions by management and lax internal controls. '44 To that also contributes 
the lack of competition and, more particularly, the fact that modem audit 
firms do not operate in an environment of perfect competition, where if an 
auditor misses a fraud, its reputation will be hurt, and there will be many audit 
firms capable of seeking to take his/her client. On the contrary, auditors can 
afford to be a little less protective about their reputation when it comes to 
displeasing their client. 145 
In practice, certain gatekeepers let investors down and they did not do 
their jobs-especially in the last decade. '46 Enron in the USA and Parmalat in 
Europe (Italy) are the most typical demonstration of this. Referring in 
particular to the Enron, under the US federal system of regulation, the 
gatekeepers are the ones charged with reviewing the merits of the offering or 
other transaction. After the Enron scandal, no one doubts that the gatekeeper- 
accountants failed the market. 147 Similarly, lawyers and investment banks 
14' See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `Understanding Enron: It's about the Gatekeepers, Stupid' 
(2002) 57 Bus Law 1403,1405; and Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An 
Agenda for the SEC' (2003) 103 Colum L Rev 1293,1293. 
14 See, e. g., Coffee, J. C., `Why Didn't the Watchdogs Bark? ' (2007) The Conference Board 
Review (an interview by A. J. Vogl), at I and 2. 
146 Id. 
'47 See, e. g., Powers Commission Report, 'Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation' (2002) February (the Powers 
Report). The climax of one of the most notorious corporate scandals in US history was 
marked by the jury verdict that made its announcement on its sixth day of deliberations. On 
25 May 2006, the jury found Ken Lay, Enron ex-CEO, guilty of all six counts and Jeff 
Skilling, Enron ex-CEO, was convicted on fraud and conspiracy on 19 of the 28 counts 
against him. On 5 July 2006, Lay dies of an apparent heart attack and Skilling's sentencing is 
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failed. Precisely, Enron's lawyers at Vinson & Elkins were reportedly 
involved in the structuring of the partnership deals and were unwilling to 
listen to warnings about the `dubious nature' of those deals. 148 Apparently, the 
lawyers also warned in-house counsel of their fears they had about Enron 
deals and when `rebuffed by Mr. Fastow'; 149 they repeatedly refrained from 
speaking to other senior executives of the Board. Ironically, the Board was the 
designated client. '50 Similarly, the investment banks were subject to criticism 
as well. For instance, the investment bank, Merrill Lynch, reportedly fired its 
analyst, who angered Enron officers by rating the stock neutral. 151 Finally, the 
press (media) failed in its watchdog role mainly due to lack of business 
journalism and reporting. In principle, it is harder to do business reporting and 
a fundamental deficiency is the lack of financial sophistication and sceptical 
questioning. 152 
Thus, the important lesson revealed from the Enron collapse is that 
every link in the audit chain failed to discover its weak financial status and to 
act to correct this condition- including the audit committee of the board, the 
board itself, the presumably independent auditor, the market specialists in 
Enron stock, the stock exchange, Enron's major creditors, the credit rating 
scheduled for 23 October 2006. (For a full coverage of the Enron trial, visit 
httD: //www. washingtonpost. corn/). 
148 See, e. g., Kranhold, K., `Law Firm Reassured Enron on Accounting' Wall Street Journal 
(New York, 1& 16 January 2002) Al 8. 
149 Mr A. Fastow was the Chief Financial Officer of Enron Corporation from 1998-2002, and 
then he was fired. Mr. Fastow is expected to serve a 10-year prison sentence after admitting 
he masterminded fraudulent bookkeeping schemes. See, e. g., Babineck, M., M. Flood and J. 
Roper, `Enron Jurors Find Lay, Skilling Guilty' Houston Chronicle (26 May 2006). 
150 See, e. g., Pollock, E. J., `Lawyers for Enron Faulted its Deals, Didn't Force Issue' Wall 
Street Journal (22 May 2002) Al. 
151 See, e. g., Opell Jr., R. A., `Merrill Replaced Research Analyst Who Upset Enron' The New 
York Times (30 July 2002); Smith, R., `The Analyst Who Warned About Enron' Wall Street 
Journal (29 January 29 2002) Cl; and Smith, R., and A. Raghavan, `Congress Probes Merrill- 
Enron Deals' Wall Street Journal (30 July 2002) Cl. 
152 See, e. g., Overholser, G., `Journalists and the Corporate Scandals: What Happened to the 
Watchdog? ' in J. W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American 
Business (MIT Press 2005) 145-155. 
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agencies, the Securities Exchange Committee (SEC), the business journalists 
and finally the presumably reliable gatekeepers. 153 Although each group had 
some opportunity (and some an explicit professional obligation) to constrain 
corporate management and to safeguard public's trust in business, yet no one 
in, the audit chain appeared to have had a sufficient `incentive' to discover and 
report the truth. Clearly, each of these groups got caught up in powerful 
market pressures that undermined their commitment to `doing the right thing', 
whether for clients, the general public, or both. In a handful of instances, a 
culture of greed compromised professionalism and produced rampant 
conflicts of interest on the part of professional service providers. '54 
If one expects from gatekeepers to report corporate business risk and 
corporate misconduct risk, then adequate incentives for them to do so must be 
in place, like for instance, a whistle blowing protection mechanism and/or a 
mechanism for compensating gatekeepers, who act in the public's interest. On 
the contrary, every party seemed to have been seriously discouraged from 
raising his concerns and acted as a `free rider', hoping that someone else 
would reveal the truth and would perform the necessary audit role. '55 
Overall, gatekeepers are interposed between investors and managers in 
order to play a public watchdog role or a corporate responsibility gatekeeper 
for regulators that reduce the agency costs of corporate governance officials, 
stakeholders and the general public in order to protect them from careless and 
imprudent corporate executives. Ultimately, absent effective gatekeepers, it is 
153 See, e. g., Niskanen, W. A., `A Preliminary Perspective on the Major Policy Lessons from 
the Collapse of Enron' (2002) Cato Institute, at 6. 
154 See, e. g., Corporate Responsibility Steering Committee of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, `Report of the American Academy's Corporate Responsibility Steering 
Committee' in J. W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American 
Business (MIT Press 2005) 161-165. 
155 See, e. g., Niskanen, W. A., `A Preliminary Perspective on the Major Policy Lessons from 
the Collapse of Enron' (2002) Cato Institute. 
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reasonable to believe that market efficiency will be lower, the cost of capital 
higher and the structure of corporate governance imperilled. '56 
The Failing Corporate Culture amid the Absence of Effective 
Whistleblowers' Protection Mechanisms 
Building on the discussion of factors that can hinder the realisation of 
the positive effects of good corporate governance, more institutions and 
factors (internal and external) are identified. As aforementioned, during a 
period of unparalleled economic growth, social and technological 
advancement and highly visible corporate misconduct, large-scale corporate 
scandals were documented to have deeper causes than just managerial 
opportunism and self-dealing practices. 
Notwithstanding the failing role of gatekeepers, -as revealed by the 
cross examination of their responsibilities in theory and in practice, likewise 
the lack of such a corporate culture -a corporate governance driven one- that 
would ensure the achievement of the dual corporate governance objectives 
(business development and the protection of shareholders' rights) is regarded 
as a critical component for the deepening of corporate failures. As a matter of 
fact those two issues (corporate culture and gatekeepers) are strongly 
interrelated, since it is expected that a corporate culture, as defined above, will 
be the main condition for ensuring two facts. First is that the corporate 
governance objectives are met. Second is that the role of gatekeepers is 
enhanced. 
156 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, 
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting' (2001) Centre of Law and 
Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 191. 
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Therefore, in what follows, a review of the importance of establishing 
such a corporate culture is undertaken, arguing for its positive contribution to 
good corporate governance by setting professional corporate values and 
objectives and by facilitating the performance of gatekeepers' role. Finally, 
effective whistle-blowing protection mechanisms are discussed as a means to 
protect shareholders' rights and ensure company's sound functioning and 
performance. Similarly, the existence of such mechanism significantly 
facilitates gatekeepers' role to the extent that their voices can now be heard. 
By definition, corporate culture describes all the web of relations, 
procedures and traditions within a company. In essence, it is the corporate 
culture that drives the organization and determines its actions, it guides how 
employees think, act and feel and it has been reckoned as the `operating 
system' of the organization. '57 
Although some firms have been well known for their excellent and 
sophisticated corporate governance mechanisms, yet due to their corrupt 
corporate culture they could not avoid the failure. In certain cases, the people 
of a company may be very good and ethical people, who acted wrongly for 
reasons tied to corporate culture and societal expectations. More particularly, 
as reports from inside Enron came out, it appears that many people were 
concerned about the company's questionable financial practices but yet no 
one raised the question. 158 In any case, the Enron executives created a culture 
of greed, corruption, deception and self-enrichment that not only permeated 
157 She, e. g., Hagberg, R., and J. Heifetz, 'Corporate Culture / Organizational Culture: 
Understanding and Assessment. Telling the CEO his/her Baby is Ugly' (2000) (Note, Hagberg 
Consulting Group). 
'5 See, e. g., Powers Commission Report, 'Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation' (2002) February. 
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the highest levels of management but also those were the persons that 
prolonged and maintained it. 
Considering also the fact that in the aftermath of the Enron collapse 
concentrated pervasive reform and government regulation was effectuated, the 
real flaw in this organization is one that no amount of regulation is able to 
fully address: a corporate culture, which preserved bad corporate foundations 
and corrupted internal structures or in other words an intrinsically rotten 
corporate culture. Therefore, although individuals are responsible for their 
actions, however, unethical or illegal individual actions are sometimes 
symptoms of systemic problems and practices within the company. 159 Against 
this background, the detrimental effects of such rotten corporate culture are 
reflected, followed by a dramatic deepening of the impact of corporate 
collapses. 
From a theoretical perspective, a corporate culture can make it hard (or 
even impossible) for ethical objections to be heard and even when they are 
heard, it fails to create appropriate internal structures so that those voices are 
taken seriously. 160 Such corporate culture is designed to suppress truth and 
transparency, followed by a situation where everyone in the corporation 
knows the truth but nobody ever tells it to anyone else. 161 Ultimately, the 
result is that ethical people are forced to remain silent when they see the most 
highly rewarded people in the firm to be the ones, who commit some of the 
worst wrongdoings. 
159 See, e. g., Clark, K. B., `Corporate Scandals: Is it a Problem of Bad Apples or Is It the 
Barrel? ' (Remarks prepared for the National Press Club, 26 February 2003, Harvard Business 
School). 
160 See, e. g., Powers Commission Report, 'Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation' (2002) February. 
161 See, e. g., Pitt, H., 'Instilling a Corporate Culture of Integrity, Ethics and Compliance- 
Setting the Tone at the Top' Compliance Week Columnist (28 September 2004). 
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In this connection, it appears that a critical factor for understanding a 
corporate culture is the extent to which the latter is leader-centric. 162 This is 
important, because the culture of a firm is likely to reflect the personality and 
attitude of the company's leaders. The behaviour that is modelled by the 
leader and the management team profoundly shapes and influences the final 
formation of the culture and the practices adopted thereof by the firm and it 
certainly sets the tone of the culture. 163 In a similar vein, the critical role of top 
management is recognised as important in the value maximization of the 
company mainly through its leadership and effectiveness in creating, 
projecting and sustaining the company's strategic vision. 164 
Furthermore, the recent corporate scandals raised important questions 
with regard to the role of a code of ethics in instilling proper corporate 
behaviours, when such code is applied within the context of a corrupt cultural 
environment. For instance, Enron had high ethical standards and it reminded, 
often, their employees about the corporations' ethics. However, after a certain 
point, the top management of the company paid no attention to it and 
consequently, it became destructive. Simply, this happened on the premises of 
the success that the company had, provided that the stress and societal 
expectations at the highest levels of management were so intense that no one's 
ethics could withstand it. 165 
162 For more reflections on the essentials for an ethical corporate culture, see, e. g., Pitt, H., 
`Essentials for an Ethical Corporate Culture' Compliance Week Columnist (25 July 2006); and 
Pitt, H., `Instilling a Corporate Culture of Integrity, Ethics and Compliance- Setting the Tone 
at the Top' Compliance Week Columnist (28 September 2004). 
163 See, e. g., Hagberg, R., and J. Heifetz, 'Corporate Culture / Organizational Culture: 
Understanding and Assessment. Telling the CEO his/her Baby is Ugly' (2000) (Note, Hagberg 
Consulting Group). 
164 See, e. g., Blair, M. M., `Should Directors Be Professionals? ' in J. W. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz 
and A. Zelleke (eds. ), Restoring Trust in American Business (MIT Press 2005), at 79-83. 
'65 See, e. g., Balay, D. H., 'Close Up: Enron Debacle Offers Tough Lessons in Ethics' United 
Methodist News Service (20 May 2002). 
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Understanding the Importance of Establishing Effective Whistle-Blowing 
Mechanisms 
It has been discussed that gatekeepers' role is advanced within the 
context of a sound corporate culture to the extent that they are recognised as 
an ingredient part of the organisational structure of the company. However, 
that alone cannot ensure that gatekeepers' voice will be heard, in the absence 
of an effective mechanism (such as for instance, reporting hotlines and 
websites) that will facilitate gatekeepers, inter alia, to blow-the whistle when 
irregularities take place. Therefore, a sound corporate culture that recognises 
the important role of gatekeepers needs to be coupled with an effective 
protection mechanism for whistleblowers. 
The legal manifestation of that is reflected in the provisions of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act that prescribes, inter alia, increased protection for 
whistleblowers. 166 More particularly, it is provided that: 
(i) Publicly held companies are now required to have a venue in place 
to receive the reports of anonymous whistle-blowers. Section 302 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act states: `each audit committee shall establish procedures 
for the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters 1.167 
'66 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, `Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002). 
167 It is important to note that the Sarbanes Oxley Act requirements regarding whistle blower 
anonymity do not match the EU requirements arising from the European data protections 
laws. The EU-US confusion is created on the grounds that whistle-blowing schemes operating 
within the EU are likely to involve collection of personal date and so are required to comply 
with the EU data protection rules enshrined in the Data Protection Directive (see, e. g., 
Council Directive (EC) 1995/46 of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 
L281/31). Such clash of legal approaches was dramatically highlighted when a French court 
in September 2005 issued an order prohibiting a French subsidiary of McDonalds from 
establishing anonymous whistle blowing procedures on the grounds that EU data protection 
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(ii) After receiving a report, any investigation conducted must comply 
with Section 806 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which states that `no publicly 
traded company, or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent 
of such company may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any 
other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the employee. 
(iii) The Sarbanes Oxley Act provisions have made it clear that 
retaliation against whistle-blowers will not be tolerated. A new Section, 
1513(e), has been added to Title 18 of the U. S. Code. It is now a criminal 
offence to retaliate against whistle-blowers, carrying penalties from a large 
fine to 10 years in prison. 168 
Essentially, the importance of the Sarbanes Oxley Act is centred on 
the fact that it establishes two enforcement regimes -one civil and one 
criminal- to protect people, who report on corporate fraud. 169 The civil 
provision creates a right to reinstatement, back pay and damages for whistle- 
blowers. The criminal provision makes it a felony to retaliate against a 
protected whistle-blower. 
It follows that authorities have, at least from a theoretical point of 
view, recognised the importance of whistle blowers. The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
intends to avert the universal phenomenon of discrediting whistle blowers and 
treating them as betrayers. To that end, in light of the scandals, it creates the 
law prevented the transfer of data without consent, thus placing the US parent company in 
breach of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. See, e. g., Marchini, R., `Conflict of Laws: Whistle- 
Blowing Hotlines under Fire in Europe' (2006) Dechert on Point (Legal Update), August. 
168 See, e. g., Salem, G. R., and L. M. Franze, `The Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002' (2002). 
169 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, `Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002). 
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legal foundation upon which the role of whistle blowers can be significantly 
enhanced. Likewise, for companies and the market at large it is important 
fully to appreciate the gains from offering whistle blowers and employees, 
alternatives to silence, so as to avoid added risks of being denied important 
information. Yet, the success of this legislation remains to be seen. 
In the light of the above, an ethical corporate culture matters, since it 
can bring prosperity and transparency to an organisation. On the contrary, 
when such culture is toxic, it can have adverse and disastrous effects. An 
important aspect of a sound corporate culture is that it provides the framework 
upon which gatekeepers' role can matter for the company as an integral part 
of it. Finally, as it has been revealed from the recent corporate scandals, in 
order for the gatekeepers' voice to be heard, the existence of an effective 
internal whistle-blowing scheme is fundamental. 
Gatekeepers, Corporate Culture, Whistle-Blowers: The Greek 
Perspective 
Recognising that the aforementioned conditions (gatekeepers, whistle- 
blowing mechanisms and corporate culture) can devalue and dramatically 
hinder the achievement of the dual scope of corporate governance (business 
development and the protection of shareholders' rights), the research focus 
shifts to examine the state of these conditions in the specific context of the 
Greek market and the Greek corporations operating thereof. 
The aim of this analysis is twofold. One aim is to show that although 
the above three conditions are not strictly speaking country specific factors (in 
relation to Greece), as the ones that will be extensively discussed at the core 
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of this thesis, they can nevertheless dramatically circumscribe the objectives 
of the Greek corporate governance system. The other is to demonstrate that 
although the structure of the Greek corporate landscape is , 
different from the 
US and other jurisdictions, there are still important lessons for Greece to learn 
from the failures in the US and in Europe (Italy). It is crucial that fundamental 
provisions are devised so as to address those weaknesses in an effort to secure 
the Greek corporate market from similar corporate failures in the future. 
, 
This chapter closes with the examination of three important issues. 
First, what is the role of gatekeepers (if any at all) in the Greek corporate 
market? More essentially, it is examined who are really regarded as 
gatekeepers in the Greek context. Second, what is the Greek corporate 
culture? To what extent is such culture expected to ensure the achievement of 
the dual objectives of corporate governance. Third, what are the whistle- 
blowing mechanisms established to facilitate that wrongdoings are made 
public? How effective are those mechanisms? 
Although most of the discussion is focused on the gatekeeping 
problems in the US market, it has to be noted that the gatekeeping problem is 
not confined to the US market and it is certainly an issue that concerns all 
countries around the world, including Europe. For instance, in the UK, the 
role of analysts in US investment banking and their conflicts of interests 
prompted the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA) to review the work of 
analysts in the banking industry. 170 Similarly, in Germany, German regulators 
170 See, e. g., Financial Services Authority - (FSA), `Investment Research: Conflicts and Other 
Issues' (2002) 15 Discussion Paper (July). 
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were investigating Deutsche Bank for selling 44 million shares of Deutsche 
Telekom one day after publicly restating its `buy' rating. 171 
This discussion as to Greece reveals important insight for the 
corporate landscape and more specifically for the corporate governance 
framework that is set in this jurisdiction. As analysed above, American 
corporate directors depend upon their gatekeepers to a certain point. In such 
state of corporate affairs the strong role of gatekeepers is crucial as a means to 
ensure business development and the protection of shareholders' rights. 
Therefore, it can be explained why in diffuse ownership structures; such as 
those of US corporations, the role of gatekeepers is important, a testament of 
which are the recent corporate failures. 
Putting this discussion on the important role of gatekeepers, as a 
means of checks and balances, into the Greek perspective, a paradox is 
revealed. By definition, in the case of family firms the role of gatekeepers is 
limited. Such importance is mainly determined by the specific ownership 
structures and the fact that family firms are characterised by concentrated 
ownership as opposed to the US diffuse ownership structures. In other words, 
as mentioned in the previous lines of the analysis, in concentrated ownership 
structures the controlling shareholders in most cases have sufficient 
information about the company; therefore the role of gatekeepers appears to 
be limited. On the other side, such state of ownership structures makes the 
presence of independent gatekeepers very relevant. This is so to the extent that 
concentrated ownership structures (e. g. family firms) absent independent 
gatekeepers to warn management about possible corporate wrongdoings are 
171 See, e. g., Miller, S. S., `Chaperoning Analysts: Procedure to Manage, Minimize and 
Disclose Conflicts' (2002) 34 Sec Reg L Rep 879. 
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better able to conceal self-dealing. Therefore, their operation might be to the 
detriment of minority shareholders' interests. 
Although theory presents a paradox, the common practice in the Greek 
context is straightforward: gatekeepers' role is limited. Such limited role may 
to a certain extent excuse the limited range of professionals and intermediaries 
that qualify as gatekeepers. More particularly, auditors are regarded as the 
most common professionals that qualify as gatekeepers. This is due to the fact 
that all companies operating in the Greek market must have their financial 
reports and statements duly signed by qualified auditors. In this sense, 
compliance with specific auditing and accounting rules is secured by auditors. 
However, there are a couple of instances that reveal auditing and accounting 
irregularities, some of which are caught by the monitoring and supervisory 
activities of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC). Similarly and 
most recently, the notorious hedge fund scandal of the Greek Pension Funds 
revealed with the most prominent way the lack of appropriate checks and 
balances with respect to accounting and financial reports. 
Supplementary to the role of auditors as gatekeepers, the watchdog 
role of media is recognised. 172 The Greek media have lately assumed a critical 
role for corporate stability and performance and from a pure sociological 
perspective they perform a major democratic function to the extent that they 
make sure that corporate affairs are as transparent as possible. 173 
172 With the term 'media', we mean the radio, the press, the TV and other electronic media 
and the people associated with them. 
"' The level of presence of media in a society is analogous to the degree of oversight that 
citizens and investors can exert over public bodies and corporations. See, e. g., Fritz, A., 
`Watching the Watchdogs: the Role of the Media in Intelligence Oversight in Germany' 
(2004) Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Working Paper 138. 
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The Greek media, which in their majority are privately owned with 
only limited cases of government ownership, serve as a sort of `unofficial 
opposition' or even as a `fall-back accountability' mechanism. Critical media 
coverage helps to disclose flaws and misconduct, the public debate is 
triggered, questioning in that way the objectives and contents of some policies 
and decisions. Senior management of corporations is more vigilant and 
transparent when taking their decisions to avoid harmful revelations by the 
media. Therefore, the media do exert to some certain extent oversight on 
corporate wrongdoings and assume an important monitoring function for the 
performance of corporations, minimising excesses, and unfair choices. 
However, as in many countries around the world, there is a price to be paid if 
the media attacks key vested interests. 
Apart from the role of auditors and the media as watchdogs, which are 
not strong, other professions (such as lawyers, credit rating agencies, etc. ) that 
could qualify for the gatekeeping monitoring role are not of significance in the 
Greek corporate landscape. As discussed above, such state of affairs is 
partially explained on the grounds of concentrated ownership and the 
dominance of family firms. 
When it comes to discussing the Greek corporate culture one 
important consideration comes to the fore. The presence of the owner in the 
management of the firm `traditionally' incorporates the whole corporate 
governance framework. 174 The owners-managers of those firms exercise their 
power to promote and satisfy their interests, usually coupled with an 
unwillingness to surrender part of their control rights and power in the shake 
174 See, e. g., London Business School, 'Corporate Governance for Corporate Sustainability: 
The Greek Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) Greek Alumni Association (Kantor; Genesis 
Pharma SA). 
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of `good governance practices. 175 Such pattern of ownership concentration 
explains the findings of the London Business School survey for the Greek 
corporate practices to the extent that they find that family firms' governance 
tends not to follow hard laws. Even if there are certain rules and principles, 
the latter are mainly formatted by the existing corporate culture and they only 
cover certain operations of the firm. 
As the main attribute of the Greek family-owned firms is the 
entrenchment of the owners-managers, the initial negative approach towards 
the implementation of corporate governance rules is explained. To the extent 
that a corporate governance system is described as a nexus of rules that 
impose specific obligations to the senior management of a corporation, it 
explains why in some cases, the senior management is not willing to comply 
with rules that could challenge their authority, position, or power. Such 
obligations may appear for family firms as a strong reason for exiting or not 
joining stock exchanges. 176 For instance, the introduction of independent 
members on the Board of Directors is not welcome in family firms because 
that would mean that the family members would have to transfer part of their 
control rights and management power to handful of independent members. 
Therefore, as derives from the above facts, the Greek corporate culture 
is not corporate governance driven but mainly family-driven in the sense that 
175 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 6. 
16 According to the London Business School survey examining the conduct of family firms in 
the Greek capital market concluded that for the period 1945 to 2000, there was a steady 
decline of the number of family firms that were present in the Top 100 of firms (according to 
total assets). While in 1945,80 of the firms were family owned, in 2000 this number declined 
to 15. Evidently, the number of companies with low corporate governance standards (i. e. 
family firms) declines compared to the number of other listed companies in the Top 100 
companies. See, e. g., London Business School, 'Corporate Governance for Corporate 
Sustainability: The Greek Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) Greek Alumni Association 
(Kantor; Genesis Pharma SA), at 21. 
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the issues of priority are the family's interests. Although such corporate 
culture cannot be classified as corrupt, yet it does not secure that the 
objectives of corporate governance are achieved. Business development and 
the protection of shareholders' rights (here minority ones) are safe only as 
long as they satisfy the family's interests. 
Finally, with regard to the issue of whistle-blowing protection 
mechanisms and the role of whistle-blowers it is crucial to mention that there 
are no statutory definitions of a whistleblower either at EU level or in Greece 
specifically. '77 Primarily, although in Greece the whistle-blowing activity is 
limited, as a result of the limited protection, whenever a crime is prevented 
`there is always someone behind the curtains who blew the whistle to the 
appropriate authorities'. 178 
Such limited use of whistle-blowing mechanisms is explained on two 
important grounds. One, it is the fact that there is no developed and adequate 
protection mechanisms for whistleblowers. In this backdrop, although the 
particular position of whistle-blower as an employee or conscientious citizen 
is recognised as a valuable source of information on fraud, there are usually 
practical dilemmas, which are mainly related to little or no protection against 
victimisation. For instance, while employees in some corporations have a 
freedom or competence to disclose information on the fraud of his/her 
employer to the authorities, they are more often than not afforded little or no 
protection against victimisation. 179 
177 See, e. g., Public Concern at Work, 'Whistle-blowing, Fraud and the European Union' 
(1996), at 5. 
18 Id. at 13. 
179 1d. at 14. 
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Two, the limited potentials of whistle-blowing protection mechanisms 
relate to the narrow context in which the whistle-blowing protection a '. 
mechanisms are understood. More particularly, in the Greek context (similar 
to France, Italy and Germany) whistle-blowing is understood to be relevant 
only in the criminal sphere. For example, in Greece a whistle-blower `is a 
person, who informs or makes an accusation against another whom he/she 
suspects of the violation of some penal statute'. 180 Against this backdrop, it 
would be suggested that the activity of whistle-blowing is broadly understood 
to relate to disclosures that have equal validity to breaches to civil and 
criminal law, associating in this setup the concept of whistle-blowing with 
principles of accountability. '8' 
Overall, the examination of these three interrelated issues brings to the 
fore that in the Greek context, first, the role of gatekeepers is rather weak, 
demanding significant progress to be made to further strengthen the role of 
those gatekeepers as watchdogs for corporate wrongdoings. Second, the Greek 
corporate culture is not corporate governance driven but rather family driven, 
added to the fact that the concept of corporate governance is at its infancy for 
Greek corporations. Third, there is lack of whistle-blowing protection 
mechanisms, which makes the role of gatekeepers very difficult so that it is 
very simple for corporate misconducts to remain unknown to the public. 
110 See, e. g., Public Concern at Work, 'Whistle-blowing, Fraud and the European Union' 
(1996), at 13. 
1 81 Id. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A MORE CONTEXTUALISED APPROACH TO THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Purposes of this Chapter 
This chapter seeks to define the theoretical aspects of corporate 
governance and to establish its key theoretical foundations upon which the 
later examination of the corporate governance concept rests. It further seeks to 
propose a particular approach to looking at the theoretical elements of 
corporate governance. The methodology of the study is informed by the 
principal-agent theory, which explains the initial focus of the analysis on 
reviewing this theory, as expressed first by Berle and Means, 
182 reiterated by 
Coase; 183 Jensen and Meckling; 184 Fama and Jensen; ' 85 Aghion and Bolton; 186 
and further clearly articulated by Hart. 
187 
On the key assumptions of the principal-agent theory, the chapter 
develops arguments in favour of a more contextualised approach to corporate 
governance. 
188 Such an approach develops around the proposition that the 
182 See, e. g., Berle, A., and G. Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (The 
Macmillan Company, New York 1932). 
ßs3 See, e. g., Coase, R., `The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
184 See, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, `Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structures' (1976) 3 (4) J Fin Econ 305. 
18 See, e. g., Fama, E., and M. Jensen, `Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983a) 26 JLE 
301; and Fama, E., and M. Jensen, `Agency Problems and Residual Claims' (1983b) 26 JLE 
327. 
186 See, e. g., Aghion, P., and J. Bolton, 'An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting' (1992) 59 (2) Rev Econ S 473. 
187 See, e. g., Hart, 0., `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications' (1995) 105 
(430) Econ J 678. 
118 This term is accredited to Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, and Jackson. 
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diversity of corporate arrangements (mainly relating to the ownership and 
control of firms), specific corporate governance patterns (such as the 
financing of firms), and approaches (e. g. policy responses and disciplining 
mechanisms) are mediated by their fit or alignment with situational variables 
arising in diverse organisational, corporate, and legal environments. The 
significance of such approach is that it explains the reasons for corporate 
governance systems to differ so much across countries. 
At a theoretical level, if the principal-agent theory is viewed from a 
more contextualised approach, it will be evident that the theory is affected by 
different patterns of ownership, legal regimes, and financing modes. Those 
variations manifest themselves in different agency concerns, which in turn 
give rise to different strategies devised to align the operation of the firm with 
the protection of shareholders' rights and the business development (e. g. 
disciplining mechanisms). Therefore, such analysis aims at contributing to the 
general discussion of corporate governance and specifically to those corporate 
governance attributes and the varying disciplining mechanisms. 
In its narrowest perspective, the benefits of such contextual view of 
the principal-agent theory are to better understand the Greek corporate 
governance arrangements and how the Greek corporate governance system 
differs from other systems. For this purpose, and besides the specific focus on 
the Greek situation, a brief reference to other jurisdictions (such as the USA, 
UK, Germany and Japan) is also made. This is important, mainly, because in 
the context of the increasing activism in the sphere of corporate governance 
around the globe, strong influence from the corporate governance practices of 
other countries and legal regimes can be observed. Therefore, such 
contextualized discussion will prove very useful for practitioners and policy 
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makers interested in applying corporate governance in particular situations 
and regimes. 
Furthermore, the argument for a more contextualized approach to 
corporate governance has additional advantages, primarily, in terms of legal 
and policy responses to defaults. As analyzed in the previous chapter, in light 
of the aforementioned corporate governance scandals, heated debate has 
emerged on the appropriateness of different policy responses based on hard 
law or regulation that draws upon soft law (such as codes based on `comply or 
explain' principles). Therefore, such approach may help explain why in 
Greece the corporate governance framework follows the spirit and the letter of 
the OECD best practices and recommendations, it strongly considers the UK 
codes approach based on the `comply or explain' principles and at the same 
time reveals a tendency to look to the US hard law approach to regulation. 
The Structure of this Chapter 
The second chapter seeks to discuss the corporate governance concept, 
based on the principal-agent theory, following a more contextualized 
approach. It intends to contribute to the theoretical discussion of corporate 
governance and aid better understanding of the varying corporate governance 
patterns across jurisdictions, primarily focusing on the Greek case. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, a brief review of the 
principal-agent theory takes place, given that much of corporate governance 
research is based on a universal model outlined by this theory. Second, on the 
basis of the diversity of corporate governance arrangements, a discussion of 
those context-dependent variables is undertaken in an attempt to challenge the 
ý'ýý. 
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universal character of this model. In this setup, three main legal dimensions 
are examined. The first is the concentrated and diffuse ownership structures, 
including a special aspect of concentrated ownership, that of family-owned 
firms, which are especially relevant as to Greece. The second element is the 
legal traditions, namely civil law as compared to common law, and vice versa. 
The third relates to the source of financing, a context-dependent variable that 
is used to separate the market-oriented from the bank-oriented corporate 
governance system. What therefore emerges from the above is that there 
appear to exist variations on the principal-agent theoretical assumptions and 
the agency concerns that arise thereof. 
Third, the question that the above assumptions raise is what 
differences do these varying agency concerns have for the way in which 
mechanisms are devised to protect shareholders' rights and ensure business 
development. Against this backdrop, the main disciplining mechanisms are 
analysed, discussing in parallel the appropriateness of those measures in 
achieving the objectives of corporate governance when applied in specific 
contexts. 
Finally, the chapter closes with the discussion on the convergence of 
corporate governance practices. Such analysis takes place on the grounds that 
pressures for change have been argued to lead to the convergence of various 
corporate governance practices and to the consequent call for agencies in 
individual countries to assess the introduction of new corporate mechanisms, 
so as to compete in the new global corporate governance environment. 
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2. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
The underlying problem of corporate governance, as recognised by a 
long tradition of scholars stretching back from Berle and Means, 189 is not 
solely the separation of ownership and control, management and finance or as 
Berle and Means put it, the `massive dissociation of wealth from active 
management'. ' The real problem is atomization, in the sense that individuals 
seek their own interests. 190 
In the state of affairs as discussed by Berle and Means, shareholders 
no longer have any real voice in how the corporation is being run and 
management is only theoretically accountable to the board of directors. An 
active shareholder, who more often than not owns only a small stake, has 
limited monitoring contribution and is characterised by lack of incentive to 
act. At the same time, most fragmented shareholders rationally forego 
involvement in management monitoring. 191 Accordingly, directors do not 
themselves have significant ownership interests in the property beneficially 
owned by others but they are entrusted with powers to use in the interest of 
others. This separation of ownership and control is important to the extent that 
it allows managers to deviate from shareholder value maximisation, given the 
fact that the interests and objectives of the principal (the investors) and the 
189 See, e. g., Berle, A., and G. Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (The 
Macmillan Company, New York 1932). 
190 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) 
Colum L Rev 10,12. 
191 This is the literal definition of a `free riding' state of affairs. `Free riding' or the `free rider 
problem' describes the situation when individuals could receive the benefits from group 
activity (or the activity of another individual) without bearing their proportional share of the 
costs. For more information on the concept of `free riding' within the social science literature, 
see, e. g., McMillan, J., `The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey' (1979) 55 (149) The Economic 
Record 95; within the organisational economics literature, see, e. g., Alchian, A. A., and H. 
Demsetz, `Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation' (1972) 62 (5) Am 
Econ Rev 777; and within the context of the principal-agent theory, see, e. g., Jensen, M. C., 
and W. H. Meckling, `The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure' (1976) 3 (4) J Fin Econ 305. 
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agent (the managers) differ. Hence, such conflict of interest is the first 
composite element of the agency theory. 
Furthermore, the second key element of the principal-agent theory is 
the incompleteness of contracts. The contractual view of the firm was 
developed by Coase; 192 Jensen and Meckling; 193 Fama and Jensen; 194 Aghion 
and Bolton; 195 and Hart. 196 In this context, the agency problem refers to the 
difficulties that financiers have in assuring that their funds are not 
expropriated. To that end, financiers and managers sign a contract, which 
specifies ex ante what the manager may do with the funds and how the profits 
are to be allocated. However, due to the fact that complete contracts are 
technically unfeasible, investors allocate 'residual control rights' to 
managers, i. e. the rights to make decisions in unforeseen circumstances or in 
circumstances not covered by the contract. 
Theoretically, financiers would exchange sinking their funds with 
retaining all residual control rights. But in practice, this is difficult for various 
reasons, but primarily due to asymmetric information problems, whereby 
typically financiers do not have the same degree or quality of information as 
managers do. 197 Therefore, it appears that managers are better informed and 
192 See, e. g., Coase, R., 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
193 See, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, `Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structures' (1976) 3 (4) J Fin Econ 305. 
19 See, e. g., Fama, E., and M. Jensen, `Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983a) 26 JLE 
301; and Fama, E., and M. Jensen, `Agency Problems and Residual Claims' (1983b) 26 JLE 
327. 
195 See, e. g., Aghion, P., and J. Bolton, `An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting' (1992) 59 (2) Rev Econ S 473. 
'96 See, e. g., Hart, 0., `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications' (1995) 105 
(430) Econ J 678,679-680. 
197 The asymmetrical information situation that was first described by Kenneth J. Arrow in a 
seminal article on health care (See, e. g., Arrow, K. J., `Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care' (1963) 53 (5) Am Econ Rev 941) is the case when asymmetric 
information creates incentives for the party with more information to cheat the party with less 
information. Importantly, Akerlof later used the term asymmetric information in his work so 
as to establish the fundamentals of asymmetrical information theory (See, e. g., Akerlof, G., 
95 
n' . 
M1 
better qualified on taking decisions -the reason that financiers hired managers 
in the first place. Consequently, managers end up with more extensive and " 
more significant control rights, which trigger the danger of managerial 
expropriation of funds and shareholders. At this juncture, lays the rationale for 
corporate governance as a means to constraint managerial opportunism by 
creating appropriate decision structures. 198 Essentially, corporate governance 
is called to strengthen managerial accountability and to ensure good 
governance structures in a firm, so that in turn investors to be encouraged for 
efficient investments. 199 Ultimately, corporate governance is mainly 
concerned with finding ways to align the interests of managers with those of 
investors. 00 
Overall, the principal-agent theory, as the dominant academic view of 
the corporate form of business organization, rests on the premises that 
corporate governance issues arise in an organisation whenever two conditions 
are present. First, there is an agency problem or conflict of interest. 201 Second, 
that transaction costs are such that this agency problem cannot be dealt with 
through a complete contract. 202 Instead, an incomplete contract will be written 
`The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism' (1970) 84 (3) QJ 
Econ 488). 
198 Managerial opportunism is the case in which managers are acting in such a way so as to 
protect their private benefits of control rather than to serve the interests of shareholders. See, 
e. g., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, `A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 
737,737. 
199 See, e. g., Maher, M., and T. Andersson, `Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm 
Performance and Economic Growth' (1999) OECD. 
200 See, e. g., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 'A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 
(2) J Fin 737,737. 
201 See, e. g., Hart, 0., `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications' (1995) 105 
(430) Econ J 678,678. 
202 Id. 
96 
a: 
and residual control rights will be allocated with corporate governance 
arrangements to be the basic solutions to these problems. 03 
3. THE CONTEXT-DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Introduction 
In a historic context, the fundamentals of the principal-agent theory, as 
analysed in the previous section, mainly describe an Anglo-Saxon state of 
affairs, which is characterised, inter alia, by diffuse ownership, sharp 
separation between ownership and control, strong legal protection of 
shareholders, and little reliance on bank finance. However, the principal-agent 
theory seems to overlook the significant variations of corporate arrangements, 
which as the corporate governance literature has documented those are, inter 
alia, the different ownership structures, legal traditions, and the reliance on 
external capital204 The principal agent theory has been developed and 
explored mainly by US-based academics, which accounts for lack of attention 
to other systems. 
Primarily, on the premises of the `nexus of contracts' theory, 205 agency 
problems may depend on the type of the contract that is signed, which in turn 
depends on a number of considerations, such as the ownership structure, the 
203 See, e. g., Hart, 0., `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications' (1995) 105 
(430) Econ J 678,678. 
204 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, `Law and 
Finance' (1998) 106 J Pol Econ 1113; La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 
`Corporate Ownership Around the World' (1999) 54 (2) J Fin 471; and Shleifer, A. and R. W. 
Vishny, `A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737. 
205 According to the `nexus of contract' theory, it is asserted that corporations are nothing 
more than a collection of contracts between different parties, primarily shareholders, 
directors, employees, suppliers and customers. This theory is often associated with Jensen and 
Meckling. See, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, `The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' (1976) 3 (4) J Fin Econ 305. Also, see, 
e. g., Hart, 0., `An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm' (1989) 89 (7) Colum L 
Rev 1757,1764. 
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legal tradition, etc. Therefore, in an attempt to explain the varying corporate 
arrangements, the principal-agent theory is examined against three different ý'". 
legal dimensions. First, when it comes to ownership patterns, the main inquiry 
relates to how much they own (referring to concentrated or diffuse ownership 
structures) and who owns corporations (families, banks, etc. ). Second, it is 
argued that national legal differences, namely common-law versus civil-law 
legal traditions, are strongly associated with varied corporate governance 
outcomes. Third, the role of different types of financial systems, and their 
capacity to provide external finance to firms (source of financing) is relevant. 
All these comparative variables may help explain why corporate governance 
systems differ quite substantially around the world. They particularly define 
the nature of the agency concerns, which are strongly associated with the 
range of those tools used to alleviate such concerns. 
The main argument developed using a more contextualised approach is 
that on the grounds of the diversity of corporate arrangements (relating to the 
ownership and control of firms; legal regimes; and the financing of firms), 
specific corporate governance patterns and approaches (e. g. policy responses 
and disciplining mechanisms) are mediated by their fit or alignment with 
situational variables arising in diverse organisational, corporate and legal 
environments. 
Notwithstanding that the universality of the principal-agent theory is 
fundamentally challenged, still this theory provides the basis for explaining 
the general corporate governance framework. However, the principal-agent 
theory presents a limited view of corporate governance,. since there are the 
specific corporate arrangements that are determined by situational patterns, 
which further define the variations in the agency concerns and demand 
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different agency responses. The latter is evidently manifested by the different 
disciplining mechanisms that are devised to alleviate such concerns, as will be ý'. 
analysed below. 
Ownership Structures: the Conflict between Concentrated and Diffuse 
Ownership 
The main question raised is the extent to which conflicts between 
managers and owners are the norm. Absent a global and uniform ownership 
structure of firms, it appears that the specific ownership structure determines 
the nature and the individual attributes of that conflict and affects the nature of 
the agency problems between managers and other stakeholders. 206 
In more precise terms, when ownership is widely dispersed, as is 
typical for the US and the UK corporations, 207 the agency problems stem from 
the conflicts of interests between outside shareholders and managers, who 
own an insignificant amount of equity in the firm208 In that context, the 
primary aim of corporate governance is to minimize managerial expropriation, 
to strengthen managerial accountability, and to protect the interests of outside 
(usually minority) shareholders. This is the most dominant aspect of the 
principal agent theory, as applied in the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model. 
Zoe See, e. g., Claessens, S., `Corporate Governance and Development: Review of the 
Literature and Outstanding Research Issues' (GCG Forum Donors Meeting, 13 March 2003, 
The Hague). 
207 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, `What Works in Securities 
Laws? ' (2006) 61 (1) J Fin 1. 
208 See, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, `Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structures' (1976) 3 (4) J Fin Econ 305,312-313. 
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At a theoretical level, the US and the UK corporate governance 
systems are classified as the `shareholder' corporate governance models, 
which are characterised by widespread and diffuse shareholding; a clear 
separation between management control and shareholder ownership; and 
fairly rigorous market control and competition. 209 In this setup, the 
maximisation of shareholders' value and the active market for corporate 
control reflect the most dominant aspects of the model. It follows that 
shareholders can exercise control over management discretion through exit, 
which establishes the threat of hostile takeover. Essentially, the threat of 
hostile takeover has led to the increased importance of shareholder interests in 
the Anglo-American system over the 1980s and 1990s, during which time (at 
least in the 1980s) `the fostering of an active market for corporate control was 
seen as one of the principal goals of company law'. 10 
The US and the UK models are regarded as the two of the most 
influential shareholder (or outsider) models. 11 The Anglo-American legal 
framework of corporate governance is characterised by placing the interests of 
the company and shareholders at its core. The board of directors and its 
209 On the shareholder corporate governance model, see, e. g., Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 
`A Survey on Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737; Zingales, L., `Corporate 
Governance' (1997) NBER Working Paper 6309; and Xanthakis M., L. Tsipouri and L. 
Spanos, Corporate Governance: The Concept and Evaluation Methods (in Greek) (Papazisis 
Publications, Athens 2003). It is observed that `although the stakeholder approach encourages 
co-operation and commitment, is not easy to identify an appropriate maximization utility 
function, like profit maximization in the shareholder model'. See, e. g., Spanos, L., `The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in Greece' (paper presented at the First LSE PhD 
Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London School 
of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, 21 June 2003, London). On these grounds the 
stakeholder approach has been widely criticised. See, e. g., Maher, M., and T. Andersson, 
`Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth' (1999) OECD. 
210 See, e. g., Kay, J., and A. Silberston, 'Corporate Governance' (1995) 153 Nat'l Inst Econ 
Rev 84 an updated version of which appears in F. MacMillan Patfield (eds. ), Perspectives on 
Company Law, Vol. 2 (Kluwer Law International 1997). 
211 In the US context, outsider models are also termed 'arm's length' systems because 
shareholders maintain their distance and give executives a free hand to manage. See, e. g., 
Cheffins, B. R., `Law, Economics and the UK's System of Corporate Governance: Lessons 
from History' (2001) 1 (1) JCLS 71,72. 
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managers are required to direct and control the company on behalf of its 
shareholders. In the US and in the UK there is strong shareholder-centred 
capitalism, contrasting with German and Japanese bank-oriented capitalism, 
pursuant to which shareholders (investors) can influence the volumes of 
external finance. Hence, shareholders' activism is manifested in the US and 
UK models, as a means to exert good corporate governance. 212 Overall, an 
`outsider' system is characterised by dispersed ownership and few (if any) 
shareholders own enough equity to have any sort of `inside' influence. 213 
On the contrary, when ownership is concentrated in one owner (or a 
few owners acting in concert, as is the case of family-owned firms), who has 
effective control of the firm, the nature of the corporate governance 
ramifications vary and agency problems shifts away from manager- 
shareholder conflicts. In the context of such stakeholder or insider model, an 
alternative to the aforementioned shareholder or outsider system, the 
principal-agent problems will be less management versus owner but more 
minority shareholders versus controlling shareholders. In this case, the aim of 
corporate governance is the alignment of the interests of strong share block- 
holders and weak minority shareholders. 214 
212 See, e. g., Morck, R., and L. Steier, `The Global History of Corporate Governance: an 
Introduction' (2005) NBER, Working Paper 11062. However, while institutional investor 
involvement establishes grounds for greater shareholder activism, the priority of fund 
managers remains shareholder wealth maximisation. But, it does not appear that the 
movement towards greater institutional ownership of shares in `open' or 'outsider' systems 
entails a move towards a stakeholding approach. See, e. g., Cook, J., and S. Deakin, 
`Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on Economic Performance' 
(1999) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge. 
213 See, e. g., Cheffins, B. R., `Law, Economics and the UK's System of Corporate 
Governance: Lessons from History' (2001)1 (1) JCLS 71,72. 
214 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `The Institutions of Corporate Governance' (2004) Harvard Law 
School, John M. Olin Centre for Law, Economics and Business, Working Paper 488; and 
Roe, M. J., 'A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 
10,15. 
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Such a stakeholder model, which is mainly found in continental 
Europe, Asia (e. g. Japan) and Latin America, is characterised by concentrated 
ownership; cross-shareholdings or vertical pyramid holdings; long-term, 
committed investors; employees' participation; and relatively modest 
importance of the stock market and the market for corporate control 215 The 
most dominant reflection of stakeholder model is the Japanese corporate 
governance, according to which not only shareholders and managers but also 
other stakeholders (e. g. employees or customers) play significant roles in the 
decision-making processes of firms. 
Finally, in a more specific context, family ownership structure216 
within the principal-agent theory is an important consideration to examine for 
two reasons. One, because the specific attributes of family owned firms give 
rise to varying nature of agency problems although to a certain extent similar 
to the concentrated ownership structures, but more complicated. Second, such 
analysis based on a more contextualised approach is valuable in an effort to 
better understand not only the different situational elements, but more 
particularly the specific context of the Greek corporate environment, which is 
characterised by the domination of family owned firms. 
2"s See, e. g., Maher, M., and T. Andersson, 'Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm 
Performance and Economic Growth' (1999) OECD; Van den Berghe, L., and L. De Ridder, 
International Standardization of Good Corporate Governance (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
London 1999); Tirole, J., 'Corporate Governance' (2001) 69 (1) Econometrica 1; and Spanos, 
L., 'The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Greece' (paper presented at the First LSE PhD 
Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London School 
of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, 21 June 2003, London). 
216 Given the lack of consensus on the definition of family enterprise, a review of the literature 
has revealed a long list of elements used by various authors to construct their varying 
definitions, e. g. the percentage of share capital owned by a family; employment of owning 
family in executive or other positions; the existence of non family executives or employees; 
whether a given family accepts that it controls its own enterprise. In this context, it is possible 
that in a family firm the owner might be different from the family itself, thus giving rise to far 
more corporate governance complexities. See, e. g., Neubauer, F., and G. L. Alden, The 
Family Business: Its Governance for Sustainability (Routledge, NY 1998), at 5. 
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To start with, in terms of the range of the agency considerations, the 
family involvement renders family firms liable to face more complex 
corporate governance issues than non-family companies. This is so because 
family relationships have to be managed in addition to business 
relationships217 To that direction, studies on the complexities of family- 
owned businesses have shown that if no family is involved, then in the 
corporate governance context seven roles are identified: 1) the role of 
management; 2) the role of the board of directors; 3) the role of the owner (the 
principal); 4) the dynamics, between the management and the board of 
directors; 5) the dynamics between the management and the owner; 6) the 
dynamics between the owner and the board of directors; and 7) the 
interrelationship between the owner, the management and the board of 
directors. 18 Accordingly, when a family is involved then in addition to the 
seven aforementioned roles, some more are identified, taking into account the 
role of the family and the interrelationship with the abovementioned dynamics 
(e. g. the management, the board of directors, and the owner). 219 
Corporate markets that have been characterised by the dominance of 
family firms are considered to include Japan and Greece. In such corporate 
setup, commonly large and wealthy families control a number of public 
companies (which are often organised in the form of a group of companies or ' 
conglomerates) and members of those controlling families maintain top 
management positions. Therefore, the agency problems in these cases of 
family owned corporations arise between strong block holders and weak 
217 See, e. g., Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's 
Company from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International. 
218 See, e. g., Neubauer, F., and G. L. Alden, The Family Business: Its Governance for 
Sustainability (Routledge, NY 1998). 
219 1d 
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minority owners, in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon norm of conflicts between 
strong managers and weak owners. 20 
a 
The Legal Traditions: From Common Law to Civil Law 
A further important situational variable that gives rise to specific 
corporate patterns is the variation in the legal families (e. g. civil law and 
common law traditions), which likewise affects the nature of the agency 
problems. The different agency dynamics are particularly explained, inter 
alia, on the grounds of the different treatment of investors' protection and the 
degree of their legal rights. 221 Such interrelationship has been clearly 
articulated by La Porta, et al., who showed that civil law countries provide 
investors with weaker legal rights than common laws do. 222 Similarly, 
common law countries give both shareholders and creditors the strongest 
protection, whereas French civil law countries the weakest. The same authors, 
also, stress that civil law's weaker legal protection is reflected by high 
ownership concentration. 223 Therefore, legal origins, in conjunction with 
considerations of ownership structure, seem to affect the nature of the agency 
problems. 
Part of the explanation that common law countries place shareholders 
and other stakeholders, in certain cases, in a better position than civil law 
220 See, e. g., Becht, M, and A. Roell, 'Blockholding in Europe: an International Comparison' 
(1999) 43 Eur Econ Rev 1049,1051; and Becht, M., 'Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and 
the Need for European Mandatory Disclosure', Executive Report, in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control: A Survey of 7 European Countries, Report to the European 
Commission submitted on 27 October 1997 (Volume 1) ECGN. 
221 For instance, in many countries whose legal systems are rooted in British common law, the 
interests of shareholders are held to be paramount in most corporate decisions. However, this 
has not been the case throughout the rest of the world. See, e. g., Millstein, I. M., 'Laying the 
Groundwork for Economic Growth' (2005) 10 (1) Economic Perspectives 4,4. 
n2 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 'Law and 
Finance' (1998)106 J Pol Econ 1113. 
223 Id. 
ý'ý'. 
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regimes derives from the legal institution of the fiduciary obligations of 
directors, as manifested in the common law context. In this context, in order 
to constraint the discretionary authority entrusted to managers, the latter are 
bound by fiduciary duties. As is explained in more detail below, the fiduciary 
constraints are imposed (either through the duty of care or the duty of loyalty), 
in an effort to minimise any self-interested actions of directors and managers. 
Hence, a defining principle of corporate governance (especially the Anglo- 
Saxon one) is that an implicit term of the contract between the principal and 
the agent is that the duty of the agents (managers and directors) to pursue the 
interests of the principal224 
More particularly, such fiduciary constraints imposed explicitly 
provide for a protection mechanism for shareholders' interests (and 
stakeholders'). In the United States, for instance, shareholders may institute 
lawsuits against directors in their own right or on behalf of the company to 
gain redress for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Such cases abound in the 
US with shareholder suits against Enron, Tyco and WorldCom to testify this 
case. Altogether, in corporate America, among other common law systems, 
the possibility of such suits is a strong motivation for better director 
performance 225 
Greece, as a civil law country, provides investors and shareholders 
with a moderate level of protection. Although the current system of corporate 
governance, as will be analysed in more detail below, plays an important role 
ua The fiduciary duties that in common law is an important concept, is the highest standard of 
care imposed by common law. It describes a situation when a fiduciary is expected to be 
extremely loyal to the person to whom they owe the duty by not putting their personal 
interests before the duty and by not profiting from their position as a fiduciary. See, e. g., 
DeMott, D. A., `Beyond Metaphor: an Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation' (1988) 1988 Duke L 
J879. 
1 See, e. g., Millstein, I. M., `The Board - Governing Beyond Where the Law Ends' (address 
to the ICGN 2006 Annual Conference, Washington DC, 5 July 2006), at 6. 
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in the protection of investors and minority shareholders, the effect of this 
system must not be overestimated if it is not truly internalised into the inside 
circles of the Greek companies (i. e. Greek companies must overcome their 
mistrust of corporate governance principles). 226 In this setup, one of the issues 
directly influencing shareholders' protection is the manner in which company 
directors are appointed and remunerated. Directors are elected by the General 
Meeting of Shareholders, which alone is competent to decide on 
remuneration. 227 However, the rights of shareholders as individuals are limited 
in Greek law. For instance, there is no provision regarding the inspection of 
directors' service contracts. Nevertheless, employment / service contracts and 
directors' remuneration are always subject to prior approval by specific 
resolution of the General Meeting of Shareholders 
228 
Source of Financing: Market-Oriented versus Bank-Oriented Systems 
Finally, the different sources of financing upon which companies 
across jurisdictions rely, is another important factor when considering the 
diversity of corporate governance arrangements. The source of financing 
defines two main variations of corporate governance systems, the market- 
oriented, and the bank-oriented model. Whereas the former describes a state 
of affairs where the financing of corporations derives mainly by the market 
u6 See, e. g., Lambadarios, C., and M. Katsimi, `Greece: The Principles of Corporate 
Governance established by Law 3016/2002 in Greece' (2005) IFLR Special Issue: The 2005 
Guide to Corporate Governance. 
7" 'The General Assembly meets and can reach its decisions when at the time of the meeting 
the shareholders participating own at least 1/5 of the company's capital', Article 29, Hellenic 
Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtes anonymes), Official 
Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
228 See, e. g., Pavlou, C., and I. Bokorou, 'Greece: Corporate Governance', (2003) IFLR 
Special Issue: Corporate Governance 2003. 
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and basically investors choose to invest their funds to certain corporations; the 
latter portrays banks' central role in the financing of corporations. 
Historically, the `market-oriented' corporate governance model is 
most frequently met in the US capital market. This can be explained if one 
looks at the legal origins of the US market stretching back in 1933, when the 
1933 Banking Act229 (most commonly known as Glass-Steagall Act) entered 
into force, creating legal barriers to banks to their taking large blocks of 
stock. 230 In more precise terms, this Act provides the legal mechanism giving 
effect to the interest of US legislators to strictly separate the banking sector 
from the other investment activities. 31 The rationale behind this 
fragmentation of capital is that US capital markets were opposed to the 
concentration of economic power to financial institutions in order to avert 
situations of domination of economic and policy decision-making. From an 
229 See, e. g., Banking Act of 1933, §16,12 U. S. C. §24 (seventh) (1988) (the Glass-Steagall 
Act). The background against which the Glass-Steagall Act was passed was one of disorder in 
financial markets. The economy was in depression and there were a record number of bank 
failures. To the average person, it appeared the stock market crash had caused the Great 
Depression and banks had had a large role in the stock markets. This perception, coupled with 
widespread bank failures, led Congress to begin a series of investigations into market abuses 
and ways to reform the banking system. Congress was concerned about certain questionable 
activities by banks and their securities affiliates. These activities included loans made by 
banks to their securities affiliates, loans extended by banks to others, who wanted to buy 
securities from the banks' securities affiliates, banks' buying securities underwritten by their 
affiliate for their own or their customers' accounts, and securities affiliates buying the stock of 
firms that were customers of the bank. Rather than restrict these specific activities, US 
Congress chose to separate commercial and investment banking altogether by passing the 
Glass-Steagall Act, incorporated into the 1933 Banking Act. See, e. g., Mester, L. J., 
'Repealing Glass-Steagall: the Past Points the Way to the Future' (1996) FRB Phil Bus Rev 
(July/August). For more details on the origins of the Glass-Steagall Act, also see, e. g., 
Benston, G. J., The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: the Glass-Steagall 
Act revisited and Reconsidered (OUP, Oxford 1990). 
230 American politics never allowed financial institutions to become powerful enough to 
control operating companies. See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 10,17; and Roe, M. J., `Political and Legal Restraints on 
Ownership and Control of Public Companies' (1990) 27 (1) J Fin Econ 7. 
23' By mid-19th century the separation was the norm. Although after the Depression and the 
World War II banks made a foray into commerce via bank holding companies, however the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ended that. See, e. g., The Bank Holding Company Act, 
§4 (c) (4) - (5), 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (c) (5) - (6) (1988). See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political 
Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 10,17; and Roe, M. J., 
'Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies' (1990) 27 (1) 
J Fin Econ 7. 
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institutional point of view, such state of affairs suited well the US Federal 
Government, where policies and actions were better executed at the state level 
rather than at the federal level? 32 
Although, the genesis of the US corporate governance model 
originated from the Glass-Steagall Act and the separation of commercial and 
investment banking, the 1933 Banking Act was repealed by the enactment of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.233 Notwithstanding the demise of the 
legal origins of the US corporate governance model (as reflected by the Glass- 
Steagall Act), the US model remained unaffected. Nowadays, although the 
separation of commercial and investment banking had been abolished, still 
there is no particular role of banks in financing corporations, followed by 
managerial control rights, as is the case in Germany and Japan. 
The US (and to a certain extent the UK) is a country with dispersed 
ownership structure and equity financing are viewed as market-based forms of 
control. 234 Such control, which is decentralized by market signals, does not 
have the same meaning or the same implications as the closer monitoring 
exercised within the framework of bilateral relations (for example that of a 
majority shareholder or a financial intermediary). Intermediated financing 
makes it possible to establish and to maintain long term relations between a 
firm and its capital providers. As for financial markets, they cause sanctions 
2'Z On the political roots of the American corporate finance, see, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political 
Theory of American Corporate- Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 10,17; Roe, M. J., 
'Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies' (1990) 27 (1) 
J Fin Econ 7.; and Roe, M. J., Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press 1996). 
'233 Also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Public 
Law No. 106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (12 November 1999), which opened the competition among 
banks, securities companies and insurance companies, allowing investment and commercial 
banks to consolidate (e. g. Citigroup, Salomon Brothers). 
234 See, e. g., Aguilera, R. V., `Hybridization and the Heterogeneity across National Models of 
Corporate Governance' (2002) 3 (2) Economic Sociology 17,19. 
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and reallocations of capital more rapidly by crystallizing scattered 
information. And this affects the trend as well as the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy. 235 
Conversely, the German and the Japanese corporate governance 
models are mainly `bank-oriented'. Japanese and German corporate 
ownership is quite concentrated and their financial institutions are more 
actively involved in their companies than are financial institutions in the US. 
In particular, German banks influence industrial companies by block voting of 
shares they own directly; shares they hold as custodian; and shares they 
manage for pensions. Bankers sit on the boards of portfolio companies. It is 
said that the German government have wanted banks to become engines of 
development, gathering long-term capital, and influencing the industries and 
managers to which that capital was allocated. 236 Similarly, strong bank 
capitalism characterises also the Japanese corporate structure with the major, 
Japanese firms to have a quarter of their stock controlled by large 
shareholders, typically banks. 
237 
From a principal-agent perspective, the specific agency dynamics 
present in such state of affairs are that bankers' oversight amounts to 
shareholder diligence and they are entrusted with the monitoring of the 
governance of other firms and the right to intervene to correct governance 
"' See, e. g., Pollin, J. P., and A. G. Vaubourg, 'Corporate Governance Systems and 
Institutional Complementarities: What Consequences for European Financial Integration? ' 
(paper presented to `The New Frontiers of the European Union', Marrakech 16-17 March 
2005). 
236 History explains the favourable climate for powerful German banks stretching back in the 
Bismarck period and the German unification. In this historic context, Bismarck sought to 
develop German industry by creating great banks as engines of development. See, e. g., Roe, 
M. J., `A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 10, 
17; Roe, M. J., `Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public 
Companies' (1990) 27 (1) J Fin Econ 7; and Roe, M. J., `Some Differences in Corporate 
Governance in Germany, Japan and America' (1993) 102 (8) Yale LJ 1927. 
237 Id. 
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mistakes. In practice, if errant managers refuse to change their ways, banks 
withhold credit, starving the misgoverned firm of capital. The role of banks in'. 
companies is not limited to the granting of loans, banks also hold stocks and 
sit in the board of directors. In fact the relation of control is much richer when 
the lender is also a shareholder, because it incites him to be interested in the 
distribution of probability of cash flows and not only in the probability of a 
repayment. 238 What is more, the conflict of interest between creditors and 
shareholders is partially erased, which reduces moral hazard, that is to say the 
incentive to overvalue risky investment. 239 Yet, the problem is created when 
banks themselves are misgoverned, then the ramifications are much worse. 
Finally, in the countries where the rights of control are strongly 
concentrated, hostile takeover bids are obviously very rare. This is so because 
hostile takeovers assume significance on the grounds of the separation of 
ownership and control as mechanisms to restrain managerial slack and 
opportunism 24° 
 See, e. g., Pollin, J. P., and A. G. Vaubourg, `Corporate Governance Systems and 
Institutional Complementarities: What Consequences for European Financial Integration? ' 
(paper presented to `The New Frontiers of the European Union', Marrakech 16-17 March 
2005). 
239 Id 
240 See, e. g., Sinha, R., `The Role of Hostile Takeovers in Corporate Governance' (2004) 14 
(18) Applied Fin Econ 1291,1291. 
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4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCIPLINING 
MECHANISMS IN CONTEXT 
Introduction 
The previous discussion of the principal-agent theory by using a more 
contextualised approach and by focusing on those context-dependent variables 
sharpens our understanding of the varying disciplining mechanisms employed 
across countries and corporate governance systems. Importantly, the analysis 
of those checks and balances contribute to reviewing the theoretical 
background of corporate governance. In addition, reference to the role of each 
of the following disciplining mechanisms in the specific context of the Greek 
market, it further contributes to better understanding the particular situation of 
Greece. 
Primarily, the fiduciary duties of the board of directors, executive 
compensation schemes, independent directors, and the significant role of the 
gatekeepers have been recognised, inter alia, as fundamental disciplining 
mechanisms241 and they are discussed within the context of public companies 
and family firms, respectively. 242 
On reflection, it is revealed that each mechanism has a different added 
value and disciplining effect within the context of the specific type of 
corporate formation. Therefore, it is difficult (and not the intention of the 
present analysis) to determine the `best' mechanism. Rather, the specific type 
Z4' For a more detailed description of all those institutions of corporate governance, namely all 
those mechanisms that affect, modulate, and control the decisions made at the top of large 
public firms, see, e. g., Roe, M. J., `The Institutions of Corporate Governance' (2004) Harvard 
Law School, John M. Olin Centre for Law, Economics and Business, Working Paper 488. 
242 There is, in addition, an approach on framing the controlling shareholder structure as an 
alternative to techniques such as independent directors and takeovers as a monitoring device. 
See, e. g., Gilson, R. J., 'Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy' (2005) ECGI, Law Working Paper 49. 
s` . 
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of organisational structure will define those mechanisms that are most 
appropriate and most effective for solving the relevant agency concerns within ý'" 
the particular setting. Towards this consideration, in what follows, the focus is 
sharply limited to outlining the various disciplining mechanisms, followed by 
a general discussion when a specific mechanism is applied to a particular 
context. 
The Fiduciary Obligations in the Context of the Common and the Civil Law 
Traditions 
The fundamental principles of directors' fiduciary obligations are 
discussed as a means to alleviate conflicts of interest and constrain self- 
interested actions. The` have been recognised as a key basis particularly for 
the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance. At a theoretical level, the fiduciary 
duties of directors are divided in the US into the duties of care, loyalty, and 
the good faith obligation. 243 The term `fiduciary' was adopted to apply to the 
types of relationships falling short of `trusts' but in which one person was 
nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee (e. g. in the relationship between 
agent-principal; director-corporation; lawyer-client; trustee-trust beneficiary, 
etc. ). 244 On the premises of the first inception of the term, the corporate form 
243 Notably, the remit of the UK Company Law Reform was to make more detailed provisions 
on fiduciary duties and conflicts and to employ an objective standard replacing the subjective 
test on the basis of which, thus far, UK directors could escape liability fairly easily. See, e. g., 
Ferran, E., `Company Law Reform in the UK: A Progress Report' (2005) ECGI, Law 
Working Paper 27. 
244 See, e. g., DeMott, D. A., `Beyond Metaphor: an Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation' (1988) 
1988 Duke LJ 879,880; and Sealy, L. S., 'Fiduciary Relationships' (1962) CLJ 69. 
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of business organisation provided the ground for the application and 
development of fiduciary principles 245 
Basically, the defining element of the principal-agent theory, vis-a-vis 
contracts' incompleteness establishes the links between fiduciary obligations 
and the solving of the agency problems. More particularly, such incomplete 
contract is coupled with fiduciary constraints on a party's discretion to pursue 
self interest. In this `gap-filling' role, the common characteristics of fiduciary 
relationships include the agent's commitment to exercise the discretion 
entrusted in a fashion that will serve the interests of the beneficiary. 246 
In more specific terms, the first legal manifestation of the fiduciary 
duties, the duty of care, requires that directors exercise reasonable care, 
prudence, and diligence in the management of the corporation. For instance, 
in an acquisitions process, the duty of care is interpreted as an obligation of 
directors to act on an informed basis after due consideration of the relevant 
materials and appropriate deliberation. 247 In this context, while directors may 
use outside experts to advise them on significant legal and financial matters 
affecting their analysis, directors may not delegate their central 
responsibilities - the duties of loyalty and care - to other decision makers. 
Accordingly, the duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders 
reflects the duty of directors to make their decisions in the absence of self- 
dealing or conflicts of interests. 248 In the event that a conflict exists, a director 
245 See, e. g., DeMott, D. A., `Beyond Metaphor: an Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation' (1988) 
1988 Duke LJ 879,880; and Sealy, L. S., `Fiduciary Relationships' (1962) CLJ 69. 
246 Id 
247 See, e. g., Law Offices of Raimi, B. L., `Mergers and Acquisitions: Role of Directors in the 
Acquisition Process', (1997), Memo, available at: 
http: //www. monevlaw. com/pdfs/merger pdfs/role directors pdf . 248 See, e. g., Millstein, I., H. Gregory, and A. Altschuler, `USA: Corporate Governance and 
Fiduciary Duties: A Multi-Jurisdictional Review of the Directors Relationship to the 
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shall disclose the conflict immediately (and in the acquisition process, for 
example, he/she shall not participate in the decision process). 
Finally, the trinity of fiduciary duties concludes with the good faith 
obligation, under which it is assumed that every contract imposes on its 
parties an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
enforcement. 249 More particularly, pursuant to the English company law, 
directors have the paramount duty of acting in a bona fide manner in the 
interest of the company. Specifically, the director individually owes a duty of 
good faith to the company, which means that he/she is a fiduciary of the 
company's interest 250 Like the other two fiduciary obligations, the obligation 
to act in good faith, as a fundamental component of traditional fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty, limits a party's discretion to use powers or advantages that 
it has by virtue of an agreement or by virtue of law. 
The importance of fiduciary duties as disciplining mechanisms for 
minimizing managerial opportunism and self-interest actions is reflected in 
the possibility for the principal (i. e. the party that the fiduciary is owed) to 
request remedies from breach of a fiduciary duty. For example, according to 
the US law when a corporation becomes insolvent, directors owe fiduciary 
duties to creditors in the sense that upon insolvency the directors effectively 
Corporation' (2004) American Bar Association, Business Law Section Corporate Governance 
Committee (Draft). 
249 The good faith obligation is articulated in the US Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(§205) of 1981 and Sections 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (US). See, e. g., DeMott, 
D. A., `Beyond Metaphor: an Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation' (1988) 1988 Duke LJ 879, 
892. 
250 See, e. g., Alexander, K., `Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation' (2004) 
Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, Cambridge University, Working Paper 17. 
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become trustees of the corporate assets, which should be held first for the 
creditors' benefit and then for that of the shareholders. 251 
When it comes to the importance of fiduciary obligations in civil legal 
traditions the following can be observed. In common law countries, fiduciary 
duties are refined by judges on a fact driven, and case-by-case, basis. On the 
contrary, in civil law countries statutory law may attempt to mandate or 
prohibit specified actions, in a legislative effort to create a system from the 
bottom up. This structure may attempt to define the responsibility of corporate 
directors and management to investors but may not explicitly create a 
fiduciary principle. 252 The above describes the Greek case, whereas concepts 
of fiduciary duty have their roots in a system of ancient Greek logic that 
became known as the natural law; however there is no explicit reference in 
Greek laws to fiduciary duties, contrary to common law countries, 253 nor are 
there strong provisions for breach of such duties in Greece. 
More particularly, the fiduciary obligations of directors of Greek 
corporations are implied in the legal provisions governing two important 
issues. One, it is the insider trading. Two, it is the conflicts of interest. Both 
imply breach of fiduciary duties to the company and the shareholders when 
directors either use inside information for personal interest (insider trading) or 
ul See, e. g., American Bar Association, `Fiduciary Duties and Potential Liabilities of 
Directors and Officers of Financially Distressed Corporations', Memorandum (22 August 
2002) citing American National Bank v. Mortgage America Corporation, 714F. 2d 1266, 
1268-69 (5 Cir. 1983); and Gever v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co.. 621 A. 2d 784,787-790 (Del. Ch. 
1992), at 4. See also in that regard Conaway, A. E., `Re-examining the Fiduciary Paradigm at 
Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors' (1995) 20 (1) 
Del. J. Corp. L. 
252 See, e. g., Millstein, I. M., `Non Traditional Modes of Enforcement' in I. M. Millstein, S. 
G. N. Bajpai, E. Berglof and S. Claessens (eds. ), Enforcement and Corporate Governance: 
Three Views (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005) Focus 3,5. 
" In a similar vein with the concept of the fiduciary duties, the main point of the natural law, 
as codified by the Greeks, Romans and English is to inhibit the abuse of power by those in a 
position of influence. See, e. g., Walker, L. J., `The Nature of Fiduciary Duty' Wall Street 
Journal (December 2002). 
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seek their own interests to the detriment of the company's interest (conflict of 
interest). However, the difference of those provisions implicitly prescribing 
the fiduciary obligations with the ones, for example, in the USA are strongly 
associated with their disciplining effects, their scope (conservative versus 
expanded254), but most significantly the implementation. It follows that main 
difference is that the US laws establishing breach of fiduciary obligations are 
implemented; 255 in Greece people do not hesitate breaking the law, in the 
absence of consequences. 
Back in the 1990s, in the Greek capital market, insider trading was not 
just a common practice; it was the status quo. 256 This is outrageous if one 
considers that as early as in 1988 the Greek state explicitly made insider 
trading a criminal offence. 257 Such paradoxical situation is mainly due to the 
following reasons. First, the great majority of the Greek listed companies are 
family-owned. Second, the Greek business environment is a `small world' 
where everybody seems to know each other and many people fulfil multiple 
roles. Third, the Greek market, despite its exponential growth in the last 
decade, is still lacking in depth. Fourth, apart from the fact that Greece has a 
254 Canadian law, for example, seems to have developed a more expansive view of fiduciary 
obligation, more so than American law, whilst Australian law and British law have developed 
more conservative approaches than either the USA or Canada. 
us 'US law on insider trading, implemented by SEC, in most of its aspects is not more 
complete or strict than the Greek law. The difference is that it is implemented'. See, e. g., 
Mathiopoulos, C., Investor's Small Guide: the Athens Stock Exchange (in Greek) (Estia, 
Athens 1996). 
256 See, e. g., Lekkas, P., `Insider Trading and the Greek Stock Market' (1998) 7 (4) Bus Ethics 
Eur Rev 193,196. 
25' Id at 196 and 199. Pursuant to article 30, Hellenic Law 1806/1988, as amended by the 
Hellenic Law 3606/2007, `whoever, having acquired confidential information on a company 
by providing his services, either permanently or temporarily, [... ] exploits such information, 
either personally or though another person [... ] with the purpose to achieve substantial 
financial benefit [... ] will be punished by at least three months of imprisonment and a fine. 
See, e. g., Hellenic Law 1806/1988 Amendment of Legislation Concerning the Securities 
Exchanges and Other Provisions, Official Government Gazette A207/ 20.09.1988, as 
amended by Law 3371/2005 on HCMC issues and other provisions, (Official Government 
Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005) and Law 3606/2007 Markets in Financial Instruments, Official 
Government Gazette A195/ 17.8.2007. 
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historic record of weak implementation of legislation, there is also a lack of 
political will and initiatives to intervene in an effort to reverse the problem of 
insider trading. 258 
All the above country-specific, context-dependent, variables fertilise 
the ground for insider trading activities, since power is concentrated, 
conspiracies are easy to construct, and there is potential for constant flow of 
inside information throughout the system. 259 Any initiatives to deal with 
insider trading are constantly postponed and undermined by this web of 
people that seem to have gained much from insider trading activities. 
Therefore, three important things can be concluded. First, laws 
regulating insider trading are not implemented as a result of strongly 
prevailing country-specific factors, which further explain the overall status of 
corporate governance framework, as is analysed in the chapters that follow. 
Second, and most importantly, on the grounds of the weak insider trading 
legal framework, the meaning of fiduciary duties, as established through the 
insider trading laws, is limited. Unrestricted insider trading activities permits 
directors to indulge in greed and to breach their fiduciary duties to the 
company and its shareholders. 60 This duty has strong moral and legal 
justification and is a fundamental corporate governance disciplining 
mechanism. However, in the specific context of the Greek capital market, it is 
de facto eliminated on accounts of the specific web of business, ethical, and 
legal standards. Third, to strengthen directors' fiduciary duties, a specific . 
proportion of the members of the board of directors must be independent. 
258 See, e. g., Lekkas, P., `Insider Trading and the Greek Stock Market' (1998) 7 (4) Bus Ethics 
Eur Rev 193,196. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 195. 
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Otherwise, it is reckoned that boards crowded with insiders can hardly 
challenge any management decision and they only serve the interests of the 
top executive, vis-a-vis the CEO. 261 In any case, such state of affairs can have 
adverse effects for shareholders' value and business development. 
62 
To a certain extent, the same rationale and argumentation applies when 
analysing the issue of conflict of interests, which likewise implicitly entails 
fiduciary obligations of directors to the company and the shareholders. With 
regard to the conflicts of interest, article 1 of the Hellenic Law 3016/2002263 
defines board members' primary responsibilities and obligations towards 
listed, in organized stock exchange market, companies as the continuous 
pursuit of the increase of the long term, corporate, financial value in parallel 
to the defence of general company interest, thus avoiding any explicit 
reference to shareholders' or even stakeholders' expectations. However, 
shareholders' legitimate interests are addressed by a series of company 
provisions mainly included in the Hellenic Law 2190/1920264 specifying their 
rights and their equitable treatment. The same law emphasizes that, at all 
instances, board members or third parties duly authorized by the board must 
not seek after their own interests in breach of company's paramount 
interests. 265 
261 See, e. g., Mavrides, M., and M. Olympios, `Governance Issues in Family-Owned Public 
Companies and Consequences on Shareholder Value' (2004) Cyprus College School of 
Business, Laboratory for Business, Ethics and Society (LaBES), Working Paper. 
262 Id. 
263 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). [Hereinafter the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002]. 
264 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (societes 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
265 See, e. g., Alexakis, S., `Incorporation of OECD Principle of Corporate Governance in 
Greek Securities Legislation' (2005) LawNet. gr. 
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From the above analysis, it is confirmed that different jurisdictions, 
legal families, and ownership structures articulate fiduciary duties in different 
modes. Perhaps the legal prescription of fiduciary duties is similar across 
countries but their disciplining effect is largely dependent on situational and 
contextual variables, i. e. country specific factors. 
Executive Compensation Schemes 
In further deepening our understanding of different disciplining 
mechanisms used to alleviate the varying agency problems, the focus of the 
analysis shifts to briefly discuss the role of executive compensation schemes 
from a more contextualised point of view. On the grounds of certain context- 
dependent variables specific corporate governance disciplining mechanisms 
may be interpreted as the firm's optimal response to its agency problems. 
Therefore, parallel to explaining the above situation, this analysis expands our 
understanding of executive compensation policies. 
At a theoretical level, the greater an executive's ownership stake in a 
firm, the stronger will be his / her incentives to efficiently manage assets-in- 
place and to spot potentially profitable opportunities. This is so since the 
executive bears direct financial consequences of his / her decisions. 66 In 
addition, a growing literature has focused on the links between performance 
and compensation, in the sense that excellent performance of directors will be 
awarded by increased compensation package. 
In this setup, the executive compensation schemes have been the 
subject of immense and growing public concern given the existing mismatch 
266 See, e. g., Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt, `Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and 
Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework' 20 (7) (1996) JBF 1135,1137. 
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between performance and remuneration. 267 According to the dominant 
approach to the study of executive compensation, managers' pay 
arrangements are viewed as a (partial) remedy to the agency problem. 268 There 
are many mechanisms through which compensation policy can provide value 
increasing incentives, including performance-based bonuses and salary 
revisions, stock options and performance-based promotion, and dismissal 
decisions. 269 
However, lack of correlation between performance and remuneration 
is particularly evident in family firms, including the majority of Greek 
corporations. This is explained on the grounds of the `command and control' 
system upon which family firms rely. 270 More particularly, in family firms, 
there is no need to rely on indirect mechanisms of control, such as equity 
compensation or stock options, in order to provide incentives to the 
management. Rather, family firms rely on a `command and control' system 
267 Although it well exceeds the scope of the present research, it is interesting to note that it is 
argued that while executive compensation represents a means to solve the agency problem, it 
must be recognised that the design of compensation arrangements is also partly a product of 
this same agency problem. Therefore, good theoretical and empirical reasons exist for 
concluding that managerial power substantially affects the design of executive compensation 
in companies with a separation of ownership and control (e. g. public companies). See, e. g., 
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried, `Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem' (2003) 17 
(3) J Econ Perspectives 71,72; and Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried, Pay Without 
Performance: the Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press 
2004). 
268 There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the role of incentive contracts in 
ameliorating agency problems. Inter alia, see, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy, 
`Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives' (1990) 98 (2) J Pol Econ 225; Murphy, 
K. J., 'Executive Compensation' in 0. Ashenfelter, R. Layard and D. Card (eds. ), Handbook 
of Labour Economics (Elsevier, 1999) 2485-2563; Bebchuk, L. A., `Making Directors 
Accountable' Harvard Magazine Forum (Nov - Dec 2003); and Core, J. E., W. R. Guay and 
D. F. Larcker, 'Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey' (2003) 9 (1) 
FRBNY Econ Pol Rev 27. 
269 For an estimate of the magnitude of the incentives provided by each of these mechanisms, 
see, e. g., Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy, `Performance Pay and Top Management 
Incentives' (1990) 98 (2) J Pol Econ 225,261-262. 
270 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe 
Differ? ' (2005) Centre of Law and Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 
274, at 11. 
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because, unlike public companies, they can directly monitor and replace 
management. 271 
In addition, it is interesting to note that C. E. O. founders and their 
family members usually tend to place shareholder wealth maximisation at a 
lower point on the managerial hierarchy than to do the C. E. O. 's of non 
founder firms. 272 In a similar vein, the role of executive compensation 
schemes to the Greek corporations (e. g. family firms) is shown from 
measuring the increase of the level of the firm's intangible assets. According 
to the findings of Chung and Pruitt, it is recorded that firms whose C. E. O. 's 
are also the founders (entrepreneurs) may exhibit lower levels of corporate 
intangibles than non-founder firms. 273 
Therefore, it appears that the disciplining effects of executive 
compensation are limited within the context of the Greek corporations. This is 
mainly explained on the grounds of ownership structures as the specific 
situational variables. 
Independent Directors 
Furthermore, independent directors as a disciplining mechanism to the 
agency problems are also recommended by various corporate governance 
codes, in order to minimise any complications from the combination of the 
roles of C. E. O. / Chairman. A key principle in the majority of corporate 
governance codes is the clear division of the responsibility for running the 
271 See, e. g., Coffee Jr., J. C., `A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe 
Differ? ' (2005) Centre of Law and Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 
274, at 11. 
272 See, e. g., Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt, `Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and 
Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework' 20 (7) (1996) JBF 1135,1153-1154. 
273 Id. 
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board and the executive responsibility for running the company's business. 
The underlying notion is that no one individual should have unfettered powers 
of decision. 274 
In this spirit, the Cadbury Report (UK) recommended that there should 
be a strong independent element to the board to prevent chief executives from 
becoming too powerful . 
275 This stance was reiterated later in the text of the 
Combined Code. 276 
Although increased director independence could be beneficial, there 
are concerns about the positive relationship between independent directors 
and good performance of boards. 77 Evidence to this direction is provided by 
the recent corporate failures (e. g. Enron, WorldCom) where many of the 
directors of those companies would have qualified as independent directors 
under the existing rules. 278 
274 See, e. g., Maier, S., 'How Global Is Good Corporate Governance? ' (2005) EIRIS August, 
at 8. 
275 See, e. g., Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury 
Committee), `Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance' (1992) December (the Cadbury 
Report), Principle 4.9. 
276 The Combined Code provides that all the members of the board committee that determines 
the remuneration of the executive directors should be independent non-executive directors. In 
addition, at least three non-executive directors must sit on the company's audit committee and 
they must form the majority on that committee. See, e. g., Committee on Corporate 
Governance, `Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Code of Best Practice' (1998) 
June (the Combined Code). 
277 The first large scale (sample of about 950 large US firms), long-time horizon study finds 
no consistent evidence that the proportion of independent directors affects firm performance, 
across a wide variety of stock price and accounting measures of performance. See, e. g., 
Bhagat, S., and B. S. Black, `The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and 
Firm Performance' (1999) 54 Bus Law 921; Bhagat, S., and B. S. Black, `Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance' (1998) Centre of Law and Economic 
Studies, Columbia Law School, Working Paper 143. Also, see, e. g., Romano, R., `Corporate 
Law and Corporate Governance' (1996) 5 (2) Industrial & Corp Change 277,287- 294 that 
identifies the benefits accruing to equity investors from independent board of directors and 
provides a review of those empirical and event studies that measure the effects and 
correlations of board of directors' composition; and Romano, R., `The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance' (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521. 
278 See, e. g., Bebchuk, L. A., `Making Directors Accountable' Harvard Magazine Forum 
(Nov - Dec 2003). 
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When it comes to discussing the important role of independent 
directors within the specific shareholding structure of family owned 
businesses, 279 the following considerations come to the fore. First, the 
presence of independent directors in the family boardroom is important, in 
order to safeguard sound decisions and family control over management. 
Second, independent directors have a special value for family firms, as an 
effective mechanism to mitigate family opportunism. 280 Third, independent 
directors are in better position for tackling specific problems or issues, and 
especially in the field of strategy, if they ask the right questions. 281 
Therefore, the case is established for the increased importance of 
independent directors in family firms compared to the other disciplining 
mechanisms, such as director's fiduciary duties and executive compensation 
schemes. 
Gatekeepers' Role 
Finally, the significant role of gatekeepers, as the reputational 
intermediaries, describes another effective deterrence strategy for agency 
conflicts. Essentially, the central role of gatekeepers and the quality of the 
information that they provide to directors and managers- are found to have a 
positive relationship with the good performance of corporations, as 
279 The authors find that investment companies; other employees; industrial partners; and 
other shareholders participate as shareholders in non-family firms more often than in the case 
of family firms. See, e. g., Van de Berghe, L. A. A., and S. Carchon `Agency Relations within 
the Family Business System: An Exploratory Approach' (2003) 11 CG 171,180. 
280 See, e. g., Mavrides, M., and M. Olympics, `Governance Issues in Family-Owned Public 
Companies and Consequences on Shareholder Value' (2004) Cyprus College School of 
Business, Laboratory for Business, Ethics and Society (LaBES), Working Paper, at 8 and 37; 
and Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's Company 
from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International, at 28. 
281 See, e. g., Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's 
Company from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International, at 28-30. 
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documented by the corporate scandals of the post 2001 period. (e. g., Enron, 
WorldCom), as analysed in the previous chapter. 
On the theory that the gatekeeper will receive little, if anything, from 
corporate involvement in crime or misconduct, it is assumed that they can be 
deterred from wrongdoing more easily than the corporation or its managers, 
who may profit handsomely from crime and wrongdoing. If these gatekeepers 
can detect offences, it will be difficult -or at least very costly- to entice them 
into a conspiracy, since that would have a great cost on their long established 
reputation capital. It follows that many offences will fail because some of 
these outsiders will prove impossible to corrupt, other will fail because the 
price of corruption exceeds its potential benefits, and still others will never be 
attempted in the expectation that they would fail for either reason. Therefore, 
the primary aim is for gatekeeper liability theory to stop a class of offences 
that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial sanction. 282 
As discussed in more depth in the previous chapter, American 
corporate directors depend upon their gatekeepers to a certain point, reflecting 
in that way that in diffuse ownership structures, (e. g. US and UK 
corporations) the role of gatekeepers is important. On the contrary, in the 
specific context of Greek corporations (vis-a-vis family firms or concentrated 
ownership structures) the role of gatekeepers (auditors, the media, credit 
rating companies, or other professionals, such as lawyers, notaries, etc. ) 
appears to be limited. This is so mainly because in concentrated ownership 
structures the controlling shareholders in most cases have sufficient 
information about the company; therefore the role of gatekeepers appears to 
282 See, e. g., Kraakman, R., `Corporate Liability, Strategies and Costs of Legal Controls' 
(1984) 93 Yale LJ 857,891. 
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be narrow. However, the presence of independent gatekeepers is also 
substantial as a means to bring to the fore possible wrongdoings and self- 
dealing instances in family firms. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DYNAMICS OF 
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS 
In this last part, the basics shared and the main differences between 
several corporate governance patterns across countries were discussed. It is 
revealed that national corporate governance systems differ dramatically along 
a number of seemingly important dimensions. Partly, those differences are 
explained upon path dependence assumptions and on account of situational 
variables, such as political, historical, cultural and organisational variations, 
proving that a convergence scenario is unlik6 Such context-dependent 
dimensions prove a convergence of corporate governance systems neither 
possible nor desirable. 
Although some countries may adopt part of the Anglo-Saxon or other 
prevailing corporate governance practices, it does not necessarily mean that 
their systems, as a whole, will converge. Rather it is argued that since there is 
not a uniform application of such practices, convergence can be only 
witnessed in isolation to the extent that practices converge, but not systems. 
For instance, the bank-oriented corporate governance systems, (as the 
Japanese and the German one) although they share many common elements, 
nevertheless present a number of variations. Unlike German co-determination 
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law, which opens the supervisory board to employee representatives, the 
Japanese law does not give employees or their representatives any status as a 
constituent of the corporation. Accordingly, the stakeholder Japanese model 
has left limited -if at all- role for shareholders, whereas the board of directors 
manages companies. 
Similarly, the Anglo-Saxon, outsider, corporate governance system 
(UK and US), presents specific variations. To name just one that whereas the 
UK corporate governance system is a principles-based one stemming 
primarily from the Revised Combined Code, the American one is more a 
gatekeeping rule-based model as envisaged by the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
283 The 
K1K experience has showed that the most effective corporate governance is 
_developed consensually, as 
a result of debate and general agreement. 
Accordingly, changes e orward incrementally when they are 
supported by the business community and public opinion. Such approach 
substantially differs from the approach adopted in the US in the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act. In general, the US `rules-based' approach is oriented towards 
mandatory compliance with legislation and stock exchange requirements, with 
a much greater emphasis on regulatory enforcement rather than voluntary 
compliance. 284 Hence, the UK approach is in the form of `comply or explain', 
as envisaged by the Revised Combined Code. 285 
283 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, 'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002). 
284 On the pros and cons of the principles- versus rules-based approaches, see, e. g., Broshko, 
E. B., and K. Li, `Corporate Governance Requirements in Canada and the United States: a 
Legal and Empirical Comparison of the Principles-based and Rules-based Approach' (2006) 
Sauder School of Business, Working Paper, available at SSRN, at 3-5. 
285 The method of `comply or explain' has been adopted by numerous countries. More 
particularly, the Higgs Report (see, e. g., Department of Trade and Industry -(DTI), `Review of 
the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors' (2003) (The Higgs Report) January), 
in the UK, supports this method, along with the High Level Group of Company Law experts 
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To continue, in both US and UK corporate governance patterns, 
managerial incentive schemes are common, hostile takeovers are observed 
quite frequently; the labour market for top managers is liquid and active; and 
employees' participation in the corporate administration is not addressed (in 
sharp " contrast with the German and the Japanese style of corporate 
governance). 
The discussion on the convergence tendencies of corporate governance 
systems reveals that although a number of reforms took place, they could not 
challenge the core of their structure. For instance, besides the evidence for a 
move to stock markets; for share ownership to relax; for banks in Germany to 
selling off their equity; and for keiretsu structures to unravel; the German and 
Japanese corporate governance are still insider control systems with a clear 
stakeholder orientation. 
At all instances, history proves that although there is a certain degree 
of influence on specific corporate governance practices; the corporate 
structures of each country heavily depend upon the specific political, 
historical and cultural attributes, therefore convergence of systems would 
most probably violate the prevailing rules and undermine long standing 
precedent. A theoretical manifestation of that is Roe's `path dependency' 
analysis according to which convergence seems unlike to progress 
substantially as long as countries retain their specific political and historical 
traditions. 286 
that were commissioned by the European Commission to review methods to modernise 
company laws and in the EU and possible corporate governance convergence. 
286 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `Political Preconditions to Separating Corporate Ownership from 
Control' (2000) 53 (3) Stan L Rev 539,560; and Roe, M. J., `Social Conflict and the 
Institutions of Corporate Governance' in M. ' J. Roe (eds. ), Political Determinants of 
Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (OUP, Oxford 2003) at 27-46. 
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However, in the context of the European Union, there is a heated 
debate on the convergence of national corporate governance systems. Such 
debate is manifested by the unsuccessful proposals for the fifth Company Law 
Directive; the adoption of the Regulation on the Statute of the European 
Company; 287 and the initiative to modernise company laws and corporate 
governance rules. 
288 
Essentially, a convergence of national corporate systems in the EU 
context seems difficult on the basis of two primary impediments. First are the 
differences of company laws and corporate governance systems of Member 
States, which reflect their different corporate cultures and their varying 
sources of finance. The second obstacle refers to the EU procedure itself for 
adopting and implementing Directives and Regulations. In this EU setup, 
although formal convergence of systems is not possible, a more informal 
convergence and influence of corporate governance practices is evident across 
EU member countries. 
In reviewing the limitations of harmonization and convergence of EU 
company laws, the first benchmark is the failure of the proposals for a fifth 
Company Law Directive, which sought, inter alia, to coordinate Member 
States' legislation on the structure of public limited companies. The increased 
political deadlock revealed the fundamental differences between Member 
States' traditions in the company law field and Member States' unwillingness 
to adopt detailed and stringent rules. 
Also, the convergence thesis from a path dependence angle is examined by Bebchuk, L. A., 
and M. J. Roe, `A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership' 
(1999) Stan LR 127. 
287 See, e. g., Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2002 on the Statute for a 
European Company (SE) [2001] OJ L294/1. 
288 See, e. g., Commission Communication COM(2003)284final of 21 May 2003 on 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - 
A Plan to Move Forward (The Action Plan). 
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On the contrary, the enforcement of the two binding legislative texts 
that establish the European Company289 and the adoption of the Directive on 
cross border mergers290 reflect the general convergence for corporate 
formations. To the same convergence path lead the EU initiatives to 
modernise company laws and strengthen corporate governance practices (e. g. 
the Action Plan291), which coincides with the Parmalat affair. 
More particularly, in the Action Plan consultation stage, the opinion of 
the vast majority of Member States was that there is neither need nor practical 
benefit from introducing an EU Corporate Governance Code, a view which 
was confirmed by the High Level Group and formally stated in the 
Communication for the `Action Plan'. 292 
Hence, it was concluded that the `EU should not devote time and effort 
to the development of a European corporate governance code'. Rather, a more 
valuable area for the European Commission is to focus its efforts on the 
reduction of legal and regulatory barriers, such as for instance with regard to 
289 The European Company is a legal instrument based on European Community law that 
gives companies the option of forming a European Company - known formally by its Latin 
name of `Societas Europea' (SE). An SE can operate on a European-wide basis and be 
governed by Community law directly applicable in all Member States. The Statute for the 
European Company reduces the legal and practical constraints and the compliance cost 
deriving from twenty-five different legal systems The Statute for the European Company is 
established by two pieces of legislation: (i) Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 directly 
applicable in Member States establishing the company law rules (See, e. g., Council 
Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2002 on the Statute for a European Company (SE) 
[2001] OJ L294/1); and (ii) Council Directive (EC) 2001/86 of 8 October 2001 supplementing 
the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ 
L294/22 (which will have to be implemented in national law in all Member States) on worker 
involvement. 
290 See, e. g., Council Directive 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005 on Cross Border Mergers of 
Limited Liability Companies OJ L3 10/1. 
291 See, e. g., Commission Communication COM(2003)284final of 21 May 2003 on 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - 
A Plan to Move Forward (The Action Plan). 
292 Notably, the vast majority of responses to the Consultative Document on the High Level 
Group's Final Report rejected the creation of a European corporate governance code. See, 
e. g., Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a modern regulatory 
framework for company law in Europe (2002) at 9. Also, see,, e. g., High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts, `A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: a 
Consultative Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts' (2002) 25 April. 
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shareholder engagement in cross-border voting (the so-called `participation 
barriers'), or the reduction of barriers to shareholders' ability to evaluate the 
governance of companies (the so-called `information barriers'). 
293 The 
adoption of the Directive on shareholders' rights confirms this stance. 
294 
Therefore, although the EU initiative has focused on a number of rules 
that can create a level of convergence, the EU should not strive to create a 
single European corporate governance code. Such effort seems difficult given 
that the underlying company laws in Member States are not harmonized in 
key areas and other conditions, which discipline company governance. 
Similarly, such adoption would not contribute constructively to the 
improvement of corporate governance in the EU, as this code would have 
either to allow for many different options or confine itself to abstract 
principles. The attempt to harmonise all the elements of a European code is a 
time demanding project with uncertain results. Perhaps, the active role for the 
European Commission in the area of corporate governance and company law 
can be fleshed out through the application of the new Open Method of 
Coordination. 295 
Finally, a decisive parameter that significantly impedes the 
convergence of national policies in the EU context, apart from national 
sovereignty arguments, is the inflexibility of the Directives and Regulations, 
as binding legislative texts. As a matter of fact, the core problem rests with the 
293 See, e. g., Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, `Comparative Study of Corporate Governance 
Codes Relevant to the European Union and Member States' (2002) Final Report & Annexes 
I-III (January). For instance, important rules that can significantly reduce barriers within the 
internal market are the Prospectus Directive, the MiFID, the Market Abuse Directive, or the 
Transparency Directive. 
294 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain 
Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies [2007] OJ LI84/17. 
295 In that context, see, e. g., Mavrommati, S., and C. Papathanassiou, 'Modified Open Method 
of Coordination for Corporate Governance' (2006) 17 (6) EBLR 1637. 
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procedure itself for adopting and implementing Directives and Regulations, 
which requires all 27 EU Member States to consent. 296 This long and time 
consuming procedure may be detrimental to the contents and the quality of the 
produced texts, since norms cannot easily and quickly be adopted keeping the 
pace of the fast changing conditions of capital markets. 
To sum up, whereas a number of key corporate governance practices 
have been a useful point of reference for other jurisdictions (such as for 
instance the `comply or explain' principle), those practices are not in all 
respects suitable for adoption by them. Similarly, whereas a certain degree of 
influence in corporate governance practices between different countries is 
evident, convergence of systems seems unlikely. By and large, experience, 
empirical studies, and a more contextualised approach in explaining corporate 
governance issues support the proposition that `one size does not fit all'. 
296 Notably, this impediment has been long recognised by the Commission and to that end a 
review of the decision-making procedures for adopting EU legislation has been assigned to a 
Committee chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy (the Lamfalussy Committee) that examined the 
problem and recommended a tiered decision making process for EU legislation, the so-called 
Lamfalussy process. The Lamfalussy process distinguished four levels of decision-making, 
with the first level of legislation, which only relates to framework principles and the 
definition of Commission implementing powers, to be adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament following a Commission proposal under the co-decision procedure. 
Technical details for adopting Level 1 framework principles should be agreed at a second 
level by the Commission and Member States' experts under the so-called `comitology' 
procedure. Level 3 and 4 of the Lamfalussy procedure cover supervision of Member States 
implementation of the Directives. In general, the success of the Lamfalussy process is still to 
be seen, since all four levels have been tested only for the adoption of the Market Abuse 
Directive (See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 (the Market Abuse Directive)). See, 
e. g., Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, `Final 
Report' (2001) 15 February (The Lamfalussy Report). 
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PART TWO 
EXPLORING THE DISCREPANCYBETWEEN THE 
OBJECTIVES OF THE GREEK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE STANDARDS, COMPLIANCE, 
AND A CTUAL GOVERNANCE EFFICIENCY 
132 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DISCUSSION OF THE GREEK CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Purposes of this Chapter 
The objectives of this chapter are four. First is to describe the Greek 
corporate governance attributes applying the contextualised approach, as in 
the previous chapter. More particularly, the chapter seeks to explain the 
specific patterns of Greek corporate governance arrangements and to highlight 
that due to situational variables the Greek corporate governance system, 
though it follows closely the models of other jurisdictions, yet it is a, distinct, 
`hybrid rule-based' system. 
Second is to further understand the legal and economic assumptions 
that explain the shape of the existing corporate governance framework. More 
particularly, alongside the progress of the Greek capital market law and 
securities legislation, the development of the Greek corporate governance 
principles has been witnessed. To that end, the chapter sketches the 
development of the Greek capital market law given that, as in other 
jurisdictions, likewise in Greece, capital market law and securities legislation 
has underpinned many of the most fundamental corporate governance 
principles. 
Third is to attest the tendency of the Greek regulator to legislate by 
producing large volumes of legal texts on corporate governance issues, 
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therefore creating an overly bureaucratic legal framework. This is particularly 
revealed by reviewing the legislative means by which the OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles were introduced in the Greek legal order. In addition, a 
key characteristic that is demonstrated throughout the following analysis is 
that the regulator closely follows the developments in the EU legislation. This 
is confirmed by describing all corporate governance obligations, the 
enactment of which is more often than not part of the incorporation process of 
the European legislation (and recommendations) into the Greek legal order. In 
this setup, the main proposition at the core of this thesis explored is that the 
current Greek corporate governance system, which entails a large amount of 
rules, contains rules that overlap with other legislation. Such overlaps and the 
inherently rigid civil law system are reckoned to create an overly bureaucratic 
legal framework. 
Therefore, the fourth objective of the present analysis is to provide the 
building block for the analysis that follows in the next chapter, in an attempt 
to show that the current, and rather rich (in terms of volumes of legal 
documents), legal framework governing the corporate governance practices of 
Greek corporations (mainly listed firms) is overly bureaucratic and rigid. In 
turn, obstacles are created in achieving satisfactory levels of compliance, 
dramatically undermining the Greek corporate governance system's 
efficiency. 
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The Structure of this Chapter 
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The chapter is structured as follows. First, upon a more contextualised 
approach to the principal agent theory, as analysed in the previous chapter, it 
is concluded that the Greek system is not a wholesale construction of the most 
dominant systems (such as for instance the Anglo-Saxon or the Continental 
European systems). Rather, as it appears from a closer examination that the 
Greek model is a distinct one, significantly influenced by international 
paradigms, yet with major adaptations to domestic attributes. 
Second, the review of the structure of the Greek capital and securities 
market offers valuable insight explaining the current formation of the 
corporate governance framework. This is so given that the Greek capital 
market law and securities legislation has provided the legal background for 
defining numerous corporate governance principles, especially the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Law in 2002, which applies to all 
listed companies (including those f =s that are in the process of being listed 
and to some certain extent to non listed firms by way of analogy). 
Third, prior to briefly describing the corporate governance rules, the 
evolution of those rules is presented, aiming to show the corporate governance 
activism in the Greek market started after the year 1999. At that time, 
although at a global level such activism was considerable, an event of 
significant national importance occurred. The slowdown of the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) revealed a number of irregularities that demanded prompt 
corrective actions. 
Fourth, the study goes through the main provisions of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, focusing on its interpretational ambiguities, its 
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drafting generalities, and the unnecessary burden that it creates to listed firms. 
The objective is to establish the regulatory overlaps, the tendency of the 
regulator to legislate on corporate governance matters (hard law approach), 
and the existence of a poorly drafted law. Such characteristics are reckoned to 
create an overly bureaucratic legal framework and to reasonably determine the 
level of efficiency of the Greek corporate governance system. 
Fifth, the pervasive influence of the OECD and most importantly of 
the EU regulations has been recognised as an important parameter for the 
development of the existing Greek corporate governance universe. Therefore, 
the incorporation of those rules into the Greek legal order, more often than not 
by the enactment of specific legislation, is extensively discussed, in an attempt 
to explain three things. One, that these two sources of law are significant for 
determining the Greek corporat overnance universe. Two, it is the fact that 
these two sources of law p sseSa p ominent position in the Greek legal order 
since they are binding legal pri ciples usually introduced by the enactment of 
legislation. Three, it is the tendency of the Greek regulator to legislate on 
corporate governance matters, therefore confirming the nature of the Greek 
rules-based corporate governance system. 
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2. GREECE: DEFINING THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SITUATIONAL VARIABLES 
Introduction 
Upon a more contextualised approach to the principal agent theory, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is established that the diversity of 
corporate arrangements, specific corporate governance patterns, and 
approaches are mediated by their fit or alignment with situational variables 
arising in diverse organisational, corporate, and legal environments. 
Therefore, the shape of the specific corporate governance model in each 
country is a compilation of those situational variables. 
The main objective of this part is to understand the Greek corporate 
governance patterns, the specific agency concerns that are associated with 
certain disciplinary mechanisms, the similarities to, and differences from other 
systems. The discussion of the Greek situational variables in comparison with 
variables of other jurisdictions will help explain why corporate governance 
systems differ across countries. 
Specifically, the differences in the corporate background and 
environment are due to, inter alia, different formations of corporations; the 
different practices in securing financing; the different capital market laws; the 
variable level of protection of shareholders; the different degree of 
participation of employees in the decision making process; the regulatory 
response to correct problematic situations, etc. 
In the analysis that follows the method of presentation is not merely a 
descriptive but comparative as well. Such comparative method is used to 
describe those situational variables as to Greece compared with other 
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jurisdictions (such as for instance USA, UK, Germany, and Japan). Therefore, 
it is shown the ways in which the Greek civil and corporate governance 
system was influenced by other international practices, confirming that the 
Greek corporate governance model entails elements from the prevailing 
international paradigms, yet with significant adaptations to domestic attributes 
and some points that it offers its own original solutions or formulations. 
The following important considerations are highlighted. First, that in 
relation to ownership structure, the Greek corporate governance framework 
most resembles the Japanese family firms' model. Second, with respect to the 
legal origin it is closer to the German system. Third, it very much follows the 
spirit and the letter of the OECD best practices and recommendations. Fourth, 
it strongly considers the UK codes approach based on the `comply or explain' 
principles. Fifth, at the same time, the Greek corporate governance model 
reveals a tendency to look to the US hard law approach to regulation. Sixth, 
that in conjunction with all the above the impact of the EC law in determining 
the nature of the corporate governance system is pervasive. 
Greek Corporate Governance Attributes under the International Spotlight 
In light of the key predicates upon which the corporate governance 
models are differentiated (i. e. ownership structure, legal tradition, the source 
of financing, disciplining mechanisms, specific social and political 
expectations, the differing paths of economic development, and the political 
history and culture within which public firms are organised and operate), an 
attempt to approach the Greek corporate governance system from a single 
point of view (e. g. the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance pattern) is not 
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possible. This is due to the fact that the Greek corporate governance system 
accommodates some of the key predicates of the most dominant corporate 
governance practices, namely the Anglo-Saxon, the German, and the Japanese, 
ones. 
Beyond the typical US and UK corporate governance systems, 
important empirical work has revealed that the world wide corporate 
governance landscape has a single monolithic feature: control of publicly 
traded corporations is typically lodged in a single individual, family, or 
group. 297 Thereby on the grounds of concentrated ownership structure, the 
Anglo Saxon practices are the less dominant ones but yet the most cited 
reference point in the corporate governance literature. 298 
Legal Tradition: Civil Law Determined by the European Law 
To start with, Greek law belongs to the category of civil law and is 
mainly influenced by the French and the German standards. Civil law's main 
feature is that only legislative enactments (rather than judicial precedents, or 
the works of legal scholars as is the case in common law systems) are 
considered legally binding. However, in reality, Greek courts do pay attention 
to, and are informed of previous decisions, especially from higher courts (and 
297 See, e. g., Gilson, R. J., `Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy' (2005) ECGI, Law Working Paper 49. In addition, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer present data on ownership structures of large firms in 27 
wealthy economies and find that relatively few of those firms are widely held, in contrast with 
the Berle-Means image of ownership of the modern corporation, vis-ä-vis US and UK firms. 
See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, `Corporate Ownership around the 
World' (1999) 54 (2) J Fin 471. 
298 Compared with most of the rest of the world, the corporate arrangements in the US and the 
UK remain an oddity. According to the OECD, more than 75% of all registered companies in 
the industrialised world are family business -and not just small and medium sized ones. Yet, 
such structures are essentially unheard of in the US and the UK. See, e. g., Becht, M., P. Betts, 
and R. Morck, `The Complex Evolution of Family Affairs' Financial Times (3 February 
2003). 
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especially those of the `Areios Pagos' -the Supreme Civil and Criminal 
Court). Usually, courts only seldom depart from prior established practice 
reflected by a series of decisions. In a similar manner, the works of legal 
scholars have the potential of influencing both the legislators in enacting the 
law and the courts in interpreting it. 299 
More particularly, from a comparative legal perspective, the Greek 
civil law belongs to the distinct group of German civil law (along with 
Germany, Austria, Croatia, Switzerland, Portugal, Turkey, Japan, South Korea 
and the republic of China). 300 For the most part, Greek law is codified and, 
unlike Anglo-American common law, only enacted laws either in the form of 
codes or other statutes are the sources of law in addition to custom and 
international law. 301 
Additionally, in Greece, as in all member countries of the EU, many 
aspects of the national legal system are exposed to rapidly accelerating change 
due to the pervasive impact of the EC law. Greece became the tenth member 
of the then European Economic Communities (now the European Union) on 
January 1,1981.302 As a result, both the rules provided for by the Treaty of 
Rome establishing the EU and the directives or regulations of the Council or 
the Commission play an important role in Greek law, either becoming an 
299 See, e. g., Christodoulou, D. P., `Introduction to the Greek Legal System' Jurist Legal 
Intelligence. 
300 It is worth noting that comparative scholars have also distinguished two more civil law 
groups. One, it is the French civil law, where France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and 
former colonies of those countries belong. Two, it is the Scandinavian civil law countries, 
where Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland belong. In the context of the literature 
on comparative law, a book written by Kerameus, K. D., and P. J. Kozyris Introduction to 
Greek Law (Deventer / Athens: Kluwer and Sakkoulas 1988) reflects the first coherent 
presentation of the Greek legal system written in English. The reader can be familiarised with 
the history, methods, and sources, as well as much of the substance of the country's law, 
which exceed the scope of the present thesis. 
301 See, e. g., Christodoulou, D. P., `Introduction to the Greek Legal System' Jurist Legal 
Intelligence. 
302 For more information on Greece's EU membership, visit 
ýttn //europa. eu/abc/european countries/eu members/greece/index en htm 
140 
w; 
integral part of the Greek legal system or influencing it towards the goal of 
harmonization of the law of all member states. 
Concentration of Ownership: the Family Firms 
The Greek corporate conditions crystallise family firms as the most 
dominant type of organisational structure. As aforementioned, according to 
studies on family firms' sustainability; 303 the family characteristics of the 
Greek firms seem to be maintained in the first generation life-cycle of the 
firm. Later on, as the family firm evolves, the corporate state of affairs are 
those of concentrated ownership, with members of the founding family to still 
possess key managerial positions, yet with no absolute controlling rights, and 
outside directors to obtain significant role. 
In terms of ownership structure, a typical attribute of the Greek capital 
market is that the majority of large corporations are controlled by handful of 
families. According to data in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 65% 
of the 20 largest Greek firms are controlled by a few wealthy families, while 
30% are state controlled and only 5% are widely held with no controlling 
shareholders. 304 
Although most Greek corporations are controlled by wealthy families, 
this is very unusual for most great American and British corporations. 305 More 
particularly, the US corporate finance was historically characterised by diffuse 
ownership among a large number of outside investors, which corresponds the 
303 See, e. g., Cadbury Sir, A., 'Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's 
Company from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International. 
304 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership around 
the World' (1999) 54 (2) J Fin 471,493. 
305 By contrast, in the US counterparties the data reveals 80% widely held firms, which rise to 
90% in the UK firms. ld. 
ý'ýý. 
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Berle and Means description of the separation of ownership and control. 
306 
Hence, the outside investors did not have any intermediate role in the 
separation of ownership and control. Against this background, the main 
corporate governance dilemmas (e. g. the protection of the interests of 
shareholders) explain the different approaches and corporate governance 
mechanisms and regulations employed to address them. 
307 
By contrast to the US and UK corporate governance model, the Greek 
listed firms cannot be considered as having a diffuse ownership structure. The 
dispersion is rather low, with a tendency to become even lower. 
308 More 
particularly, dispersion is now 35.70% when shareholders that own less than 
1% are taken into account. This figure rises to 47.22% when shareholders that 
own at least 5% of outstanding shares are taken into account. 
309 
Such pattern of ownership concentration is also explained by the 
findings of the London Business School survey310 for the Greek corporate 
practices to the extent that they find that family firms' governance 
(concentrated ownership) tends not to follow hard laws. Even if there are 
certain rules and principles, those are mainly formatted by the existing 
corporate culture and they only cover certain activities of the firm. The 
presence of the owner in the management of the firm `traditionally' 
306 See, e. g., Berle, A., and G. Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (The 
Macmillan Company, New York 1932). 
307 See, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) 
Colum L Rev 10,17; and Roe, M. J., `Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and 
Control of Public Companies' (1990) 27 (1) J Fin Econ 7. 
308 Cf. HCMC, 'Diffused Ownership in the Greek Listed Firms' (in Greek) (2001) December; 
and HCMC, 'Diffused Ownership in the Greek Listed Firms' (in Greek) (2001) June. 
309 See, e. g., Kapopoulos, P., and S. Lazaretou, 'Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Greek Firms' (2006) Bank of Greece, Working Paper 37; and 
HCMC, `Diffused Ownership in the Greek Listed Firms' (in Greek) (2001) June. 
310 See, e. g., London Business School, 'Corporate Governance for Corporate Sustainability: 
The Greek Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) Greek Alumni Association (Kantor; Genesis 
Pharma SA). 
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incorporates the whole corporate governance framework. 31 1 The owners- 
managers of those firms exercise their power to promote and satisfy their 
interests, usually coupled with an unwillingness to surrender part of their 
control rights and power in the sake of `good governance practices'. 312 
As the main attribute of the Greek family-owned firms is the 
entrenchment of the owners-managers, the initial negative approach towards 
the implementation of corporate governance rules is explained. To the extent 
that a corporate governance system is described as a nexus of rules that 
impose specific obligations on the senior management of a corporation, it 
explains why in some cases, the senior management is not willing to comply 
with rules that could challenge their authority, position or power. Such 
obligations may appear for family firms as a strong reason for exiting or not. 
joining stock exchanges. 313 
Finally, the Greek corporate governance model can be argued to be 
different from the Anglo-Saxon model, on the grounds of diversities in the 
business and legal context. The Greek business context crystallises listed 
companies as a small fraction of the total number of companies in the country. 
This contrasts sharply with the US and UK business context, where many 
311 See, e. g., London Business School, 'Corporate Governance for Corporate Sustainability: 
The Greek Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) Greek Alumni Association (Kantor; Genesis 
Pharma SA). 
312 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 6. 
313 According to the LBS survey examining the conduct of family firms in the Greek capital 
market concluded that for the period 1945 to 2000, there was a steady decline of the number 
of family firms that were present in the Top 100 of firms (according to total assets). While in 
1945,80 of the firms were family owned, in 2000 this number declined to 15. Evidently, the 
number of companies with low corporate governance standards (i. e. family firms) declines 
compared to the number of other listed companies in the Top 100 companies. See, e. g., 
London Business School, 'Corporate Governance for Corporate Sustainability: The Greek 
Reality, 1945-2000' (in Greek) (2003) Greek Alumni Association (Kantor; Genesis Pharma 
SA), at 21, 
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companies are listed, and their shares are publicly traded, resulting in little 
personal contact with their shareholders. 
External Financing 
In terms of external finance, the Greek corporate affairs, where family 
firms are the prevailing form of organisation, although in the first stages of the 
corporations' life no external finance is sought (either from bank loans or 
from stock exchange), yet, in the course of the firms' development and 
expansion, there is a fairly split trend, with some corporations to tend to seek 
external finance from banks and with some others from the securities market. 
In practice, as far as family firms are concerned, bank finance is sought to a 
greater extent, whereas larger corporations (including also ex family firms that 
have been transformed) usually list their share in the stock exchange. 
In the UK, given that corporations in general are not dependent on 
bank financing but they rather seek financing through securities, thereby 
control of most public companies is in the public domain. Hostile takeovers 
are a phenomenon largely observed in the US and the UK. 314 
Regulatory Responses 
Another distinguishing element of the Greek approach to corporate 
governance affairs relates mainly to the form of response to those concerns, .. 
whereby Greece adopts binding legislative means to address issues that 
traditionally are the subject of voluntary forms of action. This is testified by 
314 See, e. g., Gilson, R. J., `Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy' (2005) ECGI, Law Working Paper 49, at 2. 
144 
the review of the means by which the OECD Principles and other EU 
initiatives in the sphere of corporate governance were incorporated in the 
Greek legal order. In addition to the same direction point important reflections 
from the evolution of the Greek corporate governance principles, an analysis 
that also contributes to opening new avenues of comparative research and 
highlighting similarities, differences or convergence tendencies. 
The Greek approach resembles more the US rule-based practice and 
contrasts with the UK one where a `principles-based' approach is employed to 
corporate governance through the implementation of `best practices' 
guidelines in combination with mandatory explanation as to the extent of 
compliance with such guidelines and, where a firm's practices depart from 
that approach, to describe the reasons for that deviation. 315 However, the 
Greek paradox is that although there is a rules-based corporate governance 
system, it is also suggested that an informal establishment be made of the 
possibility to `comply or explain' non compliance, similar to the UK practice 
and other European countries. 
316 
315 See, e. g., Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, 'Comparative Study of Corporate Governance 
Codes Relevant to the European Union and Member States' (2002) Final Report & Annexes 
I-III' (January). 
316 According to the findings of the 2006 Corporate Governance Survey, which reflect a 
similar trend in the 2005 Corporate Governance Survey, the vast majority of the Greek 
corporations do not make use of the possibility to explain the reasons for non compliance with 
corporate governance rules. See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics 
and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 8; and Grant 
Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2005 Corporate Governance 
Survey', 2005, at 8. Such practice of Greek corporations is mainly explained on the grounds 
that it is provided for by the Mertzanis Recommendations and not by the binding provisions 
of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. On the contrary, there are very positive results on 
the level of explanation given by UK companies, who do not fully comply with the provisions 
of the Combined Code. In 2006,96% (90%, in 2005) of the companies provided at least some 
explanation as to the reasons for non compliance. See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk 
Management Services, 'Fourth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review: Highlighting 
Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 7; and Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 
'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' 
(2006), at 9. 
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The adoption of this approach means that the recommendations 
contained in the Corporate Governance Codes are associated with the 
possibility of listed corporations to justify possible behaviour divergence from 
that implied by the recommendations. 317 
Furthermore, the fact that the Greek legislator prefers to enact a 
binding legislative document to enforce corporate governance rules does not 
necessarily reflect the recognition of the importance of corporate governance 
in the Greek capital markets but it may also reflect the pressure exercised on 
the Greek legislator to deal with intense capital market problems. Against 
such pressure, drafting weaknesses were the reason for the amendment of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002, soon after its enactment, by the Law 
3091/2002.318 
In addition, although the tendency of the Greek regulator to legislate 
on corporate governance matters leads to inflexible state of legal affairs, seen 
in isolation might not be reckoned as problematic, yet in the specific context 
of the Greek market an important observation can be made. The effects of 
such situation are, inter alia, that Greek corporations are facing complexities 
and difficulties in adapting to regulations, explaining in turn the moderate 
levels of compliance, as is shown in the next chapter. 
Overall, debates have emerged over the appropriateness of different 
policy approaches based on hard law or regulation that draws upon soft law, 
such as codes based on comply or explain principles. The hard law approach '' 
to regulation (e. g. US and Greek approach) seeks to strengthen corporate 
317 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) 'Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece, at 7. 
"a Hellenic Law 3091/2002 'on Simplifications and Improvements in the Taxation of Income 
and Capital and Other Provisions', Government Gazette A330/24.12.2002. 
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governance through legal rules that cover all companies operating in a 
particular jurisdiction. Such an approach mandates high minimum standards ä ',. 
and failure to meet these results in sever legal penalties. Soft law, such as the 
UK Combined Code, is based on an alternative approach of comply or explain 
principles. 319 This approach has been criticized for its weaker degree of 
enforcement and inability to mandate uniform minimum standards, but also 
has potential benefits in dealing with costs and contingencies. 320 
On the contrary, the mix of soft law and hard law approaches to 
corporate governance regulation is to a certain extent beneficial for firms 
because it provides them with flexibility to adapt or mix various corporate 
governance practices. Such option can * help firms to tailor corporate 
governance to diverse business and organisational variables, provided that 
firms are corporate governance conscious. Overall the trade-offs involved in 
each regulatory response can be better understood by analysing the 
implementation effects. 321 As to Greece, these are analysed in more detail in 
the following chapter. 
Shareholders' and Employees' Role in the Decision Making Process 
The main legal text for the operation of Greek companies (e. g. Law 
2190/1920,322 as codified) sets the main principles for two important internal 
institutional mechanisms of those companies: (i) the General Meeting of 
Shareholders, and (ii) the formation and operation of the Boards of Directors. 
319 See, e. g., Aguilera, R. V., I. Filatotchev, H. Gospel, and G. Jackson, 'An Organisational 
Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and 
Complementarities' (2008) Organisation Sciences, forthcoming, at 31. 
320 Id. at 32. 
321 Id. at 33. 
322 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (societes 
anonymes), official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
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The General Meeting of the Shareholders is the `supreme' decision- 
making organ of the company323 and has the right to decide on all matters 
concerning key areas of the corporations' activities (e. g. make amendments to 
the company's statutes; appoint board members; appoint statutory auditors; 
approve the company's annual accounts and dividends; and distribute the 
annual profits). Shareholders exercise their rights through the shareholder 
meeting, which must be called at least once a year and shareholders must be 
notified, either in writing or by email, at least 20 days prior to any such 
meeting. The shareholders' right of vote in the general meeting corresponds to 
the shares they possess. 
In more specific terms, in cases that the majority of controlling 
ownership is not assumed by large shareholders or families, alliances among 
shareholders are made quite often, ensuring in this way that certain classes of 
shareholders will have significant control rights. In the case of big 
conglomerates, the management of firms is directly controlled by large 
shareholders, while the minority shareholders are considerably secluded and 
weak to raise any objections, even when the latter participate in the Board of 
Directors. 324 Usually, the minority of shareholders is happy with receiving the 
minimum information, either at a Board of Director's level or at a level of the 
General Shareholders Meeting. 
The Greek corporate structure more closely resembles the German and 
Japanese one in terms of the role of employees in the decision making 
process. Such role is secured by EU rules, according to which certain 
373 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtes 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified, Article 33. 
324 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis 
- Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 9. 
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procedures have been developed to ensure fair participation of employees in 
the decision-making organs and mechanisms of corporations. In specific 
cases, employees or their representatives, not only participate in the decision- 
making mechanisms but they also have rights of information, negotiation and 
even of co-decision. The Greek legislation, in compliance with the EU 
demands, stipulates that 1/3 of the employees must participate in the Board of 
Directors or in the General Meeting responsible for the Social Control. 
325 
It follows that syndicalism (or trade unionism) in Greece is quite 
developed with wide ranging role in promoting or blocking laws and 
regulations. 326 Syndicalism has gained over the time much power enabling the 
promotion of views and actions simply favourable and beneficial to 
employees' rights. 
327 However, according to data for the year 2000, it is 
recorded that the increased power of syndicalism in Greece appears to decline, 
finding an increasing decline of the role of trade unions with 65.6% of 
employees not to be members of any trade union. 
328 Notwithstanding that the 
60.6% of the participants expressed their opinion that trade union are the most 
effective means through which employees can promote their interests, the 
decline of the power of trade unions reflects a new era for corporate 
governance reforms in Greece. 
329 
325 The development of work councils was envisaged by Article 1 of the Hellenic Law 
1767/1988 Work Councils and Other Labour Provisions, Official Government Gazette A63/ 
06.04.1988, as last amended by Law 2941/2001 on Simplification of Procedures for Setting 
up Corporations (Official Government Gazette A201/ 12.09.2001). 
36 Increased government intervention and interference of political parties in the structure and 
the formation of their overall stance is typical of the Greek trade unions. For a brief historical 
evolution and explanation of today's trade unions in Greece, see, e. g., Kouzis, G., `Trade 
Unionism in Greece' (in Greek) Enimerosi, General Union of Employees in Greece (2005) 
122. 
327 See, e. g., Katsoridas, D., `Trade Unions and Labour' (in Greek) Enimerosi, General Union 
of Employees in Greece (2001) 69. 
328 Id. 
329 1d 
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In general, Greek institutional investors do not have much power and 
this is mainly due to their focus on short-term investments lather than on long- 
term commitments. In Greece, institutional investors usually follow a passive 
voting for management and they rarely provide sufficient information for their 
investment policy to beneficiaries. 330 
On the contrary it is typical that in a large American public firm, 
dispersed shareholders are very distant from the decision making process 
(either physically or due to lack of financial education). Despite the recent 
active role of US institutional investors, the US corporate governance is 
strongly characterised by generally passive shareholders, compared to German 
and Japanese investors. 331 Such passivity of American shareholders is mainly 
explained on the American structure of corporate governance, which largely 
focuses power in management, particularly in the CEO. For this reason, 
American shareholders are relatively powerless to affect management 
decisions332 and monitoring generally occurs ex post rather than ex ante, 
assuming a more evaluative than proactive nature. 333 In sharp contrast, 
managers of Japanese firms sacrifice control and flexibility for the safety and 
security of a main bank relationship. 
334 
330 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 7. 
331 For a criticism on the actual role of institutional investors, see, e. g., Millstein, I. M., `The 
Board - Governing Beyond Where the Law Ends' (address to the ICGN 2006 Annual 
Conference, Washington DC, 5 July 2006). 
332 See, e. g., Miller, G. P., and J. R. Macey, 'Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: 
a Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States' (1995) 48 (1) Stan L 
Rev 73,81. 
333 See, e. g., Boot, A. W. A., and J. R. Macey, 'Monitoring Corporate Performance: the Role 
of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance' (2004) 89 (2) Cornell L 
R 353,358. 
334 See, e. g., Miller, G. P., and J. R. Macey, `Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: 
a Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States' (1995) 48 (1) Stan L 
Rev 73,81. 
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Admittedly, labour participation is almost unknown to company law in 
the UK, in sharp contrast with the system of employee codetermination in `,. 
Germany. 335 
Stakeholders' and Institutional Investors' Role 
Pension funds and banks do not have a pivotal role in the corporate 
governance framework of the Greek capital market, compared to the US and 
the UK practices. The market itself appears to be inefficient and its 
contribution in the transformation and improvement of the operations of 
corporations -particularly with take over bids as an important mechanism, 
which could eventually lead in the change of the leadership composition- 
336 
seems to be quite limited. 
Such differences of institutional investors' voice and influence on 
issues regarding the regulation and treatment of listed companies are 
explained by historical roots. For instance, despite the general and long 
standing US tendency against concentration of power to financial 
institutions 337 and other institutional investors, only the state pension unions 
"s In a historical context, English company law was unaffected by employee concerns 
especially after the failure of the Bullock Committee's proposal on labour representation at 
the board level in the mid '70s, see, e. g., Hopt, K. J., and P. C. Leyens, `Board Models in 
Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France and Italy' (2004) ECGI, Law Working Paper 18, at 14. On the 
Bullock proposals see, e. g., Davies, P. L., `A Note on Labour and Corporate Governance in 
the UK' in K. J. Hopt, H. Kanda, M. J. Roe, E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge (eds. ), Comparative 
Corporate Governance: the State of the Art and Emerging Research (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1998) at 373-386. 
336 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 8. 
337 This American result is explained on America's politics of financial fragmentation, rooted 
in federalism, populism and interest group pressures reducing the power of American 
financial institutions, contributing heavily to the rise of the 'Berle-Means corporation'. See, 
e. g., Roe, M. J., `Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America' 
(1993) 102 (8) Yale LJ 1927,1929. Also, see, e. g., Roe, M. J., `A Political Theory of 
American Corporate Finance' (1991) 91 (1) Colum L Rev 10,17; and Roe, M. J., 'Political 
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had a governance role. 338 Starting from 1987, in the US, institutional investors 
-pension funds in particular- deviated from their prior role as passive investors 
by submitting proxy proposals focusing largely on corporate governance 
issues and therefore the decision when to reorganize a company. 339 
Accordingly, the UK institutional investors own approximately 70% of 
the equity in the country's public corporations. 340 Still, an individual financial 
institution is unlikely to control more than 5% of the equity in any one firm. 341 
However, the American equities markets are less institutionally dominated 
than the UK stock market. 342 It follows that the premise that institutional 
investors may be highly effective external monitors is intuitively appealing in 
the UK. 343 Additionally, although in the US coordinated shareholder activism 
is rare, this practice contrasts sharply with UK, where coordinated 
institutional investors often approach a company jointly to increase that 
influence. 344 
and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies' (1990) 27 (1) J Fin 
Econ 7. 
338 Shareholder activism is particularly strong in US (and the UK). However, American 
institutions remain far more hemmed in by legal constraints than their British counterparties. 
See, e. g., Black, B. S., `Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States' 
in P. Newman (ed. ), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Stockton Press, 
New York 1998), Vol. 3, at 459, further citing Black, B. S., and J. Coffee, `Hail Britannia?: 
Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation' (1994) 92 (7) Mich LR 1997; 
and Roe, M. J., `Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America' 
(1993) 102 (8) Yale LJ 1927. 
339 See, e. g., Friedman, B., `Economic Implications of Changing Share Ownership' (1996) 22 
(3) J Portfolio M 59,60. 
340 See, e. g., Steele, M., `Time for Investors to Come in from the Cold' Financial Times (19 
May 2005). 
341 See, e. g., Department of Trade and Industry - (DTI), 'Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework' (2000) URN 00/656, at paragraph 11.26. 
342 See, e. g., Black, B. S., and J. Coffee, 'Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour 
Under Limited Regulation' (1994) 92 (7) Mich LR 1997,2002. 
343 On the role of financial institutions in corporate governance in the UK, see, e. g., Black, B. 
S., and J. Coffee, `Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation' (1994) 92 (7) Mich LR 1997,2002; and Davies, P. L., `A Note on Labour and 
Corporate Governance in the UK' in K. J. Hopt, H. Kanda, M. J. Roe, E. Wymeersch and S. 
Prigge (eds. ), Comparative Corporate Governance: the State of the Art and Emerging 
Research (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998) at 373-386. 
'"' See, e. g., Black, B. S., and J. Coffee, `Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour 
Under Limited Regulation' (1994) 92 (7) Mich LR 1997. 
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The Board of Directors 
In principle, the one-tier system of Greek board of directors' structure 
is opposed to the so-called dual or two-tier system, where there is clear 
distinction between managing and supervisory directors (e. g. Germany). In 
such structures shareholders directly elect the directors through the General 
Meeting of Shareholders (i. e. monistic system). More particularly, both the 
management and the supervision are exercised by the managing Board of 
Directors345 but generally delegate day-to-day management to hired executive 
managers and it represents the company. It is made up of at least three 
members and is required to meet at least once a month. The Board of 
Directors has significant discretionary power and broad authority to decide on 
every matter related with the management of the company; the administration 
of its property; and generally with the implementation of the company's 
objectives. Yet, company's bylaws may impose stricter limits and guidelines. 
The relationship between the directors and the company, as a legal entity, is 
an organic one with directors to act as an arm-organ of the company. 346 
The liability of the managing director, otherwise the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), is much stricter than that of other senior managers of board 
members. However, with regard to the separation of the roles of CEO and 
Chairman of the Board, the family origins of Greek corporations can explain 
the trend of combining these two -roles into a single person. This is also 
reflected by the findings of the 2005 and the 2006 Corporate Governance 
Surveys, revealing that although there is a small decline of the companies that 
still combine these two positions, the remaining majority of the companies do 
345 Article 22, paragraph 1, Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies 
(socidt6s anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
346 70-71AK (Hellenic Civil Code, 23 February 1946). 
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not separate those roles. Specifically, in 2005,38.5% of the companies 
appointed different person for the position of the CEO and Chairman, and in .2:. '. 
2006 this statistic was slightly improved to 42.4%. 347 By contrast, fewer than 
25% of companies in the US and just over 50% of companies in Japan 
separate the roles of chairman and CEO. A high proportion of companies with 
separate chair and chief executives within a unitary board structure are in the 
UK, with over 92%. 
348 
Additionally, the same legal origins explain the practice of the 
Chairman having executive powers. Although, according to 2006 data, there is 
a decline in that practice with 76.6% of the corporations allowing the 
Chairman to have executive powers (in 2005,86.4%), still the Greek 
corporations are lagging dramatically behind the 7% of the UK corporations 
that the Chairman of the Board has executive powers. 349 
Independent Directors 
The USA presents high percentages of independent directors on the 
board. As aforementioned, the independent oversight of board decision- 
making is integral to the effective functioning of a company, maintaining 
accountability and transparency. In the wake of the high profile scandals of 
347 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2005 
Corporate Governance Survey', (2005), at 12; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 12. 
348 Specifically, according to the findings of the Fourth and Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review, 93.1% and 92.7% of the UK companies separated the two roles, in 2005 
and 2006, respectively. Essentially, this pattern of separating the roles of CEO / Chairman in 
the UK companies originates from the recommendation A. 2 of the Combined Code, which 
states that 'there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for running of the 
company's business. ' See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth 
FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 11; 
and Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'F jih FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 14. 
349 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2005 
Corporate Governance Survey', (2005), at 12; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 12. 
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WorldCom and Enron, the US was quick to implement reform including the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and the revised New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
listing requirements. A key focus was independence on the board. 
On the other side, a stricter UK approach is adopted with regard to 
director independence. Section 301 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act considers 
independent directors those who are not employed full time by the firm and 
who do not receive other compensation from the firm. 
350 The Sarbanes Oxley 
Act does not address director option plans and thus it does not consider 
whether director options may compromise the independence of non-executive 
directors. By contrast, the Higgs Report 351 and the revised Combined Code352 
employ a somehow stricter and more restrictive definition of director's 
independence. Although, the UK definition of independence considers the US 
definition353 to the extent that independence is precluded if the director 
receives compensation from the firm for services other than as a director, it 
goes a step further. It follows that the Higgs `no-options' definition of 
independence considers that compensation outside the director's fee would 
compromise independence. 
354 
350 See, e. g., US House of Representatives, 'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002' (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) Public Law No. 107-204,116 
Stat. 745 (30 July 2002). 
351 See, e. g., Department of Trade and Industry - (DTI), `Review of the Role and Effectiveness 
ofNon-Executive Directors' (2003) January (the Higgs Report). 
352 See, e. g., Financial Reporting Council - (FRC), `The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance' (2003) July. Following a review of the implementation of the Combined Code in 
2005, the FRC consulted on a small number of changes to the Code. These changes were 
incorporated in an updated version of the Code published in June 2006 (See, e. g., Financial 
Reporting Council - (FRC), `The Combined Code on Corporate Governance' (2006) June) 
(The revised Combined Code). 
353 Requiring a greater degree of independence on boards has been a central theme in the US 
corporate governance reform measures. The Sarbanes Oxley Act requires all members of the 
audit committee to be independent. Under the new NASDAQ listing rules and the new NYSE 
listing rules, a majority of the board must be independent. See, e. g., Department of Trade and 
Industry - (DTI), `Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors' (2003) 
January (the Higgs Report). 
354 See, e. g., Department of Trade and Industry - (DTI), `Review of the Role and Effectiveness 
ofNon-Executive Directors' (2003) January (the Higgs Report). 
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In terms of the evolution of corporate governance, the Higgs Report - 
was a timely opportunity to review the role and effectiveness of non executive''. 
directors, thereby further developing the UK framework of corporate 
governance with emphasis on the non-executive directors as the custodians of 
the governance process. 355 More particularly, the Higgs Report reflects on the 
quality of non-executive directors and on the boardroom climate, along with 
the behaviour necessary for their success. Its main findings are mainly 
concentrated on enhancing the competence and effectiveness of boards in 
promoting business prosperity. 
When it comes to the specific context of the Greek market, a paradox 
is observed. On the one side, it is recognised that independent directors as 
disciplinary mechanism are vital, envisaged also in Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002,356 but on account of the entrenchment of 
the owners-managers in the context of family firms their role is limited. From 
an agency perspective, the conflicts of interest do not usually arise between 
shareholders and managers but rather between large shareholders and external 
investors. In the cases of large shareholders, who control and influence the 
General Shareholding Meeting, the role of non executive members in the 
Board is limited. Such restricted role can be also explained on the fact that the 
appointment of independent non executive members on the Board of Directors 
is not welcome in family firms because that would mean that the family 
members would have to transfer part of their control rights and management 
power to handful of independent members. Therefore, although independent 
ass See, e. g., Department of Trade and Industry - (DTI), `Review of the Role and Effectiveness 
ofNon-Executive Directors' (2003) January (the Higgs Report). 
36 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
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directors are needed, family firms are reluctant to appoint them. Apparently, 
in such state of affairs; the focus should be on the duties and obligations of the 
members of the Board of Directors and especially of the shadow directors, 
who manage the company without typically to be eligible to participate in the 
Board. 357 
3. THE GREEK CAPITAL MARKET: DEVELOPMENT 
AND MAIN ATTRIBUTES 
In further understanding the elements of the existing corporate 
governance framework, the focus of the analysis shifts to discuss the 
development of the Greek capital market. This is so given that as in other 
jurisdictions likewise in Greece the capital markets law and securities 
legislation has provided an important legal background for defining 
fundamental corporate governance principles. Alongside the progress of the 
Greek economy and the capital market law, the development of the Greek 
corporate governance structures has been observed. 358 Therefore, the 
economic history of Greece provides useful insight for the development of the 
country's capital market law and its corporate governance regime. 
357 See, e. g., Hadjiemmanouil, C., `Corporate Governance' (in Greek) (speech to the Institute 
of Democracy Konstantinos Karamanlis, April 2002) Working Paper Series 15. 
151 See, e. g., Athanassiou, P., 'Recent Developments in Greek Capital Markets Law' (2005) 
16 (4) EBLR 893,900. 
157 
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE)359 that suffered until the mid-1990, 
performed spectacularly in the period of 1995-1999 (particularly, after `" 
January 1997 and until December 1999, when corrections of prices took 
place 360) Such progress gained significant momentum when the Greek 
economy met the Maastricht criteria and Greece joined the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001. Within this environment, the Greek 
economy sustained its high growth rate despite the slowdown in the global 
economy -which was aggravated after the terrorist attack in New York. 
During this period of positive economic performance, the market 
capitalization of the ASE grew fast with significantly increased numbers of 
359 The Athens Stock Exchange was founded in 1876 as a regulatory independent government 
agency, the forerunner of the equity securities market of the contemporary Athens Exchange 
(ATHEX). For a historical review of the 125 years of the operation and evolution of the ASE; 
presentation of all the basic economic, political and other factors, which contributed to its 
evolution and its current formation, see, e. g., Athens Stock Exchange S. A., 11876-2001: the 
125 Years of the Athens Stock Exchange' (2001). ASE's transformation process began in 
1995 when the ASE became a state owned societds anonymes instead of the then self- 
regulated public law institution, operating under the supervision of the then Minister of 
Economy and Finance and the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (A joint stock company 
was established under the name `Athens Stock Exchange S. A. '). The transformation of the 
ASE gained momentum in March 2000 with the establishment of the 'Hellenic Exchanges 
S. A. ', which is the parent company of the ASE. Currently, the ASE consists of the following 
different markets: (i) the Main Market; (ii) the Parallel Market; and smaller markets such as 
(iii) the New Stock Exchange Market ('NEHA' established under the Law 2733/1999 on 
Development of New Market in the ASE, General Amendments of the Capital Market, the 
Public Companies and Organizations, the Corinth Canal SA and Other Provisions, Official 
Government Gazette A155/ 30.07.1999, as last amended by Law 3152/2003, Official 
Government Gazette A152/ 19.06.2003, and it provides a less onerous listing and trading 
regime for the securities of innovative or high growth medium and small sized firms, which 
did not fulfill the listing requirements of the ASE's Main or Parallel market. ); and (iv) the 
Greek Market of Emerging Capital Markets ('EAGAK'). See, e. g., Athanassiou, P., 'Recent 
Developments in Greek Capital Markets Law' (2005) 16 (4) EBLR 893,898. The main 
responsibilities of the ASE include, inter alia, the approval of the listing of new shares; the 
supervision of its members and its listed companies; the provision of assistance to the HCMC 
on matters of corporate governance, including the monitoring of acquisitions of significant 
stakes of listed companies and obligations under the exchange's rules of conduct; the 
coordination of the processes for conducting market transactions; the certification and 
appointment of brokers' representatives. 
3 See, e. g., Doukas, P. G., Corporate Governance, Securities, Stock Exchanges and 
Corporations' Evaluation (in Greek) (I. Sideris Publications, Athens, 2002), at 66-67. The 
author also provides a range of explanations that lead mainly domestic investors to seize on 
the vast potentials for the expansion of the Greek securities markets at that time. (See also id. 
at 67-71). 
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listed companies and was also marked by the operation of the Athens 
Derivatives Exchange (ADEX)361 in autumn 1999.362 
In retrospect, the shallow Greek capital market and the usual practice 
of domestic investments to mainly be directed to the domestic shares and 
values, with foreign institutional investors to be the minority, 363 reflected 
important elements of the corporate landscape in Greece and excuses to some 
361 The Law 2533/1997 on Derivatives Exchange and Other Provisions, Official Government 
Gazette A228/ 11.11.1997, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
A178/ 14.07.2005) provides the necessary legal framework for the establishment of the 
formal and organized derivatives market in Greece. The ADEX and the Athens Derivatives 
Exchange Clearing House S. A (ADECH) are established for the organisation, operation and 
development of the market. The main purpose of ADEX is the organization and support of the 
transactions concluded in the derivatives market; the operation of the trading system in the 
derivatives market as well as any similar activity (Article 2, paragraph 2). ADECH's main 
purpose is to participate in the derivatives contracts conducted in ADEX; to clear transactions 
concluded in the derivatives exchange market or in other markets; to ensure compliance of the 
contracting parties with the obligations arising from derivative contracts; and to engage in any 
other related activity (Article 16, paragraph 2). In respect to the adherence to the rules and 
regulations of the capital market, the HCMC exercises control and supervision on ADEX's 
and ADECH's operation (Article 8, paragraph 1). 
362 See, e. g., Tsipouri, L., and M. Xanthakis, 'Can Corporate Governance Be Rated? Ideas 
Based on the Greek Experience', (2004) 12 (1) CG 16,17. 
363 The Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) flows remain low in comparison with the EU. FDI 
inwards as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation increased from 5.9 in 1985-1995 to 
6.0 in 2001. However, in 2002 FDI inwards in proportion to Greece's gross fixed capital 
formation dropped sharply to 0.2. At the same time, the EU average increased from 5% in 
1985-1995 to 22.5% in 2002. In general, Greece's inward FDI Performance Index is below 
the composite index for the EU countries. Interestingly, among the group of Mediterranean 
countries, Greece shows the second lowest level of estimated deterred FDI, in a range from 
92-122%. See, e. g., Spanos, L., 'Corporate Governance in Greece: Developments and Policy 
Implications' (2004) EconWPA. According to 2005 data from Eurostat, Greece takes the 
second lowest place in total FDI outflows for 2005. See, e. g., Eurostat, 'Increased FDI Flows 
for the EU in 2005' (2006) 21 Economy and Finance (10 October 2006). Additionally, the 
current increased FDI outflow in Greece is mainly due to the fact that (i) the Dutch company 
Aramco sold all its shares that possessed from Motor Oil Holdings S. A.; and (ii) the major 
Greek banks, based on their strategy, expand their operations to the Balkans with the 
acquisition of Jubanka in Serbia & Montenegro by Alpha Bank (total FDI outflow of 152 
million Euros); participation of Alpha Bank to the share capital increase of its subsidiary 
Alpha Bank Romania (total FDI outflow of 66 million Euros); and the acquisition from EFG 
Eurobank Ergasias S. A. of the Nationalna Stedionica Banka in Serbia & Montenegro. In 
general, the high levels of bureaucracy and the overall investment environment in Greece 
partially explain the low position of Greece in that regard. See, e. g., Stergiou, L., 'Large FDI 
Outflows in 2005' (in Greek) Kathimerini (13 October 2006). In May 2006, although the 
acquisition from the Dubai Financial Group of the 31.5% of Marfin Financial Group, an FDI 
inflow of 392 million Euros, along with the participation of Societe General in the share 
capital increase of Geniki Bank and Credit Agricole to Commercial Bank of Greece, reflected 
the beginning of an era of increased FDI inflows, still the activities of Greek banks in the 
region of Balkans can ultimately correct such increase (e. g. in January, the National Bank of 
Greece participated in the share capital increase of Banca Romanesca S. A. in Romania; and in 
March, EFG Eurobank Ergasias S. A. acquired the 100% of Polska Bank in Poland). See, e. g., 
Stergiou, L., '800 Million Euros FDI Inflows in Telecommunications and Banks in 2006' (in 
Greek) Kathimerini (13 October 2006). 
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certain extent the limited (at least at that time) role of corporate governance 
principles. In view of the lack of the foreign element, the Greek capital 
market, while theoretically open to foreign investments, does not attract 
international investments. 364 Therefore, the alternatives for (domestic) 
investors were limited; helping in this way the championing of certain 
conditions and practices, not necessarily oriented by good corporate 
governance principles. 
However, certain signs of change have been documented particularly 
after the Olympic Games of 2004, when the Greek market was put into the 
international spotlight and attracted significantly more foreign investments 365 
At the same time, the Greek Governments encourage foreign direct 
investments (FDI's) as a matter of policy and a range of effective measures 
have been introduced to make the country more attractive to FDI's. Against 
this objective, a new Investment Incentives Law has been passed, along with 
the tax reforms 366 Both these regulatory initiatives aim to cut red tape, which 
exists both at the opening of an enterprise and during its whole function, and 
simplifying the tax structure to foster investments. 
According to data by the Hellenic Centre for Investment, (ELKE), 
FDI's in Greece have improved over the last few years as foreign enterprises 
364 The foreign institutional investors, who as shown by international practices and surveys 
(see, e. g., Felton, R. F., A. Hudnut, and J. van Heeckeren, 'Putting a Value on Corporate 
Governance' (1996) 4 The McKinsey Quarterly 170) are willing to pay a premium for a well- 
governed company, do not form a large part of today's investors in the listed companies in the 
ASE, see, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003). 
30 See, e. g., - 'Business and Investment Prospects strong after Olympic Games Triumph', 
Our World, by USA Today (29 December 2004). 
366 Hellenic Law 3299/2004 on Private Investment Incentives for Economic Development and 
Regional Convergence, Official Government Gazette A261/ 23.12.2004, as last amended by 
Law 3468/2006 (Official Government Gazette A129/ 27.6.2006) funds up to 55% of the 
investments made by older or newly established companies. See, e. g., Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, 'National Reform Program for Growth and Jobs: 2005-2008' (2005), at 26. 
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investing in Greece rise in numbers, while foreign enterprises already based in 
Greece reinvest their profits. 367 In this new era of increased FDI's in Greece, 
the largest FDI in Greece's history is the sale of Emporiki Bank that was 
finalised on 14 August 2006.368 Such developments with increased foreign 
elements in the Greek securities and financial markets will intensify the 
debate of corporate governance and is to be advanced to a key priority for all 
Greek companies, as a means to survive from strong competitive forces. 
In strong relation to the above, the membership of Greece in the EU 
and particularly, recently, in the EMU, makes the Greek corporate landscape a 
dynamic one. The impact of the EC law has been so pervasive that to discuss 
Greek capital markets law otherwise than in the light of Greece's compliance 
with its EC Treaty obligations would be tantamount to disregarding an 
essential ingredient in its ongoing reform process. For over a period of almost 
25 years, a tendency of the Greek legislator to closely follow the 
developments in the European Union legislation is evident. 369 Remarkably, 
only occasionally does the Greek regulator take own legislative initiatives to 
address domestic needs, and rather those initiatives are primarily based on 
international pressure. 
The Greek stock market capitalization is in line with other European 
countries but has suffered an acute boom-bust cycle and the market is quite 
illiquid. The Greek capital market has a limited range of products with core 
367 FDI's to Greece recorded a net inflow of E 893 million in the January-May 2006 period, 
sharply up from a net inflow of E 59 million in the corresponding period last year. (FDI 
recorded a net inflow of E 519 million in May alone helped by the inflow of E 392 million by 
Dubai Financial to buy a 31.5% equity state in Greece's Marfin Financial Group), see, e. g., 
ELKE, 'Greece Reports Steady Inflow of FDI', Investment Tracker, July and August 2006. 
368 The French bank Credit Agricole S. A. on 14 August 2006 increased its shares to Emporiki 
Bank S. A. from 8.83% to 71.97%. See, e. g, Emporiki Bank, 'Changes in the Shareholding 
Structure of the Bank' Press Release (14/08/2006). 
369 See, e. g., Athanassiou, P., `Recent Developments in Greek Capital Markets Law' (2005) 
16 (4) EBLR 893,898. 
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product the ordinary share. There are few corporate bond issues and very 
limited secondary market transactions. 370 In view of such structure there is 
limited scope for the development of instruments and mechanisms necessary 
for asset management and pension funds. 
The mutual fund industry is relatively small but increasing and is 
dominated by the banks. Derivative markets are also relatively limited. The 
trading volumes in futures and options that are traded on the ADEX are 
equally low. A testament to that is the fact that although banks use interest 
rate swaps and currency futures to hedge exposures, they are not active in 
credit derivatives markets. 371 
According to the IMF's assessment for Greece, the future role of 
capital markets is estimated to be constrained by the limited financial 
disclosure and the uneven introduction of IAS / IFRS, since almost 70% of the 
Greek corporations are not listed on the ASE therefore their application 
appears as an obligation only for the 30% of the listed companies. 
Additionally, such uneven introduction of IAS / IFRS rules creates problems 
in comparing the performance and the good standing of companies since their 
balance sheets will certainly make them difficult to compare. In that context, 
close monitoring by the Greek authorities on those companies that still report 
under the Greek Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GGAAP) is 
important 372 
370 See, e. g., International Monetary Fund, `Greece: Financial System Stability Assessment: 
Including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics, 
Banking Supervision, Insurance Supervision, Securities Regulation, and Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', Country Report 06/06 January 
(2006) at 12. 
371 Id at 10. 
372 See, e. g., International Monetary Fund, 'Greece: Financial System Stability Assessment: 
Including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics, 
Banking Supervision, Insurance Supervision, Securities Regulation, and Anti-Money 
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In the specific context of the region of Balkans, the Greek capital 
market is regarded as the most advanced one. Greece has a leading and 
important role to play in the Balkans. A testament to that is the recent 
increased activity of Greek banks that have focused their future strategic 
planning in the expansion of their operations in the countries of the Balkans 
and in particular, in Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria and 
Turkey. 373 Greek banks have increased their claims in the Balkan region, 
which shows a high growth potential. 
374 Such expansion takes place through 
Mergers and Acquisitions and the formation of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries. 375 
Against this background, the introduction of good corporate 
governance for the Greek market is considerably necessitated by the impetus 
of the unprecedented capital market growth in Greece. In the context of 
capital markets' integration and the general globalisation process that results 
in an increased interaction of capital markets, countries are prompted to 
advance or modernise their practices in order to remain competitive in the 
global capital market arena. Likewise, Greece has a strong interest in keeping 
up with the international pace with regard to corporate governance rules. 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism', Country Report 06/06 January 
(2006) at 10. 
"' In April 2006, an agreement was reached between the National Bank of Greece (No. 1 
Greek bank) and Finansbank (Turkey), where NBG will acquire the 46% of the Turkish bank. 
For more information, visit http: //www. reporter. gr where an overview of the acquisition is 
provided. 
74 See, e. g., Bank of Greece, `Annual Report' (2005). 
375 From a legal perspective, whereas these new-established entities in the Balkans are 
governed by their local rules and regulations, at the same time they have to comply with the 
general rules and guidelines as set by the Group, in which they belong. This increases the 
need for the development of good corporate governance rules in order to create a strong, 
competitive and stable formation. Additionally, the fact that these Balkan countries have been 
championed for weak legal structures and protections, the Greek groups that seek to expand 
their operations to these countries must take all appropriate measures (including strong 
corporate governance rules) to safeguard their ongoing operations and activities. 
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4. THE GREEK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
UNIVERSE 
Introduction 
In further sharpening our understanding of the Greek corporate 
governance universe, the analysis shifts to discuss first, the evolution of the 
Greek corporate governance rules; second, the main provisions of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002; third, the Greek securities and capital 
market legislation; fourth, the EC capital market law; and fifth, the OECD 
principles. 
The main proposition argued at the core of this thesis is that the 
general, overlapping to some certain extent, corporate governance 
requirements and the inherently rigid civil law system give rise to an overly 
bureaucratic legal framework. Therefore, the effects of such situation are, 
inter alia, that Greek corporations are facing complexities and difficulties in 
adapting to regulations, further explaining the moderate levels of compliance, 
as shown in the next chapter. This affects the level of efficiency of the Greek 
corporate governance framework. 
The Evolution of the Greek Corporate Governance Universe 
Before analysing the main corporate governance provisions that 
govern the operation of Greek corporations it is helpful to briefly sketch the 
key dates when major corporate governance developments took place. More 
particularly, the debate on corporate governance in Greece first arose in May 
1998. At that time two important facts occurred. First, the ASE was used, 
mainly for domestic investors, as a good conduit to invest in Greece's 
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growing economy and the potential expansion of the Greek financial and 
securities market. Second, at that time, the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), in 
coordination with ASYK S. A., conducted a survey on corporate governance 
regarding specifically a review of the mechanisms to control and monitor the 
management of corporations. 76 This study was the first step for the future 
development of recommendations and rules for listed companies in the ASE 
and its timing is strongly associated with ASE's expansion, the increased need 
for instilling investors' confidence, and the boost of transparent procedures. 377 
The effect of this survey was very important, since it led to the consultation of 
corporations relating to several issues of the public companies' (societes 
anonymes) governance. This consultation was primarily employed at a stock 
exchange level and later at the level of a special Committee, which was to be 
established to perform this task in the first place. 
In April 1999, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), 
expressing its interest in the establishment of efficient corporate governance 
practices, set up the Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece. This 
Committee published in October 1999 a White paper titled 'Principles of 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its competitive 
transformation', which is known thereafter as the Mertzanis Report. 378 The 
376 See, e. g., ASE / ASYK SA, `Systems of Corporate Control' (1998). 
377 See, e. g., Doukas, P. G., Corporate Governance, Securities, Stock Exchanges and 
Corporations' Evaluation (in Greek) (I. Sideris Publications, Athens, 2002), at 71. 
378 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. On the provisions 
of the White paper, see, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: 
Article by Article Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) 
(Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2003); Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International 
Experience, Greek Reality (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003); Spanos, L., 
`The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Greece' (paper presented at the First LSE PhD 
Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London School 
of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, 21 June 2003, London); Mouzoulas S., `The 
Governance of Listed Companies' (in Greek) (speech to the 9t' Conference on Commercial 
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Mertzanis Report stresses the necessity of good and efficient corporate 
governance as a vital prerequisite to competitively transform and modernize ý'. . 
the Greek capital market and economy. 379 This voluntary corporate 
governance code was developed in collaboration with all the relevant agents 
in the Greek economy and was made on the basis of internationally accepted 
terms and conditions that reflected the experience of other countries and took 
into consideration problems that arose during the implementation of other 
regulations by financial authorities. The principles and best practices 
contained were closely modelled the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance. 380 
The Mertzanis Report contained 44 recommendations compiled into 
seven main categories and these recommendations were based on the 
satisfaction of three basic principles: transparency, consistency and 
accountability. 38 1 The Report recognized the key role for efficient governance 
of the corporation's Board of Directors, which would assume as its main 
responsibility to ensure the establishment of efficient governance rules. 
Likewise, the General Shareholders Meeting would have a very important role 
in the supervision of the management to the extent that it would still be the 
Law, Delfoi 12-14 November 2000, Greece); and Perakis, E., `The Governance of Listed 
Companies' (in Greek) (speech delivered to the 9`h Conference on Commercial Law, Delfoi 
12-14 November 2000, Greece). 
"' See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
380 See, e. g., OECD (2004) `OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
381 The main categories were the following: the rights and obligations of shareholders; the 
equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; 
transparency, disclosure of information and auditing; the board of directors; the non-executive 
members of the board of directors; and the executive management. See, e. g., Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the HCMC) `Principles on 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation' 
(The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
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competent organ for the approval of certain acts, aiming at the transparency of 
their implementation. 
Notwithstanding that the Mertzanis Report was recognized to be the 
first step towards good corporate governance, criticisms and reservations were 
expressed on the coherence of the principles recommended, since they were 
either reiterated in older legal documents, such as the Corporations' Law, 
382 or 
their introduction seemed problematic, giving rise to interpretative 
ambiguities and enforcement complications. 
383 Therefore, the challenge for 
Greek legislators was to avoid structuring Greece's corporate governance as a 
wholesale transplantation of the Anglo-Saxon model or any other corporate 
governance model. Rather, it seemed important that Greece's corporate 
governance efforts focus on incorporating basic corporate governance 
elements into the Greek system, while developing national solutions to 
problems that are unique in the Greek business landscape. 
384 
Whereas the initial introduction of corporate governance rules in the 
Greek capital market followed the method of self-regulation (soft law) with 
the Mertzanis recommendations and best practice rules, the first regulatory 
intervention of the Greek regulators took place in 2002. At that time, the 
Ministries of National Economy and Development, under the coordination of 
the HCMC, set up, in 2000, a law making Committee on corporate 
382 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtds 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
383 For a criticism on the recommendations of the Mertzanis Report, see, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., 
Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis - Evaluation from 
Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2003); 
Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality (in Greek) 
(Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003); and Perakis, E., `The Governance of Listed 
Companies' (in Greek) (speech delivered to the 9t' Conference on Commercial Law, Delfoi 
12-14 November 2000, Greece). 
384 See, e. g., Mertzanis, H. V., 'Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece', (2001) 9 (2) 
CG 89; 90. 
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governance (vis-a-vis the `Rokkas Committee'). The primary aim of the 
`Rokkas Committee' was to present a legislative document on corporate 
governance that could provide the basis for the Greek government's initiative 
to transform the entire corporate legal framework, conditioning the operation 
and behaviour of listed and non-listed corporations. 
In light of an imminent legislative intervention to regulate corporate 
governance in the fashion of `hard law', the Greek corporations and trade 
unions strongly expressed their dissatisfaction. The main argument that Greek 
firms stressed was the fact that self-regulation was deemed the optimal means 
to introduce rules on corporate governance. Self-regulation was viewed by 
firms as the only way of introducing corporate governance rules ensuring at 
the same time the flexible and dynamic character of these rules, along with the 
fact that self-regulation was in line with the market operations. 385 
The strong resistance and dissatisfaction of the Greek firms in the 
legislative fashion of promoting corporate governance rules opened the way to 
a new era in corporate governance law making methods in the Greek business 
sector. A legal manifestation of that is the enactment of the Law 2836/2000,386 
which pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 3, the HCMC assumes legislative 
power to introduce and enforce a code of conduct for listed companies in the 
ASE and their competent organs. The HCMC Code of Conduct was issued in 
November 2000, which decisively contributed to the enhancement of 
385 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 4. 
386 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2836/2000 on Completion of Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
Regulation, Amendments Concerning the Public Real Estate Company, Insurance 
Compensations, Value Added Tax, Investing Gold and Other Provisions, Official 
Government Gazette A168/ 24.07.2000, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A 178/ 14.07.2005). 
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transparency and disclosure regarding the behaviour of listed companies in the 
Greek capital market. 387 
Until that time, the Greek business sector had witnessed the 
introduction of corporate governance rules both at a voluntary basis (e. g. the 
Mertzanis Report) and at a more legislative fashion (e. g. HCMC Code of 
Conduct), but the effects were still limited. The Greek companies did not 
widely apply the Mertzanis corporate governance recommendations and such 
reluctance was partly justified on the grounds that these rules were of 
unsatisfactory low quality, coupled also with the certain degree of 
unfamiliarity of Greek firms with the corporate governance concerns. 388 
387 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006) (The HCMC Code of Conduct for Listed 
Companies); and Spanos, L., 'The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Greece' (paper 
presented at the First LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science 
Research on Greece, London School of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, 21 June 2003, 
London) at 13. The HCMC Code of Conduct for Listed Companies along with the Law 
1969/1991 (see, e. g., Hellenic Law 1969/1991 on Portfolio Investment Companies, Mutual 
Funds and Other Provisions Aiming at the Modernisation and Improvement of the Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission, Official Government Gazette A167/ 30.10.1991, as last 
amended by Law 3371/2005 on HCMC issues and other provisions, Official Government 
Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005), the Law 2836/2000 (Hellenic Law 2836/2000 on Completion of 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission Regulation, Amendments Concerning the Public Real 
Estate Company, Insurance Compensations, Value Added Tax, Investing Gold and Other 
Provisions, Official Government Gazette A168/ 24.07.2000, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005); and Section A of the 
Presidential Decree 348/1985 (See, e. g., Presidential Decree 348/1985 on Determination of 
Conditions for the Edition, Audit and Publication of the Prospectus to be Published for 
Securities Listing in the ASE, Official Government Gazette A125/ 04.07.1985, as amended by 
Law 3401/2005, Official Government Gazette A257/ 17.10.2005) represent a major 
contribution to the enhancement of transparency and disclosure regarding the behaviour of 
listed companies in the capital market. The primary aim of the Code is to promote corporate 
transparency, protect investors, interests against corporate mismanagement and enhance the 
investors' confidence in the ASE. Most importantly, on disclosure matters, the Code specifies 
that shareholders already owning more than 10% of the listed company's stock and intend to 
buy or sell additional shares that correspond to at least 5% of the company's stock are obliged 
to announce their intention before the transaction. This has to be noted that reflects an 
important advance over previous regulations, such as the Presidential Decree 51/1992 
(Presidential Decree 51/1992 on Information to be Published on Cross-Shareholdings by ASE 
Listed Companies in Accordance with Council Directive (EEC) 88/627, Official Government 
Gazette A22/ 14.02.1992, as last amended by Law 3340/2005, Official Government Gazette 
Al 12/ 10.05.2005). 
388 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 36. 
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Soon, the voluntary codes and best practices on corporate governance 
were replaced by legislative rules, something that was not welcomed by the 
Greek firms. Against this controversy, the Federation of Greek Industries 
(FGI), which is now called the Federation of Business and Industries (FBI)389 
and the Union of listed companies in the ASE issued, in August 2001, the 
voluntary `Principles of Corporate Governance', as a means to demonstrate 
their preference in self-regulation. Although the scope of application of those 
principles could cover all companies, its special focus was declared to be the 
ASE listed companies. One of the main recommendations included the 
establishment of board level committees consisting of a majority of non- 
executive directors and the implementation of internal control by a specific 
department or individual. 
In March 2002, the Centre of Financial Studies of the University of 
Athens presented its corporate governance rating methodology, in the ASE. 
The research team, with a grant by the ASE, set up a Special Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Governance, consisting of members of all the 
relevant authorities. 390 The findings of the questionnaire-based work on the 
evaluation of the level of corporate governance of listed companies on the 
ASE showed (i) a strong preference of Greek companies to self-regulatory 
389 It is important to note that the Federation of Business and Industries has been re-baptised 
three times in its history. From the original Federation of Greek Industries and Crafts in 1907, 
in 1946, it became the Federation of Greek Industrialists, and then in 1979 the Federation of 
Greek Industries. These name changes mirror strategic developments in the nature of Greek 
business, the economy and society, and point to the Federation's desire to move along with 
these developments and play a leading role within them. The new Statute aims to allow more 
flexibility to the Federation. See, e. g., Daskalopoulos, D., (speech by the President of the 
Federation of Greek Industries - SEV- at the afternoon session of the Annual General 
Assembly, Athens, Greece, 24 May 2007) (in Greek). 
390 The Hellenic Capital Market Commission; the Athens Stock Exchange; the Federation of 
Greek Industries; the Athens Chamber Commerce & Industry; the Union of Institutional 
Investors; Hellenic Bank Association; and the Union of Brokerage Firms. 
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corporate governance principles; and (ii) a moderate level of corporate 
governance compliance that needs to further improved. 391 
The Ministries of National Economy and Development and the 
HCMC, deviated from the self-regulation and initiated the introduction of 
corporate governance rules through legislative means. The manifestation of 
this shift was the enactment of the Corporate Governance Law in May 
2002.392 Besides the fact that the enactment of this Law took place in a 
climate of objections and opposition, it was viewed as a major development in 
Greece. 393 New regulations were needed in order to capture modern corporate 
governance issues that older legal pieces could not address. This is so because 
prior to the enactment of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, the efficient 
operation of public limited companies through its proper management, the 
protection of its minority shareholders, and the transparency standards were 
primarily secured by the Corporations' Law dated back in 1920, as amended, 
along with the Presidential Decree 350/1985. 
Not long after the enactment of the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002, it was amended by Laws 3091/2002 and 3371/2005. This reflects two 
issues. One, that good corporate governance has been high up in the agenda of 
Greek corporations. Two, the first version of the Corporate Governance Law 
"I See, e. g., Xanthakis M., L. Tsipouri and L. Spanos, Corporate Governance: the Concept 
and Evaluation Methods (in Greek) (Papazisis Publications, Athens, 2003), at 111-132. 
392 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). [Hereinafter the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002]. The Corporate Governance Law of 2002 was based on the initial plan of the 
`Rokkas Committee'. See, e. g., Spanos, L., `The Evolution of Corporate Governance in 
Greece' (paper presented at the First LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social 
Science Research on Greece, London School of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, 21 June 
2003, London), at 16. 
393 For a criticism on the Law, see, e. g., Hadjiemmanouil, C., 'Corporate Governance' (in 
Greek) (speech to the Institute of Democracy Konstantinos Karamanlis, April 2002) Working 
Paper Series 15. 
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of 2002 was not well-drafted, therefore, immediate amendment and 
completion was needed. 
The Corporate Governance Law of 2002 lays down fundamental 
corporate governance obligations, which intend, inter alia, to foster 
transparency, ensure business development and protect investors' and 
shareholders' rights. The core requirements of the Law centre on the 
composition of the Board of Directors (Articles 2-4); non executive director's 
remuneration (Article 5); internal auditing (Articles 6-8); and share capital 
increases (Article 9). However, the main argument against this Law advanced 
is that it only reiterates provisions already proclaimed by other legal texts 
(basically the Corporations' Law394). Against the limited effects of the 
provisions of the Law, its binding character is counter balancing any 
criticisms on its purpose. 
In July 2002, the ASE followed a unique approach in the promotion of 
corporate governance rules, aiming to create incentives to all listed companies 
to apply good governance practices that could lead to better performance and 
increased firm value. Therefore, the ASE encourages listed companies to 
adopt qualitative criteria with which to assess their organization and operation 
and thus contribute to their higher visibility in the capital market and to the 
improved information of investors. Such qualitative criteria have been 
developed following a study by the Research and Development Department of 
the ASE and they were finalized in consultation with listed companies and the 
associations that represent them. 
394 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtds 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
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The optional application of these criteria, which are additional to the 
legal requirements of the Law, is based upon the active behaviour of listed J°. I. 
companies. 395 Such method, which can be classified somewhere between the 
method of self-regulation and legislative intervention was not developed 
without concerns on its efficiency. 396 Mainly, concerns were advanced on the 
possibility of false evaluation and classification of a company. 
In 2005, and most recently in 2006, the Athens University of 
Economics and Business in cooperation with Grant Thornton conducted a 
Corporate Governance survey, assessing the level of corporate governance 
compliance in the Greek business landscape. 397 The primary objective of the 
survey was to map the corporate governance practices of the Greek listed 
companies. According to the main findings of the survey the issue of 
corporate governance has been advanced to an important one both from a 
regulatory/supervisory perspective and also listed companies have recognized 
its value. The survey concluded that 30% of the Greek listed companies apply 
corporate governance rules, whereas almost 70% explain their reasons for not 
abiding by such rules. Overall, significant progress took place, yet there is 
much room for more improvement. The majority of the Greek listed 
companies, which seem to comply with the nominal legal demands of the 
legislator, fail fully to capture the rationale of corporate governance 
principles, such as those of the OECD. 
395 See, e. g., Athens Stock Exchange, (Press Release) `Qualitative Criteria covering Corporate 
Governance, Transparency and Communication with Investors' (in Greek) ATHEX Board of 
Directors 27 June 2002. 
396 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 38. 
397 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005); and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006). 
[Hereinafter, the 2005 Corporate Governance Survey and the 2006 Corporate Governance 
Survey, respectively]. 
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Notwithstanding the general agreement that Greece's corporate ' 
': 
governance environment should not be structured as a wholesale 
transplantation of the Anglo-Saxon model or any other corporate governance 
model, the Mertzanis Report and the enactment of the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002 give rise to scepticism and dilemmas. Whereas the former 
represents a mere translation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance into Greek without specific reflections of the Greek environment, 
the latter creates a severe confusion about the real intentions of the legislator. 
The contents of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, which focus 
to a large extent on the formation and the activities of the Board of Directors 
(including the responsibilities, the participation of non executive members of 
the Board, and independent non executive members), and the publication of 
Internal Mechanism Regulation, 399 reveal that the Greek legislator's initial 
intentions were to follow the UK practice based on the Cadbury Committee 
principles 400 Even if the intention of the legislator was to follow the example 
of the Cadbury Committee with several years of delay, certain specifications 
were not taken into account (such as for instance the lack of a definition of 
independence), which can result in an increased operational cost for small 
Greek companies. 
"I See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
399 The term Internal Mechanism Regulation can be also read as Internal Regulation. These 
two terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
400 See, e. g., Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury 
Committee), `Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance' (1992) December (the Cadbury 
Report). 
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More particularly, the specific formation of the Board of Directors and 
the participation of non executive members served particular dynamics of the 
British ownership and management structures of UK listed companies, which 
do not necessarily serve relevant dynamics in the Greek capital and stock 
market. The Greek companies characterised by concentration of ownership 
(more often than not family firms) should be governed by a corporate 
governance framework that would not merely underline the participation of 
non-executive members in the Board of Directors but should pay more 
attention to the role and duties of the members of the Board. 
The focus of the analysis now shifts to discuss the main provisions of 
the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 aiming to highlight the following 
issues. First, that the Board of Directors, the Internal Regulation, and the 
Internal Audit are the cornerstone of the Greek corporate governance system. 
Second, that the title of the Law is to a certain extent misleading given that the 
Law at its substance governs matters relating to the Board of Directors, 
without dealing with other corporate governance issues, such as the 
relationship between shareholders and the management. It follows that the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 could be well called as the `Board of 
Directors' Law. Third, that the rules embodied in the Law are general, 
inadequate, and not clearly articulated. Fourth, throughout the analysis, the 
reasons that led the Greek regulator to adopt a `hard law' approach to 
corporate governance are not evident. Fifth, alongside the absence of an 
imminent need for the Law, significant regulatory overlaps are identified, 
which further point towards this Law being unnecessary. Sixth, any positive 
effects and the achievement of the objectives of the Law seem to be 
undermined by its very nature (hard law). Seventh, the Law moves between 
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the boundaries of capital market law and company law, which deprives it of 
clear legal orientation, creating confusion with respect to supervisory issues. 
Therefore, the main proposition at the core of the thesis is supported 
and it is further evident that the aforementioned facts tend to weaken the 
efficiency of the Greek corporate governance system. The concerns on the 
added value of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, although raised in the 
controversy developed already from the first draft proposal, were not able to 
be overcome. However, the amendments that were introduced in a very short 
period of time after its passing revealed in the most prominent way its 
problematic fate. 
Scope of application (Article 1) 
Pursuant to Article 1, `the provisions of the Corporate Governance 
Law are applied to societes anonymes, which are in the course of listing or 
have their shares or other transferable securities listed in a regulated stock 
market'. Here, variable interpretations have been stressed with regard to the 
scope of application of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, since the 
Greek corporate governance principles are both a matter of company and 
capital markets law. From a company law perspective, the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002 seems to be applicable only to the companies 
established in Greece, whereas according to the capital markets law, the 
decisive parameter to define the scope of the Law is the listing in a regulated 
stock market 401 
401 The use of the term `regulated stock market' reflects the intention of the regulator not to 
restrict the application of the provisions of the Law only on the listed on the ASE but rather to 
include companies listed on other regulated stock markets that have been developed at the 
time of the enactment of the Law or will be developed in the future. Strictly speaking the 
adoption of the term `regulated stock market' conflicts with the relevant term used in Law 
2396/1996 (see, e. g., Hellenic Law 2396/1996 Investment Services in the Securities Field, 
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The Corporate Governance Law of 2002 does not change nor reject the 
provisions proclaimed by the Hellenic Law 2190/1920, as codified, 402 which 
governs the main operations of the societes anonymes (at the apex of which 
stands the Board of Directors). On the contrary, it is stated, `the provisions of 
the Law 2190/1920, as codified, are in force as long as they do not conflict 
with the provisions of the present Law'. Here two important observations can 
be made. 
First, that such an approach substantially differs from the stance 
adopted in the Mertzanis Report in 1999, according to which `the Committee 
of Corporate Governance is of the view that the Law 2190/1920 has 
constituted an essential contribution to the development of the legal 
framework for the corporate operation and behaviour the last - 80 years. 
However, the Law including its successive modifications is rather inadequate 
in providing the basis for the effective settlement of current corporate issues 
as they arise in the modern corporate world. Indeed, the Law does not include 
basic concepts, terms and conditions required for the development of a 
modern and efficient corporate governance framework. The subsequent 
issuance of Presidential Decrees 350/1985403 and 51/1992404 and a series of 
Capital Adequacy of Investment Services Firms and Credit Institutions and Shares' 
Dematerialisation, Official Government Gazette A73/ 30.04.1996, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005), which incorporates into the 
domestic legal order the Investment Services Directive (See, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 
1993/22 of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field [1993] OJ L141/27). In 
the latter, it is used the term `regulated market' and these usage differences can give rise to 
interpretation problems. 
402 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtbs 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
403 See, e. g., Presidential Decree 350/1985 on Listing Requirements in the Athens Stock 
Exchange and Issuers' Duties and Obligations, Official Government Gazette A126/ 
04.07.1985, as last amended by Law, as last amended by Law 3401/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A257/ 17.10.2005). 
404 See, e. g., Presidential Decree 51/1992 on Information to be Published on Cross- 
Shareholdings by ASE Listed Companies in Accordance with Council Directive (EEC) 
88/627, Official Government Gazette A22/ 14.02.1992, as last amended by Law 3340/2005 
(Official Government Gazette Al 12/ 10.05.2005). 
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Ministerial Decisions have contributed significantly in the meeting of 
considerable regulation need, without however providing a full solution to the 
problem ; 4os 
It appears that in three years time, the Greek regulator shifted his 
approach with regard to the role of the Corporations Law, thereby creating 
confusion to firms. 
Second, the reasons that led the Greek regulator to enact one more 
Law to govern same matters are unclear. This is established given that the 
main provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 regulate the 
specific issues with regard to the board structure (which is also governed by 
the Corporations' Law) and the operation of listed companies (which is also 
governed by other capital market law and securities legislation, such as for 
instance the HCMC Code of Conduct for listed firms 406) One can argue that 
the rules in the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 only amend the relevant 
provisions (e. g. board of directors requirements) of the Corporations Law, 
without changing the remaining obligations of the Corporations Law. Even in 
such a case, for the sake of coherence it would be more appropriate for 
amendments to be incorporated in a later version of the existing Law and not 
to enact a new one. 
Another interesting aspect of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 
is its limited application only to listed firms. Such limited scope gives rise to 
405 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
406 See, e. g., HCMC Decision 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed 
on the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B 1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
178 
two contradictory conditions. On the one hand, it is positive that compliance 
with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is a 
prerequisite for firms that wish to list their shares on the stock exchange and 
an obligation on listed firms, to which. failure to comply will bring sanctions 
and penalties. However, on the other side, the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002 leaves unregulated in terms of corporate governance the operation of 
non listed firms, which particularly in the Greek market are a considerable I 
number, the majority of which are family firms. Therefore, the Greek 
regulator seems to have implicitly compromised with the initial stance of 
firms (including family firms) against the imposition of additional obligations. 
The Greek regulator's intervention rested only at a minimum, without 
stipulating those obligations to apply to non-listed companies by analogy. 
Finally, pursuant to Article 52, paragraph 10, of the recent Law 
3371/2005,407 the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) is 
empowered with the authority to define certain regulated stock markets where 
the provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 will not be applied 
either in part or in full. The latter modification further strengthens the role and 
responsibilities of the HCMC, as aforementioned. Beyond the enhanced role 
of the HCMC, this provision reveals the intention of the Greek regulator to 
classify the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 more as part of the securities 
legislation and capital market law, rather than a piece of company law. Such 
intention is also clearly evident from Article 10 of the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002, as is analyzed below, pursuant to which the HCMC is 
empowered with the monitoring and supervisory competencies with respect to 
407 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3371/2005 Regarding Issues of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005. 
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the compliance of firms with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Law 
of 2002. 
Board of Directors (Articles 2-5) 
The -Board of Directors stands at the apex of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002. Articles 2-5 of the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002 specify the duties and the obligations of the Board of Directors of 
companies listed in regulated stock markets and it also regulates the formation 
of their Board. This Law, on the premises of Article 2, paragraph 1, that 
states, 'the principal obligation and duty of the members of the Board of 
Directors of each company, which is listed in a regulated stock market is the 
continuous pursuit of the enhancement of the lasting economic value of the 
company408 and the protection of the general interests of the company clearly 
takes a position in favour of the principle of maximisation of shareholder 
value. 409 Importantly, it is necessary to note that the continuous effort to 
increase the firm's long-term market value is not the primary obligation of the 
Board of Directors only of listed firms (or firms in the process of listing their 
shares on the stock exchange), but likewise for non listed firms. Here the 
408 The Permanent Committee of Economic Affairs within the Greek Ministry of Economy 
and Finance that was called to evaluate the provisions of the Law prior to its final approval 
raised its concerns about the usage of the word `long lasting' versus `long term', clearly 
favouring the latter. Depending on which term is adopted, the obligations of the Board of 
Directors, as envisaged by this provision, can be interpreted in a different way. See, e. g., 
Permanent Committee of Economic Affairs, `Preamble on the Draft Law on Corporate 
Governance' (in Greek) Ministry of Economy and Finance, (April 2002). 
409 This strongly resembles the US and UK corporate governance models, as aforementioned, 
where it is established that the priority of corporate managers remains shareholder wealth 
maximisation. Yet, Mouzoulas argues that this provision by stating as a principle obligation 
of the Board of Directors to 'protect the general interest of the company' also reflects the 
stakeholder theory. He further argues that the intentions of the regulator were to attempt a 
convergence of the shareholder and stakeholder theories. See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 
3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis - Evaluation from 
Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2003), at 39- 
40. 
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intention of the Greek legislator is to implicitly apply by way of analogy the 
objective of the pursuit of firm's long term value for non listed firms. " 
At paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article it is provided that `the 
members of the Board of Directors and any third party, [... J, are prohibited 
from seeking their own interests, which conflict with the company's interest; 
and [... J shall disclose in due course any own interests, which shall arise 
during the exercise of their duties. The need for such provision is underlined 
by the fact the relatively widespread shareholding structure of modem listed 
companies, as a result of which the activities of the Board of Directors can 
deviate from the general corporate interest and the protection of the interests 
of shareholders. The complex structure of modem companies and the financial 
sophistication in their operation has significantly endangered the interests of 
shareholders. This risk is intensified by the absence of legal measures to 
punish corporate wrongdoings and raise claims. 
Against this problem, the Corporate Governance Law of . 2002 
explicitly provides that the Board of Directors and other third parties are 
prohibited from soliciting their own interests conflicting with the interests of 
the company. In case of conflicts of interest, a disclosure obligation exists so 
as to ensure that greater transparency in the relations is achieved between the 
company and its Board. 
Interestingly, Article 23 of the Corporations Law provides the 
possibility to the members of the Board of Directors to pursue other interests 
that fall in the sphere of the corporate objectives and purposes `upon the prior 
approval by the General Shareholding Meeting'. It follows that such milder 
approach to the issue of conflicts of interest creates a regulatory confusion. 
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Although on the one side, the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 requires 
disclosure of such conflict of interest, the Corporations Law stipulates prior 
approval. However, neither the Greek courts nor the regulator have decided 
whether the different approach by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 
constitutes a conflict with the provisions of the Corporations Law, therefore 
creating interpretational and implementation concerns. 
Furthermore, a brief examination of the effects of the Article 2, 
paragraph 3, in the context of take over bids, proves their limited practical 
significance. More particularly, by definition, a take over bid entails a 
personal interest of the members of the Board to the extent that their position 
in the new legal entity that will be created after the successful bid, is not 
secured. Pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 3, the members of the Board are 
prohibited from determining or influencing the final outcome of a take over 
bid, so as to serve their own interests. Such action would constitute a severe 
breach of the said provision, let alone a violation of the business judgment 
rule. Therefore, in the context of take over bids, the members of the Board are 
obliged to disclose the existence of a personal interest; an interest that goes 
beyond the obvious concern on maintaining their position in the Board and 
rather includes an interest reflecting the existence of personal ties with people 
from the target company. However, in the Greek practice of take over bids, 
there has never been recorded a disclosure of such personal interests 410 
Apparently, shareholders almost never possess such facts in order to enable 
them to take informed and rational decisions. 
ago See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 255-257. 
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Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 
establishes the obligation of the `Board of Directors to draft a report, 
annually, which shall include, in detail, all transactions that the company has 
entered into with its associated firms [... J. Such report shall be notified also 
to the supervisory authorities. ' The purpose of this provision is not to block 
those transactions from being conducted, but rather to make them public, 
therefore increasing the level of transparency. In turn such disclosure 
enhances the overall credibility of the company against its shareholders and as 
such is of utmost importance for the Greek legislator. 
Unfortunately, this provision has not come without a drafting 
weakness. The main problem stems from the general and broad character of 
this provision that demands to be read in conjunction with another specific 
rule. This provision avoids referring to the publication frequency and it is only 
after the implementation of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 on 
related party transactions that this gap is filled 411 
To continue with Article 3, its essence is based on the separation of 
executive and non executive Board members, 412 along with the introduction of 
the independent non executive members of the Board, which is a prevailing 
corporate governance principle. 413 According to Article 3, paragraph 1, 'the 
411 IAS 24 `Related-Party Disclosures' introduces to companies the obligation to disclose of 
information with regard to the existence of related parties and details of their transactions. 
The objective of the IAS 24 is to ensure that an entity's financial statements contain the 
disclosures necessary to draw attention to the possibility that its financial position and profit 
or loss may have been affected by the existence of related parties and by transactions and 
outstanding balances with such parties. 
412 In practice, this separation of responsibilities and roles between executive and non- 
executive Board members is already evident in the Greek listed companies. 
413 This is also reflected in Principle 5.6 of the Mertzanis Report. See, e. g., Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the HCMC) `Principles on 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation' 
(The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
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Board of Directors consists of executive414 and non-executive415 members 
[... J, the number of non-executive Board members should not be lower than 
one third (1/3) of the total number of Board members [... J, at least two of the 
non-executive members must be independent'. 416 Notwithstanding that it is 
mandated by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 that the Board of 
Directors shall consist of executive and independent non executive members, 
this institutional distinction does not abolish the principal nature of the Board 
of Directors as a joint and solid decision-making entity. 417 Such general 
provision is to be specified by Article 6, paragraph 2 (b) of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, which introduces the Internal Mechanism 
Regulation, where companies need to define the powers of the executive and 
non executive members of the Board. Here, it is important to note that such 
distinction between executive and non executive members has been adopted 
by the majority of the Greek corporations, yet the fact that, as analysed below, 
there is no definition on independence limits the potential of this provision. 
Furthermore, Article 3, paragraph 1 introduces an exemption with 
regard to the appointment of independent non executive Board members that 
is worth discussing. It states that 'at least two independent non executive 
Board members should exist in the Board [... ]' except 'if representatives of 
414 The Board members dealing with daily administrative issues of the corporation are 
considered to be the executive members, (Article 3, paragraph 1). 
415 Non-executive are the Board members mandated with the promotion of all corporate 
issues, (Article 3, paragraph 1). 
416 By way of exception, 'in case where representatives of the minor shareholders are 
explicitly appointed in the Board and participate therein as members, the participation of 
independent members is not obligatory' (Article 3, paragraph 1). Yet, interpretation problems 
may arise with regard to `who is regarded as representative of the minority shareholders'. 
This ambiguity will be solved in due course by court decisions that might be dealt with in 
front of the Greek courts. 
417 Pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 1, as amended by Article 26, paragraph I of the Law 
3091/2002, the Board of Directors elects the executive and non-executive board members, 
whereas the General Assembly of Shareholders is competent to appoint the independent, non- 
executive Board members. 
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the minority shareholders are appointed and participate as members in the 
Board'. In principle, such exception considers that independent non executive 
members and the representatives of the minority shareholders are equal. 
However, by definition, the roles of these two classes of directors are 
different, to the extent that the representatives of the minority shareholders are 
not independent from the company, since they have certain interests. 
418 This is 
further supported by Article 4, paragraph 1, item (d) that defines `as a relation 
of dependence, if a board member (... J (d) has been appointed according to 
Article 18, paragraph 3 of the Corporations Law', which includes, inter alia, 
the representatives of the minority shareholders. Therefore, the application of 
this exception creates concerns on its correctness and undermines the 
significance of the appointment of independent non executive Board 
members. 
Article 3 (paragraphs 1 and 2) of the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002 shall be read in conjunction with Article 5. In both provisions, the Board 
of Directors assumes full responsibility to appoint the non executive members 
of the Board (article 3, paragraph 1), to determine the general remuneration 
policy419, and to set the remuneration of non executive board members (article 
5). Such responsibility is an absolute one, in the sense that the Board is 
prohibited from transferring this right to third parties (Article 3, paragraph 2). 
Notably, such obligation is in contrast with Articles 18, paragraph 2 and 22, 
paragraph 3, of the Corporations Law, which allows the transfer of the said 
task to third parties. This conflict between the two Laws is solved by virtue of 
418 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 330-33 1. 
419 It is important to note that the intention of the Greek regulator is not only to stipulate by 
virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2 that the Board of Directors is responsible to decide upon the 
general remuneration policy. Most importantly, the Greek regulator implicitly prescribes that 
the Board of Directors is responsible for implementing such policy. Id. at 390. 
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Article 1 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, as analysed above, which 
states that `the provisions of the Law 2190/1920, as codified, are in force as 
long as they do not conflict with the provisions of the present Law'. 
Alongside this conflict, Article 5 that regulates the remuneration of 
non executive Board members reveals two problems. First, that the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is not deemed 
necessary to the extent that this provision only makes reference to the relevant 
provisions of the Corporations Law, without any substantial additions or 
modifications to it. It is implicitly admitted by the Greek regulator that the 
Corporations Law is still appropriate and adequate to regulate corporate 
governance matters. Second, a cross examination of Article 5 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002 with Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Law 
1969/1991420 that governs the operation of portfolio investment companies 
and mutual funds brings to the surface significant interpretational problems 
and confusion. For both reasons, inter alia, the extent to which listed 
companies have properly complied or not with the requirements of Article 5 
of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is to be decided ex post by the 
competent supervisory authority (the HCMC) 
42' 
The legal manifestation of the protection of the general interest of the 
company', as the primary responsibility of the Board of Directors, is reiterated 
in Article 4 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, which introduces the 
420 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 1969/1991 on Portfolio Investment Companies, Mutual Funds and 
Other Provisions Aiming at the Modernisation and Improvement of the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission, Official Government Gazette A167/ 30.10.1991, as last amended by 
Law 3371/2005 on HCMC issues and other provisions, Official Government Gazette A178/ 
14.07.2005. 
421 For a more comprehensive discussion of the problematic interaction between Article 5 of 
the Corporate Governance Law and Article 10, paragraph 4 of the Law 1969/1991, see, e. g., 
Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality (in Greek) 
(Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 393-394. 
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concept of independent non executive Board members. The importance of 
these members is particularly reflected in the widely-held listed companies, 
where deviations from the corporate interests are more common and difficult 
to monitor amid the absence of independent Board members. However, two 
main criticisms have been raised against the inception of this provision. 
First, the concept of independent non executive directors is determined 
by the use of qualitative criteria. Such criteria are based on the lack of 
directors' dependence with the company, namely the absence of conflict of 
interest. 422 Second, the Law does not provide a definition of who is regarded 
as being independent or what constitutes independence. Rather, the Law 
defines what constitutes a relation of dependence. It follows that although the 
intention of the legislator was to determine independent members this has not 
been achieved. A definitional gap exists, which if not filled, may lead to 
interpretational problems. Some criticisms also focused on the fact that for the 
sake of legislative cohesion, the Greek legislator should avoid legislating 
issues without defining them first. 23 
Building on the above discussion, although not prescribed by the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002, it is important that the Board of 
Directors, on an ongoing basis, verifies the independence of the members of 
the Board. Namely the Board assumes the responsibility of ensuring the 
au See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 327-328. 
47 A similar comment was raised by 0. Kyriakopoulos. See, e. g., Kyriakopoulos, 0., 
`Corporate Governance' (in Greek) (speech to the Institute of Democracy Konstantinos 
Karamanlis, April 2002) Working Paper Series 15, at 13. 
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proper implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, more often than not through 
adequate mechanisms of internal controls. 424 
Moreover, in order to better safeguard the independence of 
independent non executive Board members, the Corporate Governance Law 
of 2002 provides two directions. First, that independent Board members 'may 
submit, separately or jointly, reports and separate expositions from those of 
the Board of Directors at the [... J General Assembly of the company, where it 
is considered necessary' (Article 4, paragraph 2). Such optional submission, 
though aims at instilling shareholders' confidence towards the Board of 
Directors, it has limited effect to the extent that it only presents independent 
board members with a choice and not a strict obligation. 425 The significance of 
such choice is at odds, given that it is not coupled with specific guidance on 
the way by which independent directors can make those submissions. This 
gap is not filled by other regulatory bodies' rules or acts. Therefore, if this 
provision provides only a choice without clear guidance, then it is more likely 
that Greek corporations will not make use of such option. 
Second, the independent board members will be appointed by the 
General Shareholder Meeting (Article 3, paragraph 1). Here the Greek 
regulator follows the right approach for two reasons. First, because the 
General Shareholder Meeting is not an executive organ and at the same time, 
it ensures that decisions are taken upon the principle of majority rule 426 
Second, it safeguards coherence due to the fact that the members of the Board . 
424 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 334. 
425 See, e. g., Permanent Committee of Economic Affairs, `Preamble on the Draft Law on 
Corporate Governance' (in Greek) Ministry of Economy and Finance, (April 2002). 
426 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 328. 
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of Directors are appointed upon prior decision reached by the General 
Shareholder Meeting. 27 
Internal Regulation and Internal Audit (Articles 6-8) 
In view of the recent capital market developments and the increased 
sophistication of the global financial markets, the need to introduce the 
practice of Internal Regulations emerged. In modem publicly held 
corporations given their widespread shareholding and the lack of adequate 
monitoring from the principal of the corporation, the management of the 
company is more often than not prone to serving their own interests. 
Against this reality, the Greek legislator imposed on all listed 
companies the obligation, as envisaged by Article 6 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, to issue an Internal Mechanism Regulation. 428 This 
obligation aims at protecting not only shareholders' interests but also 
safeguarding -and even boosting- the credibility of the Board. On that basis, 
the drafting of the Internal Mechanism Regulation by the Board of Directors 
applies as a requirement for both non listed and listed firms. Whereas for the 
former, such obligation reflects a necessary prerequisite for them in case that 
they wish to apply for entry into the ASE (as derives from the obligation that 
was first introduced by the HCMC Code of Conduct for listed companies429), 
427 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 329. 
428 Prior to the enactment of the Corporate Governance Law, the Internal Mechanism 
Regulation was an internal, non public document that was not stipulated as a company law 
obligation for corporations to publish. The Internal Mechanism Regulation is different from 
the Articles of Incorporation, with the latter to be superior in case of conflict. In practice, the 
Internal Mechanism Regulation specifies the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation. 
429 It considerably strengthens the obligation of companies to publish their Annual Report 
stipulating that the Annual Report shall be available to investors and shareholders 10 working 
days prior to the General Shareholders Meeting taking place and at the latest 20 working days 
after the publication of the annual financial statements (Art. 16). See, e. g., HCMC Rule 
5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 06.12.2000, as 
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for the latter is a binding obligation, failure to comply with brings fines and 
other sanctions. 
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, as 
recently amended by article 32, paragraph 3 of the Law 3340/2005,430 
provides the minimum contents of this Internal Regulation (e. g. the 
administrative structure of the company; 431 the responsibilities of executive 
and non-executive Board members; recruitment and selection procedures of 
executive members; 432 monitoring procedures of transactions, etc. ). Its 
purpose is to promote corporate transparency and better information to 
investors, which is underlined by paragraph 2.433 
A careful examination of Article 6, gives rises to two main issues. 
First, its current wording does not give a clear insight on whether the 
obligation of the Board of Directors for drafting the Internal Regulation is an 
exclusive one. Although the provision lacks clarity in that regard, it is 
presumed that such obligation is exclusive to the Board of Directors. This is 
supported by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 4 that outlines the main 
responsibilities of the Board, including that `the Board of Directors draws an 
annual report referring in detail to the transactions between the corporation 
and its subsidiaries'. 
amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette B 1081/ 01.08.2005) 
and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 51204/14.11.2000 (Official Government 
Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
430 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3340/2005 on the Protection of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission from Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), Official 
Government Gazette Al 12/ 10.05.2005. 
431 The structure of the company should include an audit department, investor relations 
department, and a department for company announcements. (Article 6, paragraph 2, a). 
432 In this sense, the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 imposes the obligation to listed 
companies to establish such procedures. See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on 
Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' 
Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2003), at 143. 
433 '[ J the company's Internal Mechanism Regulation must at least provide for departments 
of Internal Audit, Shareholders' Service and Corporate Announcements. ' 
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Second, the subject matter of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, namely determining the contents of the Internal 
Regulations, is also covered by Article 11 of the HCMC Code of Conduct for 
listed companies 434 This reveals a regulatory duplication with an additional 
paradox. Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is 
more detailed and specific referring to the minimum contents of the Internal 
Regulation. On the contrary, Article 11 of the HCMC Code of Conduct for 
listed companies is much more general mentioning a number of criteria that 
the Internal Regulation shall meet, without touching upon the issue of its 
contents. Based on the usual law-making technique applied by the Greek 
regulator this is paradoxical to the extent that the introduction of rules based 
on a law (e. g. HCMC rules) are typically more specific and not vice versa. 
Beyond the intentions of the Greek regulator for the detailed nature of this 
provision, for the sake of regulatory coherence a single legal document should 
prescribe the contents of the Internal Regulation. 
Whereas Article 6 refers to the contents of the Internal Regulation, 
Articles 7 and 8 focus on the set up, the operation, the powers, and the duties 
of the Internal Audit, which is first introduced in Article 6, paragraph 2 (a). 
The internal audit is to be effectuated by a special435 department of the 
company, consisting of independent internal auditors, 436 the main duties of 
which are described in Article 8. 
434 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B 1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
ass 'Special' in the sense that is the only and exclusive department, integrated in the structure 
of the company, which is responsible for conducting internal audit. 
436 Pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 3, as amended by Article 26, paragraph 1 (e) of the 
Hellenic Law 3091/2002 (on Simplifications and Improvements in the Taxation of Income and 
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Notably, the study of Article 7 of the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002 supports the proposition at the core of the thesis on the existence of 
regulatory repetitions. This is confirmed to the extent that the obligation to set 
up an Internal Audit Department is also covered, though with a range of legal 
variations, in other legal documents, such as for instance (a) Article 12 of the 
HCMC Code of Conduct for listed companies; 437 (b) Article 8 of the Code of 
Conduct of Mutual Fund Management Firms and Investment Services Firms; 
438 (c) Section V (a) of the Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2577/2006.439 
Furthermore, the scope of internal audit is quite broad so as to include 
the verification not only of the financial statements of the company but also of 
the internal structure and management of the corporation. 44° Additionally, the 
Capital and Other Provisions, Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002), 'Internal 
auditors are appointed by the Board of Directors of the company and are employed full time 
and exclusively'. Internal auditors although non executive members of the company, they 
certainly are members of the company, i. e. not third parties. It follows that the principal 
intention of the legislator is precisely to block the simultaneous exercise of management and 
control duties rather than to create an obligation to companies to hire third parties. The issue 
raised is the extent to which internal auditors are or can be monitored. The answer to this 
issue is a conflicting one, since literature suggests that internal auditors are monitored by 
external auditors and vice versa. Yet, the Greek state of auditing affairs underlines, and 
pursuant to relative legislation, that the set up and composition of internal audit is only 
monitored by the Board of Directors and not external auditors, whereas their audit mission is 
supervised by the Internal Audit Department, as envisaged by Article 7, paragraph 2 of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002. Besides, external auditors are commissioned to evaluate 
the overall effectiveness of internal control systems of a corporation. Internal and external 
audit are complementary functions, which although share different objectives and aims they 
co-exist in the context of a corporation without an absolute hierarchical order and superiority. 
437 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
438 See, e. g., HCMC Decision 8422/132/19.05.1998 on the Code of Conduct of Mutual Fund 
Management Firms and Investment Services Firms, Official Government Gazette B615/ 
18.06.1998. 
439 See, e. g., Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2577/2006 on the Framework Principles for the 
Operation and Evaluation Criteria of Systems of Internal Controls of Credit Institutions and 
Financial Institutions and relevant responsibilities of their administrative bodies (in Greek) 
Official Government Gazette A59/ 09.03.2006. 
440 The mission of external audit primarily focuses on the verification of the correctness and 
accuracy of the financial statements and conditions of a corporation. External audit, which is 
conducted solely by external auditors that do not belong into the company, is supplementary 
to the internal audit and their objectives although different they seem to converge at some 
points. On the differences between internal and external audit, see, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 
3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis - Evaluation from 
192 
ýf 1 
internal audit is conducted in order to identify dysfunctional management 
practices and to ensure the sound and proper operation of a corporation 
through which it indirectly safeguards the interests of shareholders. 441 The 
internal audit checks the extent to which the investment decisions of the 
Board of Directors are in conformity with their principle obligation and duty, 
namely `the continuous pursuit of the enhancement of the lasting economic 
value of the company and the protection of the general interest of the 
company' (Article 2, paragraph 1). 
In the same line of thinking, pursuant to Article 8 (b) of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002, a primary duty of internal auditors is to report to 
the Board of Directors with regard to conflicts of interest, which is reiterated 
in Article 2 paragraph 2. In essence, the main focus of the internal audit is the 
Board of Directors and a testament to that is Article 8(c), which stipulates that 
the results of the internal audit check are only available to the Board of 
Directors and are not publicly available information. Internal auditors can 
disclose information with regard to their check to the supervising authorities 
(e. g. the HCMC and the ASE), provided that they have received approval by 
the Board to do so (Article 8, d). 
Other Provisions (Articles 9 and 10) 
Article 9 introduces specific requirements with regard to share capital 
increase in cash, aiming at protecting shareholders (minority) and investors as 
Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 2003), at 
163-168. 
441 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 163-168. 
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the participating parties in the share capital increase 442 The introduction of 
this provision is important as a means to enhance greater transparency through 'A 
timely and accurate information to shareholders and stakeholders. 
In practical terms, this provision directly links corporate governance 
matters with the requirements on the prospectus, as set forth by the Decisions 
of the ASE Board of Directors Nos. 47 and 48.443 Such approach is innovative 
to the extent that international practice has not confirmed it. However some 
scepticism is raised relating to regulatory overlapping, given that Article 39 
paragraph 4 (b) of the Corporations Law, and the Decisions of the ASE Board 
of Directors Nos. 47 and 48, as aforementioned, adequately govern this issue. 
A careful consideration of the interaction of those provisions 
highlights the following observations. First, the scope of Article 9 of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is centred on the obligations of the Board 
and not the contents of the prospectus, in case of share capital increase, as is 
in the ASE decisions. Second, paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002 is innovative to the extent that the ASE decisions do 
not make reference on the issue of deviations from the use of the drawn 
capital. Third, the ASE decisions cover also the share capital increase for the 
purposes of a merger with another company, a provision that is absent from 
Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. Fourth, there are 
442 The timing of the introduction of this provision is placed at the period where at the ASE a 
large number of corporations have submitted their share capital increase reports and at the end 
it was found that there were dramatic deviations from the use of the drawn capital. See, e. g., 
Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article Analysis - 
Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, 
Athens, 2003), at 260. 
443 See, e. g., ASE Board of Directors Decision 47/2000 on the Prospectus on Share Capital 
Increase by Cash (in Greek) Official Government Gazette B1194/ 28.09.2000; and ASE 
Board of Directors Decision 48/2000 on the Terms and Conditions for the Approval of the 
Prospectus in Special Occasions of Share Capital Increase by Cash (in Greek) Official 
Government Gazette B 1194/ 28.09.2000. 
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different sanctions for breaches of the provisions, with only administrative 
ones for breaches of Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 and 
non approval of the prospectus for the ASE decisions. 
Notwithstanding that the general subject matter of those legal 
documents is the same, there are variations relating to specific 
requirements. 444 Against this backdrop, the incorporation of this provision in 
the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is questionable. Such requirements 
might be more appropriate to be introduced and defined by the ASE, on the 
basis of Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Law 2836/2000,445 as has already been 
the practice. 
Finally, Article 10 refers to the imposition of sanctions to 'any person 
exercising Board of Directors' powers ; which is strongly associated with 
Article 1, paragraph 4 (b) of the Law 2836/2000, on the grounds of which the 
HCMC is endowed with the authority to impose administrative sanctions and 
monitor the compliance of the parties subjected to the Law. 
446 In practice, the 
sanctions imposed for breaches of the provisions of the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002 amount to the ones envisaged in Law 2836/2000 for breaches of 
the provisions of the HCMC Code of Conduct. 47 However, as will be shown 
444 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 267-268. 
445 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2836/2000 on Completion of Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
Regulation, Amendments Concerning the Public Real Estate Company, Insurance 
Compensations, Value Added Tax, Investing Gold and Other Provisions', Official 
Government Gazette A168/ 24.07.2000, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
4461d 
44' See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
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in the analysis that follows for a number of reasons there are only few 
instances where sanctions have been imposed. 
The Impact of Different Sources of Law in Determining the Greek 
Corporate Governance Universe 
The Greek Securities and Capital Markets Legislation 
As revealed from the detailed analysis of the main provisions of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002, the securities and capital market 
legislation defines the majority of the Greek corporate governance standards. 
The main corporate governance requirements are included in the Greek 
securities and capital markets legislation. For the purposes of improving 
market efficiency, enhancing transparency, ensuring business development, 
preventing unfair trade practices, protecting shareholders' rights, and bringing 
the Greek market up to international and European standards, a package of 
reforms consisting of measures to liberalize, regulate, and develop the 
securities market was introduced since the 1990s. 
More particularly, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), 
pursuing its mandate, has enacted five fundamental codes of conduct of 
business, whose provisions are compulsory for relevant regulated entities. 
These Codes are the following: (a) the Code of Conduct of brokerage firms 
and investment services; 448 (b) the Code of Conduct of mutual fund 
448 See, e. g., HCMC Ministerial Rule 12263B500/11.04.1997 on the Code of Conduct of 
Investment Companies Licensed under the Provisions of the Law 2396/1996, Official 
Government Gazette B340/ 24.04.1997; and Hellenic Law 2396/1996 Investment Services in 
the Securities Field, Capital Adequacy of Investment Services Firms and Credit Institutions 
and Shares' Dematerialisation, Official Government Gazette A73/ 30.04.1996, as last 
amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005)), which set up 
the investment services firms transposing the Investment Services Directive, now MiFID (see, 
e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2004/39 of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments 
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management companies and portfolio investment services firms; 449 (c) the 
Code of Conduct for underwriters and underwriting services; 450 (d) the Code 
of Conduct of companies listed in the ASE; 45' and (e) the Take-Over Bid 
Code 452 
amending Council Directives (EEC) 85/611 and 93/6 and Directive (EC) 2000/12 and 
repealing Council (EEC) 93/22 [2004] OJ L145/1; and Council Directive (EEC) 1993/22 of 
10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field [1993] OJ L141/27) and the 
Capital Adequacy Directive (see, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 1993/6 of 15 March 1993 on 
the capital adequacy of investments firms and credit institutions [1993] OJ L141/1). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the fundamental changes that the Investment Services Directive 
brought about, see, e. g., Athanassiou, P., 'Recent Developments in Greek Capital Markets 
Law' (2005) 16 (4) EBLR 893,897. 
449 See, e. g., HCMC Decision 2/132/19.05.1998 on the Code of Conduct of Mutual Fund 
Management Firms and Investment Services Firms, Official Government Gazette B615/ 
18.06.1998, as amended by HCMC Decision 24/318, Official Government Gazette 
B1843/13.12.2004, and HCMC Decision 8/330, Official Government Gazette B361/ 
21.03.2005), which is based on the Hellenic Law 1969/1991, as amended, (see, e. g., Hellenic 
Law 1969/1991 on Portfolio Investment Companies, Mutual Funds and Other Provisions 
Aiming at the Modernisation and Improvement of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, 
Official Government Gazette A167/ 30.10.1991, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 on 
HCMC issues and other provisions, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005) and the 
Hellenic Law 2533/1997 (see, e. g., Hellenic Law 2533/1997 on Derivatives Exchange and 
Other Provisions, Official Government Gazette A228/ 11.11.1997, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
450 See, e. g., Ministry of Economy and Finance, `Code of Conduct for Underwriters and 
Underwriting Services' (in Greek) Ministerial Decision 41517B1972/04.12.1998, Official 
Government Gazette B1257/ 15.12.1998, as last amended by decision 6400B888, Official 
Government Gazette B625/ 11.05.2005) that was linked with the Law 2651/1998 (see, e. g., 
Hellenic Law 2651/1998 on Stock Exchange Market Issues and Other Provisions, Official 
Government Gazette A248/ 03.11.1998) including the key requirements for the drawing up, 
scrutiny, and distribution of the disclosure document to be drawn up and published prior to 
the admission to listing of securities. 
431 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B 1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005, Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005, and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000, 
Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006, is associated with the Law 1969/1991 (see, 
e. g., Hellenic Law 1969/1991 on Portfolio Investment Companies, Mutual Funds and Other 
Provisions Aiming at the Modernisation and Improvement of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A167/ 30.10.1991, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005 on HCMC issues and other provisions, Official Government Gazette A178/ 
14.07.2005), Law 2836/2000 (Hellenic Law 2836/2000 on Completion of Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission Regulation, Amendments Concerning the Public Real Estate Company, 
Insurance Compensations, Value Added Tax, Investing Gold and Other Provisions, Official 
Government Gazette A168/ 24.07.2000, as last amended by Law 3371/2005, Official 
Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005), and Section A of the Presidential Decree 348/1985 
(see, e. g., Presidential Decree 348/1985 on Determination of Conditions for the Edition, Audit 
and Publication of the Prospectus to be Published for Securities Listing in the ASE, Official 
Government Gazette A125/ 04.07.1985, as amended by Law 3401/2005 (Official Government 
Gazette A257/ 17.10.2005). 
452 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 2/258/ 05.12.2002 on the Take-Over Code for Tender Offers in the 
Capital Market (Take-Over Bid), Official Government Gazette B19/ 16.01.2003, which 
abolishes the HCMC Rule 1/195/19.07.2000, Official Government Gazette B1030/ 
22.08.2000), which is combined with the Hellenic Law 2733/1999 (see, e. g., Law 2733/1999 
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The enactment of these Codes of Conduct of business was part of the 
incorporation process of the European legislation into the Greek legal order. 
In practice, the responsibility for the monitoring of compliance with the codes 
of conduct rests with the HCMC, which pursuant to the provisions of the Law 
2836/2000,453 is endowed with the authority to impose administrative 
sanctions (such as suspension and revocation of license, trading halts, 
imposition of fines) on all supervised legal and physical entities that violate 
capital market law and the rules. It is also endowed with the authority to 
submit indictments to prosecution authorities when punishable financial law 
violations are detected. 
Interestingly, all five codes of conduct are combined with previous 
legislation to enforce securities and capital markets rules, governing, 
particularly, publicly traded companies. This fact explains the following 
observations. First, the tendency of the regulator to legislate is confirmed. On 
this account, the corporate governance framework is transformed to a rigid 
and inflexible one, which further explains, at least in part, the second 
observation, namely the weak compliance at firms' level. Such situation is a 
status quo and the HCMC is aware of that, which partially explains why the 
HCMC permits (or even encourages to some certain extent) that the voluntary 
codes of best practices are further strengthened, (i. e. to become compulsory), 
on the Development of New Market in the ASE, General Amendments of the Capital Market, 
the Public Companies and Organizations, the Corinth Canal SA and Other Provisions', 
Official Government Gazette A155/ 30.07.1999, as last amended by Law 3152/2003, Official 
Government Gazette A152/ 19.06.2003), and the Hellenic Law 1969/1991 (see, e. g., Hellenic 
Law 1969/1991 on Portfolio Investment Companies, Mutual Funds and Other Provisions 
Aiming at the Modernisation and Improvement of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, 
Official Government Gazette A167/ 30.10.1991, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 on 
HCMC issues and other provisions, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
453 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2836/2000 on Completion of Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
Regulation, Amendments Concerning the Public Real Estate Company, Insurance 
Compensations, Value Added Tax, Investing Gold and Other Provisions, Official 
Government Gazette A168/ 24.07.2000, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
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when they are introduced at the same time by means of legislation. Such weak 
compliance is also testified in the analysis of the following chapter. 
Third, it is confirmed that the Greek corporate governance universe 
entails regulatory repetition and overlaps, since some best practices are also 
binding provisions in legislation. This creates confusion to the extent that 
from the one side corporations are encouraged from the codes to apply the 
recommendations and to be informed of them for ensuring business 
development and better protection of shareholders' rights, yet on the other 
side legislation on the same issue demands compliance. Furthermore, overlaps 
undermine the coherence and efficiency of the legal framework, and increase 
operational costs for corporations. 
Overall, from the above codes, which all represent a major 
contribution to the enhancement of transparency and disclosure regarding the 
behaviour of listed companies in the capital market, particular corporate 
governance overlaps have been noted with respect to key provisions of the 
code of conduct for listed companies. 454 
In general, the Code of Conduct for listed companies, aiming to 
eliminate uncertainty in the market about corporate affairs, sets behaviour 
standards for all ASE listed companies; their major shareholders; members of 
the board of directors; executive managers with specific responsibilities; and 
other persons or associated companies, which are directly or indirectly related 
to those listed companies. The fact that the key provisions of this Code are 
also reiterated by the Articles 2-5 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, 
454 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005, Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005, and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000, 
Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006. 
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as is analysed in more detail below, explains the existing regulatory overlaps 
and confirms the main proposition with regard to the creation of an overly 
bureaucratic legal framework. 
More particularly, this Code recognises the dissemination of reliable 
and timely information for important corporate events that shall be taken to be 
the most efficient way for the elimination of speculation by company insiders 
or other persons that may have inside information and the distortion of share 
prices as a result of misleading information and unsubstantiated rumours. The 
Code specifies all corporate actions that must be in a timely fashion 
announced and explicitly verified and requires that all listed companies form a 
corporate announcements department. A similar approach is adopted in the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 that stipulates in article 6 paragraphs (d) 
and (e) the establishment of adequate procedures for monitoring transactions 
made by board members, management, and persons who due to their specific 
post in the company have internal information and the establishment of a 
procedure to announce and notify the public of important company-related 
transactions and other economic activities of the Board members or third 
parties to whom responsibilities of the Board of Directors have been granted, 
as well as transactions with main clients or suppliers. 455 
Additionally, all listed companies are required to form an internal 
audit department, which is also reiterated by article 7 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002. On disclosure matters, all listed companies are also - 
obliged to publish an Annual Report, the content of which will bear close 
resemblance to the content of company Prospectus, as provided by 
455 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002), Article 6, paragraph 2. 
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Presidential Decree 348/1985.456 An important contribution to financial 
disclosure practices is the requirement to publish in the Annual Report a cash 
flow statement, which will allow the efficient monitoring of both company 
cash flows (and consequently their level of liquidity) and the uses of funds 
raised through share capital increases. 57 Resembling the prospectus that 
companies shall submit to get approval of their application for an initial public 
offering is the Internal Regulation that companies are obliged to prepare 
pursuant to article 6 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002.458 Here, the 
effect of overlapping regulations is the creation of more obligations to 
companies than actually needed therefore increasing -compliance and 
operational costs. 
The EU and the OECD Legal Principles 
General Remarks 
Furthermore, in an attempt to demonstrate the pervasive impact of 
international and European standards in the formation of the Greek corporate 
governance universe, two important sources of law are described. First, there 
is EU legislation that has introduced important corporate governance 
requirements through implementation of EC capital market law in the 
456 See, e. g., Presidential Decree 348/1985 on Determination of Conditions for the Edition, 
Audit and Publication of the Prospectus to be Published for Securities Listing in the ASE, 
Official Government Gazette A125/ 04.07.1985, as amended by Law 3401/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A257/ 17.10.2005). 
457 The cash flow statement is structured along International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
constitutes the first step of implementing IAS in Greece. 
458 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002), Article 6, paragraph 1. 
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domestic legal orders of member states. 459 Second, there are the OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles that have brought in important ';. 
developments in the Greek corporate governance regime. 
Such discussion reveals three important issues. First, these two sources 
of law are significant for determining the Greek corporate governance 
universe, given that, particularly with respect to the EU legal principles, the 
Greek regulator tends to closely follow the developments in the EU 
legislation. Failing to discuss the impact of those sources would be 
tantamount to disregarding two important factors explaining regulatory 
initiatives. Second, these two sources of law possess a prominent position in 
the Greek legal order since they are binding legal principles. Third, the 
tendency of the Greek regulator is to legislate on corporate governance 
matters, therefore confirming the nature of the Greek rules-based corporate 
governance system. 
The EC Capital Market Law 
The EC capital market law, as one important branch of the European 
financial law, has significantly impacted on the shaping of the Greek 
459 For the purposes of better understanding the following analysis of the main EC regulatory 
initiatives, it is deemed necessary to briefly explain the new EC law making procedure. The 
time-consuming procedure of the implementation of EU Directives was a significant obstacle 
in the achievement of the tight timeframe for the implementation of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) measures. Against this background, a Committee of Wise Men was 
appointed, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, to address this issue. The Committee in 
its final report (15 February 2001) recommended a tiered decision making process for EU 
legislation, the so-called Lamfalussy process. The introduction of new legislative techniques 
proposed was based on a four-level approach, namely framework principles, implementing 
measures, cooperation and enforcement. Level 1, the directive, should confine itself to broad, 
general `framework' principles and the definition of Commission implementing powers, 
while Level 2 should contain technical implementing measures for adopting level 1 
framework principles, which should be agreed at a second level by the Commission and 
Member States' experts under the so-called `comitology' procedure. Level 3 and 4 of the 
Lamfalussy procedure cover supervision of Member States implementation of the Directives. 
202 
k: 
corporate and capital market landscape, and has an omnipresent influence on 
corporate governance principles. More particularly, the EC capital market law 
contains provisions by means of which the following objectives are, inter alia, 
sought. First, it is the ensuring of the efficiency of the capital market. Second, 
it is the ensuring of the stability of the capital market. 
For the purposes of ensuring the efficiency of the capital market, the 
European Council and the Commission have issued Directives and 
Regulations to govern the issues of market abuse (including its two main 
branches, namely market manipulation and insider dealing), transparency, and 
listing requirements. 
In the area of market abuse, the EU has produced a comprehensive set 
of legal principles, recognising in that way the importance of mitigating 
market manipulation and insider dealing activities in order to ensure the 
integrity of community financial markets and to enhance investor confidence 
in those markets 460 EC Directive 2003/6 (known as the Market Abuse 
Directive) is the key legal document in that regard, which has been associated 
with three more directives and one regulation. 461 The Directive is based on the 
460 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 (the Market Abuse Directive), preamble item 
12. 
461 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 (the Market Abuse Directive). On the law 
making process, it is recalled that the Commission adopted four Level 2 acts implementing 
the Market Abuse Directive: three directives (a) Commission Directive (EC) 2003/124 of 22 
December 2003 implementing Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards the definition of 
public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation, [2003] OJ 
L339/70; (b) Commission Directive (EC) 2003/125 of 22 December 2003 implementing 
Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest, [2003] OJ L339/73; and (c) 
Commission Directive (EC) 2004/72 of 29 April 2004 implementing Council Directive (EC) 
2003/6 as regards accepted market practices, the definition of insider trading in relation to 
derivatives and commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers' 
transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions, [2004] OJ L162/70 and one 
Regulation, e. g. Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing 
Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and 
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principles of transparency and equal treatment of market participants and 
requires closer cooperation and a higher degree of exchange of information 
between national competent authorities. This Directive is a cornerstone of EU 
legislation in that it has reduced to some certain extent potential 
inconsistencies, confusion, and loopholes by establishing a framework for the 
allocation of responsibilities, enforcement and cooperation within the 
Community. 
Following the developments in the EU legislation, the market abuse 
legal framework in Greece has been greatly strengthened by the enactment of 
the Law 3340/2005,462 which transposes into the domestic market the Market 
Abuse Directive. In addition, the role of the HCMC has been significant to the 
extent that it has issued a number of decisions to transpose the level 2 
directives imposing the market abuse directive. 463 
However, at this point it is important to note that the Greek regulator, 
although not explicitly deriving from the EC obligations, decided to treat all 
stabilisation of financial instruments, [2003] OJ L336/33. The Level 2 Regulation entered into 
force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal (23.12.2003). 
462 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3340/2005 on the Protection of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission from Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), Official 
Government Gazette Al 12/ 10.05.2005. 
463 (a) The HCMC Decision 1/347/12.7.2005 on market abuse typology, (Official Government 
Gazette B983/13.7.2005) and HCMC Decision 3/347/12.7.2005 on issuers obligations to 
disclose inside information, (Official Government Gazette B983/13.7.2005) introduce to the 
Greek capital market the provisions of the Commission Directive (EC) 2003/124 of 22 
December 2003 implementing Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards the definition of 
public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation, [2003] OJ 
L339/70; (b) the HCMC Decision 4/347/12.7.2005 on the obligations of financial analysts, 
(Official Government Gazette B983/13.7.2005) transposes the Commission Directive (EC) 
2003/125 of 22 December 2003 implementing Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards the 
fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
[2003] OJ L339/73; and (c) the HCMC Decision 2/347/12.7.2005 on the obligations of 
persons that due to their post conduct transactions, in relation to the prevention of market 
abuse practices, (Official Government Gazette B983/13.7.2005), the HCMC Decision 
3/347/12.7.2005 on issuers obligations to disclose inside information, (Official Government 
Gazette B983/13.7.2005), and the HCMC Decision 5/347/12.7.2005 on the procedure and the 
criteria for acceptable market practices, (Official Government Gazette B983/13.7.2005) 
transpose Commission Directive (EC) 2004/72 of 29 April 2004 implementing Council 
Directive (EC) 2003/6 as regards accepted market practices, the definition of insider trading 
in relation to derivatives and commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification 
of managers' transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions, [2004] OJ L162/70. 
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market abuse acts (e. g., market manipulation and insider dealing) as criminal 
offences and as such severe penalties are stipulated by the Greek Penal Code 
and other penal laws. 
464 
To continue with the objective of EC capital market law to ensure 
transparency for investors, the European Parliament and the Council have 
issued the so-called Transparency Directive, which deals with financial 
reporting requirements, disclosure of interests in securities, and 
communications with holders of shares and debt securities and the market 465 
This Directive aims to enhance investor protection, to attract investors to the 
European market place, and to improve the efficiency, openness and integrity 
of European capital markets. In addition, it also removes certain national 
barriers linked to transparency requirements, which may discourage issuers 
from having their securities admitted to trading on more that one regulated 
market in the EU. The Directive upgrades the current level and frequency of 
the mandatory financial information that issuers have to provide to the 
markets throughout the financial year. 
464 The legal framework for the elimination of market abuse acts has been further 
strengthened with the recently enacted Hellenic Law 3424/2005 amending Law 2331/1995 
and implementing Council Directive (EC) 2001/97 on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering, (Official Government Gazette A305/ 
13.12.2005) that incorporates into domestic legal order the Council Directive (EEC) 1991/308 
OJ L166/77, as amended by Council Directive (EC) 2001/97 OJ L344/76 (Council Directives 
(EEC) 1991/308 of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering [1991] OJ L166/77, as amended by Council Directive (EC) 
2001/97 of 4 December 2001 [2001] OJ L344/76) and the revised 40 Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) Recommendations (2003), and part of the 9 Special FATF Recommendations. 
Pursuant to Article 2 (i) (p) `market abuse acts are considered to be predicate offences and as 
such they can bring penal fines and restrictions'. 
465 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2004/109 of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Council Directive (EC) 2001/34 
[2004] OJ L390/38 (the Transparency Directive). 
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The effects of this Directive, along with the Investment Services 
Directive466, as it has been considerably amended by the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), 467 have been pervasive to the Greek legal 
order to the extent that more comprehensive financial reports for issuers of 
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market have been introduced. Such 
development is positive since it allows investors to make a more informed 
assessment of the issuer's situation. 
The Transparency Directive has been transposed into the Greek capital 
market law by the enactment of the Law 3556/2007468 and prior to that the 
Law Hellenic Law 2396/1996469 transposed the main provisions of the 
Investment Services Directive. Moreover, the regulatory intervention of the 
HCMC has been significant for the transposition of the level 2 implementing 
measures for the purposes of which -three important decisions have been 
published that further strengthen the regulatory framework on ensuring the 
regular flow of information to investors 
470 
466 See, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 199322 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the 
Securities Field [1993] OJ L141/27. 
467 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2004/39 of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives (EEC) 85/611 and 93/6 and Directive (EC) 2000/12 
and repealing Council (EEC) 93/22 [2004] OJ L145/1. It is important to note that MiFID is 
expected to bring about important changes to the Greek capital market legal framework and 
has been recently transposed into the Greek legal order by the Hellenic Law 3606/2007 on 
markets in financial instruments, Official Government Gazette A195/17.08.2007. 
468 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3556/2007 on the transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
Official Government Gazette A91/30.04.2007. 
469 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2396/1996 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, Capital 
Adequacy of Investment Services Firms and Credit Institutions and Shares' 
Dematerialisation, Official Government Gazette A73/ 30.04.1996, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
470 The level-2 measures of the Transparency Directive have been introduced by the following 
HCMC Decisions: (a) HCMC Decision 1/434/3.7.2007 on the specification of ongoing and 
periodic information requirements pursuant to the Law 3556/2007 (Official Government 
Gazette B1222/17.7.2007); (b) HCMC Decision 6/448/11.10.2007 on information and data 
included in the quarterly and semi-annual financial reports (Official Government Gazette 
B209229.10.2007); and (c) HCMC Decision 7/448/11.10.2007 on additional information and 
data included in the annual and semi-annual financial reports (Official Government Gazette 
B2092/29.10.2007). 
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Furthermore, the Prospectus Directive, and its level 2 implementing 
measures, represents an essential instrument for ensuring investor protection'', 
and market efficiency (mainly through establishing the principle of the single 
passport to the issuer) in accordance with high regulatory standards adopted in 
the relevant international fora. 471 The new regime for prospectuses is the 
centrepiece of the new disclosure framework. It allows firms to organise 
European-wide capital-raising exercises on the basis of a single document. 
Essentially, this Directive introduces a new `single passport for issuers' so 
that once a prospectus had been approved by the home country authority of 
the issuer, it has to be accepted throughout the EU for public offer and/or 
admission to trading on regulated markets. The Directive makes the whole 
system for prospectuses much simpler and operational and so makes it easier 
and cheaper to raise capital throughout the EU. 
The effect of this EC regulatory initiative for the progress of the Greek 
capital market legislation is all-pervading, since the Greek regulator, like 
other European regulators, has closely followed the developments of 
European legislation by enacting the Law 3401/2005472 and the HCMC has 
issued relevant decision applicable to all listed companies on the ASE 473 
Therefore, this legislative framework envisages, inter alia, the obligation of 
companies to issue a prospectus when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading, the obligation to publish reliable information at least on 
an annual basis, the publication of consistent and easily understandable 
471 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Council Directive (EC) 2001/34 [2003] OJ L345/64 (The Prospectus Directive). 
472 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3401/2005 on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are 
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, Official Government Gazette A257/ 
17.10.2005. 
473 See, e. g., HCMC Decision 3/398/22.9.2006 on the procedure and the requirements for 
prospectus' approval (Official Government Gazette B 1566/25.10.2006). 
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information on a regular basis, and means to facilitate the circulation of the 
various information and documents and encourage the use of electronic ý' .. 
communication facilities, such as the Internet. 
Accordingly, the discussion of the EC law making initiatives that aim 
at ensuring the stability of the capital market reveals the significant effects of 
the MiFID (modernising the previous Investment Services Directive474). The 
recent implementation of the MiFID appears to have omnipresent effect 
within the context of the EC capital market to the extent that it contains 
provisions addressing, inter alia, issues relating to the sound operation of 
capital markets, the granting of license and operation of investment 
companies, credit institutions, and Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), the withdrawal of authorisation, the capital 
adequacy requirements, and general prudential supervision matters. 
Although the scope of the present analysis is limited to describe 
mainly the effects of the EC legislation, it cannot extend to discussing in 
detail the changes that the MiFID is about to bring in the Greek legal order 
(and to a similar extent to other member states' market). Briefly, beyond the 
substantial IT upgrading and the review of contracts with clients and data 
suppliers that firms will have to make in order to classify them in one of the 
three categories (e. g. retail client, professional client, or eligible counterpart), 
the important change that the new regime brings is that there will be no 
regulated exchange with a `de facto' monopoly of trading for a certain 
financial instrument in a certain jurisdiction. Although the latter is expected to 
foster competition and a level playing field between EU trading venues, it is 
474 See, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 1993/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the 
Securities Field [1993] OJ L141/27. 
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important to bear in mind that the creation of many market operators will 
require that the overall operational and technology structure of firms must 
have sufficient capacity and flexibility to include them as they occur. 475 
Finally, an important change introduced by MiFID relates to the 
transformation of the concept of `Best Execution', since it moves away from 
the traditional simple `best price' (e. g. lowest bid, highest offer) towards `best 
possible outcome at lowest possible costs' 476 
Notwithstanding that MiFID represents an opportunity for firms to 
consider how they wish to conduct business across Europe in the future and 
offers a chance to create an integrated, highly efficient business model to 
deliver maximum business advantage, the transition towards implementing the 
new regime is a serious quest. There are substantial conceptual differences 
and significant practical implications, which excuse the quite late 
transposition from the Greek regulatory authorities. MiFID has been recently 
incorporated in the Greek legal order by the Law 3606/2007.77 In addition, 
the Greek capital market framework has been substantially strengthened with 
the enactment of the Law 2396/1996,478 as amended, that governs the 
investment services in the securities field and is the result of transposing the 
Investment Service Directive. 479 
475 See, e. g., Mertzanis, H. V., `The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID): 
Multiple Trading Venues and Best Execution' (presentation to the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Athens, 25 September 2007). 
4761d.. 
477 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3606/2007 on markets in financial instruments, Official 
Government Gazette A195/17.08.2007. 
478 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2396/1996 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, Capital 
Adequacy of Investment Services Firms and Credit Institutions and Shares' 
Dematerialisation, Official Government Gazette A73/ 30.04.1996, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
479 See, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 1993/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the 
Securities Field [1993] OJ L141/27. 
209 
w; 
3. 
Overall, while the new regime is expected to bring about fundamental 
changes in the Greek capital market, as aforementioned, Greek market 
participants are still not comfortable enough with MiFID's overly technical 
requirements. Besides, such regulatory changes will enable the Greek market 
to further develop into a more mature and efficient market, where investors 
(foreign and domestic) can enjoy legal and regulatory certainty. 
Finally, another important development in EC legislation that has 
significant effects on the Greek capital market and corporate governance 
universe by modifying the way that corporations operate, relates to 
requirements on financial statements and most importantly the introduction of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
More particularly, all listed companies on the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE) are required to comply with the provisions of the Presidential Decree 
350/1985,480 which brings into the Greek law the Council Directive (EEC) 
79/279.48 1 According to this Presidential Decree, the companies, whose shares 
are listed on the ASE, have certain obligations as regards the annual financial 
statements and the publication of management reports. The company places at 
the disposal of the public, as soon as possible, its last annual financial 
statements and the last management report. If the company draws up together 
with the unconsolidated financial statements the consolidated ones, it places 
them at the disposal of the public. 
480 See, e. g., Presidential Decree 350/1985 on Listing Requirements in the Athens Stock 
Exchange and Issuers' Duties and Obligations, Official Government Gazette A126/ 
04.07.1985, as last amended by Law, as last amended by Law 3401/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A257/ 17.10.2005). 
481 See, e. g., Council Directive (EEC) 1979/279 of 5 March 1979 Coordinating the Conditions 
for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing [1979] OJ L066/21. 
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On 19 July 2002, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
the Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 `on the application of International 
Accounting Standards'. 482 The Regulation has as its objective the adoption 
and use of international accounting standards in the Community with a view 
to harmonise the financial information presented by corporations in order to 
ensure a high degree of transparency and compatibility of financial statements 
and hence an efficient function of the Community capital market and of the 
Internal Market. 
Against this background, the Greek regulator passed the Law 
2992/2002,483 and most recently the Laws 3229/2004484 and 3301/2004,485 
which introduced into the Greek legislation the new IAS/IFRS. Consequently, 
as of 1 January 2005, all Greek listed companies are obliged to apply in their 
financial statements the new IAS/IFRS standards, the compilation and 
publication of which will be made according to the provisions of the 
aforementioned Laws. This reflects a milestone for transparency and efficient 
compatibility of accounts among different types of companies, since financial 
statements of all Greek listed companies will become directly and easily 
comparable with those of publicly traded entities in all other euro zone 
countries. 
482 See, e. g., Council Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) [2002] OJ L243/1 (the IAS Regulation). 
483 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2992/2002 on Measures on Capital Market Enhancement and 
Other Provisions, Official Government Gazette A54/ 20.03.2002, as last amended by Law 
3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
484 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3229/2004 on Supervision of Private Insurance and Controls on 
Lucky Games, Application of the International Accounting Standards and Other Provisions, 
Official Government Gazette A38/ 10.02.2004, as last amended by Law 3427/2005 (Official 
Government Gazette A312/ 27.12.2005). 
485 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3301/2004 on the Application of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), Official Government Gazette A263/ 23.12.2004. 
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The OECD Corporate Governance Principles 
M: 
Following the discussion of the impact of EC capital market law in the 
Greek legal order, the focus of the analysis now shifts to argue for the 
prominent position of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles for the 
shaping of the Greek corporate governance universe. A first testament of that 
is the publication of the `Mertzanis Report', which in substance represents a 
translation of the OECD Principles. 86 Secondly, the fact that in view of the 
OECD Principles, a number of legislative improvements took place in the 
Greek securities markets, which in addition sketches the Greek rules-based 
corporate governance system. 
To start with, Principle One declares the importance of effective 
corporate governance framework as a means to promote transparent and 
efficient markets and is determined that the corporate governance framework 
should be developed with a view to its impact on overall economic 
performance, market integrity, and the incentives that it creates for market 
participants. This Principle is mainly incorporated into the Greek legal order 
by Law 3371/2005,487 which determines the basic preconditions to be met 
when securities are admitted to trading on the ASE. Pursuant to Article. 10 
paragraph 2, the ASE may refuse to accept an application for securities to be 
traded on the ASE, if it considers that market's efficient operation or 
investors' rights are somehow adversely affected, albeit other legal or 
regulatory conditions are met. Whereas Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2 
empowers the ASE with the authority to postpone the trading of some 
486 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece Cf., OECD (2004) 
`OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. 
487 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3371/2005 Regarding Issues of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005. 
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securities on the fear of endangering market integrity and efficiency, the 
HCMC assumes broader responsibility (paragraph 3) in the sense that it can 1''". 
even order, under specific circumstances, the deletion of the securities from 
being traded on the ASE. Hence, it appears that the Greek legislators have 
developed a concrete legal framework to accommodate Principle One. 
Principle Two defines the most essential rights of shareholders and 
key ownership functions, whose exercise should be protected and facilitated 
by the corporate governance framework of Principle One. Article 11, 
paragraph 1 of the Law 3371/2005,488 introduces that Principle by securing, 
inter alia, shareholders' right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed 
on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, and by requiring 
companies to provide the necessary facilitations in the exercise of 
shareholders' rights and make announcements regarding share capital increase 
(paragraph 3). The latter is also envisaged in Article 9 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002.89 
This framework for the protection of shareholders' rights is 
supplemented by Articles 4 and 5 of the HCMC Code of Conduct for listed 
companies that mandate the obligation of listed companies to timely provide 
accurate and true information to shareholders. 490 In addition, this provision 
stipulates the setting up of a special department, the Investors' Relations 
488 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3371/2005 Regarding Issues of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005. 
489 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
490 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
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Department, within the company, responsible for the dissemination of 
corporate information. 
Principle Three is divided into two different parts with part one to 
refer to the equitable treatment of shareholders, in the sense that companies 
ensure that all shareholders have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. Subsequently, part two concerns the insider trading 
and abusive self-dealing activities. With regard to the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, Article 11 paragraph 1 (a) of the Law 3371/2005491 describes 
the relevant obligation and Article 6 of the HCMC Code of Conduct for listed 
companies specifies the sanctions that shall be imposed in case of breach of 
the companies' obligation to equally treat shareholders. 492 
Accordingly, insider dealing and market manipulation activities are 
prohibited by Articles 3-9 of the Law 3340/2005,493 which incorporate into 
the domestic legal order the Market Abuse Directive, as aforementioned 494 
These provisions sketch an integrated framework for insider dealing imposing 
a number of obligations to listed companies and other persons with access to 
`privileged information' vis-a-vis confidential information. In a similar vein, 
the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 addresses the issue of conflicts of 
interests, as provided for by Article 2 paragraph 3, by obliging Members of 
the Board of Directors to disclose in due course to the other members of the 
a91 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 337112005, Regarding Issues of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005. 
492 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons, Official Government Gazette B 1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006). 
493 Articles 3-6 refer to the insider dealing practices and Articles 7-9 cover the market 
manipulation practices. See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3340/2005 on the Protection of the Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission from Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 
Official Government Gazette Al 12/ 10.05.2005. 
494 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16 (the Market Abuse Directive). 
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Board any own interests, which are likely to arise from transactions of the 
company falling within their competences 495 The HCMC, pursuant to Articles 
21 and 22 of the Law 3340/2005 assumes the responsibility to safeguard the 
full implementation of the provisions of the Law. At the same time, HCMC 
has increased supervisory and investigatory powers in order to establish a 
breach of the provisions. Finally, the sanctions and administrative fines that 
can be imposed are described in Articles 23-24 and 29-31 of the Law 
3340/2005. 
The Fifth Principle emphasizes the pressing need for disclosure and 
transparency in the interest of investors, who will be able to better monitor 
and evaluate corporations' performance. The fifth principle covers a wide 
range of information that also satisfies other OECD principles, such as for 
instance Principle two that refers to the shareholders' rights. The 
implementation of some of the main elements of the fifth principle has been 
declared by Law 3401/2005,496 which in principle incorporates into the Greek 
legal order the Prospectus Directive, 497 as aforementioned, that aims to ensure 
investor protection and market efficiency. 
The above legal framework is significantly supplemented by the 
HCMC Code of Conduct for listed companies498 and the Law 3371/2005 499 
495 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
496 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3401/2005 on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are 
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, Official Government Gazette A257/ 
17.10.2005. 
497 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Council Directive (EC) 2001/34 [2003] OJ L345/64 (the Prospectus Directive). 
498 See, e. g., HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 on the Code of Conduct for Companies Listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange and Connected Persons', Official Government Gazette B1487/ 
06.12.2000, as amended by HCMC Decisions 3/348/2005 (Official Government Gazette 
B1081/ 01.08.2005) and 7/372/15.02.2006 on Amendment of HCMC Rule 5/204/14.11.2000 
(Official Government Gazette B247/ 27.02.2006), at Articles 2 and 4. 
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The latter modernises the operation of the HCMC' and includes fundamental 
provisions with regard to information to investors. More particularly, Article 
11 paragraph 2 of the said Law stipulates that all listed companies shall 
disclose and make public to investors the annual consolidated financial 
statements without delay, along with management reports. Additionally, 
Articles 15 and 16 of the same Law underline and strengthen the role and 
powers of the HCMC and lay down the obligation of listed companies to 
provide any information that might be considered necessary by the HCMC in 
view of protecting investors and/or market efficiency. 50° Finally, the central 
role of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) is secured by virtue of Article 285 
of the Athens Exchange Rulebook, according to which `issuing companies 
must provide the Athens Exchange with all information requested by the latter 
in its capacity as administrator of a regulated market and in the framework of 
its role as a mechanism for the dissemination of information to the public, 
with the aim of protecting the investing public or ensuring the smooth 
operation of Athens Exchange. soi 
Furthermore, the information that shall be disclosed, as outlined in the 
fifth principle, is also stipulated by the provisions of the Law 3301/2004,502 
which imposes the application of the International Accounting Standards / 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS / IFRS), in compliance with 
Council Regulation (EC) 1606/2002503 and the Presidential Decree 
4" See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3371/2005 Regarding Issues of, the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005. 
500 The latter is in strong correlation with the OECD Principle One, as described above. 
501 See, e. g., Athens Exchange Rulebook - Listing and Trading, 7`h Edition (25 October 2007). 
502 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3301/2004 on the Application of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), Official Government Gazette A263/ 23.12.2004. 
503 See, e. g., Council Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) [2002] OJ L243/1 (the IAS Regulation). 
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360/1985, s° which refers to the publication of financial statements on 
companies' web site. 
Principle Six acknowledges that the corporate governance framework 
shall ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of 
management by the board and the board's accountability to the company and 
the shareholders. Overall, the provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 
sos 2002 address the key objective sought from this Principle. 
Therefore, from the above discussion it is evident that the OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles are largely incorporated into the Greek legal 
order by means of binding legislation. The binding nature of those legislative 
texts reflects the rule-based approach of Greek legislators to regulating the 
area of corporate governance. The ultimate challenge of Greek markets is not 
merely to implement corporate governance principles, but most importantly to 
ensure their full internalisation. The next chapter will address this issue. 
504 See, e. g., Presidential Decree 360/1985 on Financial Information to be Published 
Periodically by Companies Listed in the ASE, Official Government Gazette A129/ 
09.07.1985, as last amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 
14.07.2005). 
sos See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002, as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
GREEK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: COMPLIANCE 
AND EFFICIENCY 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Purposes of this Chapter 
Building on the previous discussion of the Greek corporate governance 
universe, this chapter's main objective is to discuss the recorded discrepancy 
between the objectives of the corporate governance standards, compliance, 
and governance efficiency. For this purpose the following analysis has two 
main dimensions. First, to study the level of compliance of Greek listed 
companies with the corporate governance standards, as documented by recent 
Corporate Governance Surveys. Second, building on the basis of the overall 
moderate level of compliance of Greek listed firms with the corporate 
governance requirements, the focus of the analysis shifts to further explore 
those country specific factors that have contributed to the aforementioned 
discrepancy. 
Therefore, the present analysis goes beyond merely reviewing the 
contradiction, where Greece is a country, which besides the existence of a 
wide range of corporate governance obligations, its overall governance is not 
as efficient as the aims of the corporate governance rules, and best practice 
recommendations have designed it to be. It goes further by providing in-depth 
reasoning to explain this contradiction, which seems to be strongly associated 
with another paradox in that the Greek corporations fail to comply not only 
218 
M, 
with the non binding corporate governance requirements, but also with the 
binding rules. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to shed some light on the 
overall performance and efficiency of the Greek corporate governance system 
based primarily on two recent Corporate Governance Surveys that examine 
the corporate governance compliance. The fundamental contribution of this 
analysis is twofold. First, that this thesis is a full-length study that discusses 
the relationship between Greek corporate governance rules and the extent to 
which those are implemented, as documented by recent Corporate 
Governance Surveys. Most importantly, it mainly attempts, for the first time, 
to explain such relationship on accounts of country-specific attributes. 
Second, the examination of those factors that can circumscribe the 
achievement of the objectives and aims of the Greek corporate governance 
framework is important, in that realistic and effective suggestions for 
improvement are designed, to mitigate the specific corporate governance 
weaknesses in the Greek corporate structures. 
The Structure of this Chapter 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, for the purposes of this 
study, it is important to briefly determine those efficiency parameters upon 
which the latter governance assessment is undertaken. The central role of the 
Board of Directors in the Greek corporate governance framework explains the 
primary focus of the following assessment, which is centred on this corporate 
governance mechanism. 
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Second, the main conclusions on the overall efficiency of the Greek 
governance system are reviewed, based on the key findings of the two recent 
Corporate Governance Surveys conducted by Grant Thornton and the Athens 
University of Economics and Business in 2005 and in 2006.506 Both surveys 
document significant findings for the level of the governance performance in 
the Greek system. 
Alongside this review a brief comparison with the corporate 
governance compliance of UK public limited corporations takes place. This 
serves two main purposes. First, to reveal the importance of country- and 
governance-specific variables (such as for instance the family origins of Greek 
corporations as opposed to the diffuse shareholding ownership of UK 
corporations) in determining the overall performance of a country's 
governance system. Second, notwithstanding the different governance origins 
and attributes of the UK public limited corporations, the fact that the latter 
enjoy high levels of governance performance offers a good example for Greek 
corporations. Importantly, the present study does not imply that Greek 
companies should transplant the UK corporate governance practices, which is 
neither possible nor desirable. Its aim is rather to throw down a challenge to 
those charged with governance to truly embrace the spirit of the Greek 
corporate governance rules and international best practice and so ensure a 
better future for the Greek governance system. 
Third, the moderate levels of compliance are particularly explained on - 
account of certain country-specific conditions aiming to determine the extent 
to which such factors have affected the Greek governance performance. Such 
506 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005); and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006). 
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discussion enables those entrusted with promoting good corporate governance 
to better capture those situational variables in that more realistic proposals for ' .. 
improving governance efficiency to be made. 
2. GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT AND REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE: THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
The Corporate Governance Law of 2002, as analysed in the previous 
chapter, places the Board of Directors at the apex of the Greek corporate 
governance system. This further explains the scope of the following 
governance assessment that mainly covers the specific compliance issues 
around this important corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, a review 
of the following efficiency factors is undertaken: (a) the independence of the 
Board of Directors; (b) the presence of independent non executive members in 
the Board of Directors; (c) the existence of remuneration policy for board 
members; (d) the adoption of appropriate organisation and internal regulation; 
(e) the establishment of internal control and risk management systems; and (f) 
the participation of shareholders in the governance processes. 
The Board of Directors 
At a theoretical level, as described in the previous chapter, the one-tier 
system of the Greek Board of Directors' structure is opposed to the so-called 
dual or two-tier system, where there is clear distinction between managing 
and supervisory directors (e. g. Germany). The role of the Board of Directors 
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is central in determining the efficiency of the Greek corporate governance 
system, as recognised by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002507 and the 
Mertzanis Report, 508 in that it assumes the responsibility of ensuring the 
establishment of efficient governance rules. 
More particularly, the Mertzanis Report stresses that the Board of 
Directors has the responsibility, inter alia, (i) to deal with the corporation's 
affairs exclusively in the interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
within the existing regulatory framework; (ii) to ensure the establishment of 
efficient governance rules and be accountable to the General Shareholders 
Meetings for its activities and performance; (iii) to set the corporation's long- 
term goals and make all strategic decisions; (iv) to make available all required 
sources for the achievement of strategic goals, the appointment, and the 
supervision of management. 509 
Although the Board of, Directors stands at the apex of the Greek 
corporate governance system, yet in practice a `paying lip service' to 
compliance with certain governance requirements has been demonstrated. sto 
Essentially, a significant performance is required with regard to the Board of 
Directors, along with ensuring independence of highest levels of the Board of 
Directors. Therefore, in assessing the independence of the Board of Directors, 
as an important factor for the overall efficiency of the Greek governance 
system, the following conclusions are reached. 
507 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration and 
Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, 
(Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
"I See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
sog Id atz. 
510 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 3. 
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According to the findings of the 2005 Corporate Governance Survey 
in about 9 out of 10 cases (86.4%), the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
holds executive responsibilities as well, and additionally 61.5% of the 
companies enquired fail to divide responsibilities at the head of the 
company. '" A similar trend is noted in 2006, where in about 8 out of 10 
companies (76.6%), the Chairman exercises executive responsibilities as well, 
and in 57.6% of the companies, the Chairman of the Board and the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) are either the same person or close relatives. 512 At 
this point is important to note that with regard to the separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chairman of the Board, the family origins of the Greek corporations 
can explain the trend of combining these two roles into a single person. 
Notably, within a short period of time (from 2005 to 2006) a slight 
improvement of the Greek governance performance is recorded with regard to 
the -clear division of 
duties and responsibilities at the highest level of the 
company (from 61.5 to 57.6%). However, it is important to note that the 
difference between the percentages of Greek and UK companies that separate 
the roles of CEO / Chairman remains significant (92.7% for UK 
corporations 513) As aforementioned, such pattern prevails in Greek 
corporations due to their family origin and the personal character of firms, in 
511 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 12. 
512 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 12. 
s'3 Specifically, according to the findings of the Fourth and Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review, 93.1% and 92.7% of the UK companies separated the two roles, in 2005 
and 2006, respectively. Essentially, this pattern of separating the roles of CEO / Chairman in 
the UK companies originates from the recommendation A. 2 of the Combined Code, which 
states that `there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for running of the 
company's business. ' See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth 
FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 11; 
and Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 14. 
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contrast with the diffuse shareholding structure of UK public limited 
corporations. 
In a similar vein, the Greek companies are lagging dramatically behind 
the statistics of the UK companies with regard to transparency for the reasons 
of not complying. More particularly, according to the findings of the 2006 
Corporate Governance Survey (which reflect a similar trend in the 2005 
Corporate Governance Survey) the vast majority of the Greek corporations do 
not make use of the possibility to explain the reasons for non compliance with 
corporate governance rules. 514 On the contrary, there are very positive results 
on the level of explanation given by UK companies, which almost total 
compliance with the provisions of the Combined Code is shown. In 2006, 
96% (90%, in 2005) of the UK companies provided at least some explanation 
sis as to the reasons for non compliance. 
The above findings with regard to the compliance of Greek 
corporations with the principle of `comply or explain' give rise to the 
following considerations. First, such low compliance can be explained on the 
grounds that this principle is provided for by the Mertzanis Recommendations 
as an option for corporations to use and not as obligation. Second, the 
compliance at Greek corporations' level is poor in that they do not realise on 
their own. that choosing to explain the reasons for deviating from the legal 
framework will further boost their governance efficiency. Three, the previous 
two observations are strongly associated with the small size of Greek 
514 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 7-8; and Grant Thornton and Athens 
University of Economics and Business, '2005 Corporate Governance Survey', (2005), at 7-8. 
515 See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 7; and Grant Thornton 
(UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: 
Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 9. 
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corporations, which in turn makes the application of such an option expensive 
in that it creates additional administrative costs and workload, so corporations 
choose not to adopt. 
To continue with additional indications that show that companies do 
not ensure full independence at the highest level (e. g. the Board of Directors) 
the following factors are assessed. First, when the Chairman and/or the CEO 
are at the same time the major shareholder. 516 According to the findings of the 
2005 Corporate Governance Survey, it appears that in half of the cases, the 
Chairman and/or the CEO is at the same time the major shareholder. 517 The 
need for more independence at the highest levels of the company is evident 
also from the findings of the 2006 Corporate Governance Survey, where in 7 
out of -10 companies the major shareholder is the CEO and/or the Chairman. 518 
Such practice confirms the personal character of the formation of the Board of 
Directors of Greek corporations and it stresses the need for reform. 
Second, the establishment of adequate mechanisms is needed to 
appraise the performance of the Board members, its committees, and its 
individual directors. Such principle has been developed by the revised 
Combined Code (UK), which considers the adoption of this principle as 
519 crucial for efficient governance. Significantly, the UK statistics record that 
there has been an overall reduction in the number of companies, who gave no 
516 Major shareholder is defined here as the natural persons or legal entities that hold more 
than 3% of the company's shares. 
517 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, 12005 
Corporate Governance Survey', (2005), at 13. 
518 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 13. 
519 This is another principle introduced by the revised Code relating to performance evaluation 
and it states that `the board should state in the annual report how performance evaluation of 
the board, its committees and its individual directors has been conducted. See, e. g., Financial 
Reporting Council - (FRC), 'The Combined Code on Corporate Governance' (2006) June, at 
A. 6.1. 
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disclosure at all on performance evaluation, and a greater number of 
companies (in 2006 40% from 31% the year before) provided `more detail' 
than the bare minimum required by the code. 520 
Notwithstanding that there is no such requirement in Greek corporate 
governance, the levels of compliance with such international best practice 
reveals the extent to which Greek corporations truly embrace the essence of 
good governance. Unfortunately, as it appears from the findings of both the 
2005 and 2006 Corporate Governance Surveys, only a minority of Greek 
corporations has established appropriate evaluation mechanisms and 
procedures to appraise the performance of the Board of Directors and 
individual directors (24.5% in 2005 and 41.5% on 2006). 521 Despite the 
recorded improvement, still the large majority of Greek corporations fall short 
of establishing performance evaluation procedures. This further contributes to 
the poor governance efficiency and the lack of independence at the highest 
level of corporations. 
Third, the extent to which corporations have established procedures 
for facilitating Board members to exercise their duties and responsibilities is 
important. In this line, the recommendations of the Mertzanis Report 
recognise the importance of external consultants by urging corporations to 
establish procedures that would allow the Board of Directors to obtain advice 
by external advisors. 522 In this context, according to the findings of the 2006 
52° See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 12; and Grant Thornton 
(UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: 
Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 15. 
521 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 14; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 14. 
522 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) 'Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
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Corporate Governance Survey, almost 5 out of 10 companies (e. g. 47%) have 
established procedures for taking external advice, 
523 which is considerably' 
improved with that of 37.9% documented in 2005.524 
It is estimated that this statistic will further increase in the following 
years given two important considerations. First is the tendency of Greek 
corporations to hire third parties for consultation projects. As Greek 
corporations' size will grow, so reliance on external advisors will increase. 
Second is the fact that in the Greek market there is a wide net of consultancy 
firms that are in position to offer `cut and paste' advice packages, due to 
similarities between Greek corporations. 
Fourth is the extent to which corporations encourage the effectiveness 
of the Board of Directors, in that board members are allowed to participate in 
affiliated or other companies. The findings of the 2005 Corporate Governance 
Survey reveal, which are at a similar range with the ones in 2006, that almost 
half of the members of the Board of Directors participate in the Board of 
affiliated or other companies 
525 Therefore, the phenomenon of the `busy 
director' that is recorded in Greek corporations can be explained by the 
following reasons. First is the shallow Greek market and its small size that 
illuminates the lack of high level executives. Second is the absence of such a 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece, at 14, 
recommendation § 5.9. 
523 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, 12006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 15. 
524 See, e . g., 
Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 15. 
su In 2005,41% (41.1% in 2006) of the companies' Board members participated in the Board 
of Directors of affiliated companies and 47.4 % (51.2% in 2006) of other companies. See, 
e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 Corporate 
Governance Survey' (2005), at 16; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics 
and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 16. 
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corporate governance requirement, 526 revealing once more that Greek 
corporations are not informed by international best practices. In addition, such 
state of affairs raises concerns about the effectiveness of the Board, the overall 
governance efficiency, the extent to which the independence at the highest 
level of corporations is ensured, and whether potential conflict of interests are 
avoided. 
Importantly, such a phenomenon is not met in the UK FTSE 100 
corporations, where only 11% of the companies share their chairman with 
another corporation. 527 This reveals a strong compliance with the principle of 
the revised Combined Code, which states that `no individual should be 
appointed to a second chairmanship of a FTSE 100 company'. 528 
Finally, the establishment of a nomination committee and the 
development of specific procedures for appointing new members of the Board 
of Directors is recognised by international corporate governance practices as 
important for good governance. 529 Still, the statistics for the compliance levels 
of Greek corporations with this principle are not good. This is so given that in 
526 There is only a very narrow obligation introduced by the Corporate Governance Law of 
2002, which is limited to govern the disclosure of conflicts of interest, which may arise from 
the exercise of their tasks. See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, 
Board Remuneration and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as 
amended by Law 3091/2002, (Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002), Article 2, 
Paragraph 3. [Hereinafter the Corporate Governance Law of 2002]. 
27 See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Third FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2004), at 13; Grant Thornton 
(UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review: 
Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 12; and Grant Thornton (UK), Risk 
Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: Highlighting 
Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 14. 
sza See, e. g., Financial Reporting Council - (FRC), 'The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance' (2006) June, at A. 4.3. 
529 1d. at A 4.1. 
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2005 16.2% (20.6% in 2006) of the Greek corporations enquired disclosed 
their procedures for appointing new members of the Board of Directors. 530 
This statistics can mean four things. First, that since the majority of 
Greek corporations do not publish their nomination policy, it can be assumed 
that perhaps they do not have one in the first place. Second, the above 
assumption on the absence of nomination policy can be further supported by 
the family origins of Greek corporations, the operations of which have not 
demanded the adoption of such policy. Third, adjacent to the family origin of 
Greek corporations rests also the fact that the general practice of Greek 
corporations to base their decision on appointing new members of the Board 
on abstract and personal criteria (such as recommendation from close 
relatives, or people with close ties) makes it hard for corporations to comply 
with independent and subjective nomination criteria. Fourth, that Greek 
corporations seem to lack a corporate governance driven corporate culture that 
would underline the importance of complying with requirements even if there 
are not compulsory. Against this backdrop, it is important that Greek 
corporations make all necessary efforts to capture the essence of efficient 
governance, such as to be informed by international best practices. 
Independent Non Executive Members 
In addition to the moderate levels of independence of the highest 
r 
ranking officers of corporations, au analysed above, the appointment of 
independent non executive directors is a decisive factor on the overall 
governance performance. As discussed in previous chapters, independent 
$30 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 20. 
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directors as a disciplining mechanism to alleviate the agency problems is 
recommended by various corporate governance codes, 531 in order to minimise 
any complications from the combination of the roles of CEO / Chairman and 
more significantly, for the protection of the interests of shareholders, and 
particularly the minority shareholders. 
When it comes to discussing the important role of independent 
directors within the specific shareholding structure of family owned 
businesses, the following considerations come to the fore. First, the presence 
of independent directors in the family boardroom is important, in order to 
safeguard sound decisions and family control over management. Second, 
independent directors have a special value for family firms, as an effective 
mechanism to mitigate family opportunism. 
532 Third, independent directors 
are in better position for tackling specific problems or issues and especially in 
the field of strategy, if they ask the right questions. 533 
Against this background, the essence of Article 3 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002 is based on the separation of executive and non 
executive Board members. Additionally, the legal manifestation of the 
protection of the general interest of the company', as the primary 
531 For instance, the Cadbury Report recommended that there should be a strong independent 
element to the board to prevent chief executives from becoming too powerful. See, e. g., 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury Committee), 
`Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance' (1992) December (the Cadbury Report), 
Principle 4.9. This stance was reiterated later in the text of the Combined Code. The 
Combined Code provides that all the members of the board committee that determines the 
remuneration of the executive directors should be independent non-executive directors. In 
addition, at least three non-executive directors must sit on the company's audit committee and 
they must form the majority on that committee. See, e. g., Committee on Corporate 
Governance, `Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Code of Best Practice' (1998) 
June (the Combined Code). 
532 See, e. g., Mavrides, M., and M. Olympios, `Governance Issues in Family-Owned Public 
Companies and Consequences on Shareholder Value' (2004) Cyprus College School of 
Business, Laboratory for Business, Ethics and Society (LaBES), Working Paper, at 8 and 37; 
and Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's Company 
from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International, at 28. 
533 See, e. g., Cadbury Sir, A., `Family Firms and their Governance: Creating tomorrow's 
Company from Today's' (2000) Egon Zehnder International, at 28-30. 
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responsibility of the Board of Directors, is referred to in Article 4 of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002, which introduces the concept of 
independent non executive Board members 534 
According to those provisions, `the Board of Directors consists of 
executive 535 and non-executive536 members [... J, the number of non-executive 
Board members should not be lower than one third (1/3) of the total number 
of Board members [... J, at least two of the non-executive members must be 
independent'. 
More particularly, according to the findings of the 2005 Corporate 
Governance Survey, almost all companies seem to meet the legal 
requirements of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 regarding the 
adequate number of non executive and independent non executive members 
that sit in the Board of Directors. In 98.1% of the companies, non executive 
directors represent at least 1/3 of the total number of Board of Directors 
members. Accordingly, at least two independent non executive members sit in 
97% of the companies. 537 Such good statistics with regard to non executive 
members are also documented in 2006 538 
534 This is also reflected in Principle 5.6 of the Mertzanis Report. See, e. g., Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the HCMC) `Principles on 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation' 
(The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
535 The Board members dealing with daily administrative issues of the corporation are 
considered to be the executive members. See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate 
Governance, Board Remuneration and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 
17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, (Official Government Gazette A330/ 
24.12.2002), Article 3, paragraph 1. 
536 Non-executive are the Board members mandated with the promotion of all corporate 
issues. See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance, Board Remuneration 
and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 17.05.2002 as amended by Law 
3091/2002, (Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002), Article 3, paragraph 1. 
537 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 20-21. 
538 76.4% of the companies comply with the requirements with regard to the appointment of 
non executive members, and 95.5% with the requirement on independent non executive 
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Beyond the high levels of compliance with the above corporate 
governance requirements, there seems to be a discrepancy between meeting 
the requirements of appointing independent non executive directors and 
ensuring in practice the independence of those directors. Notably, the majority 
of the companies inquired for the purposes of the 2005 Corporate Governance 
Survey, claimed to sufficiently ensure the independence of their board 
members. 539 In practice, however, it appears that only 6 out of 10 companies 
truly ensure their independence. 540 This statistic is improved in 2006, without 
yet adequate signs of elimination of the above mentioned discrepancy. 
541 
As described in the previous chapter, the reasons for such discrepancy 
mainly rest on the poorly drafting of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, 
which has determined the concept of independent non executive directors 
upon the use of qualitative criteria. Such criteria are based on the lack of 
directors' dependence with the company, namely the absence of conflict of 
interest. 542 Additionally, another important reason relates to the fact that the 
Law does not provide a definition of who is regarded as being independent or 
what constitutes independence. Rather, the Law defines what constitutes a 
relation of dependence. Due to such definition gap, interpretational problems 
have arisen and Greek corporations have not received more specific guidance 
in that regard excusing to some certain extent their difficulty in ensuring 
directors' independence. All the above factors considerably limit the range of 
members. See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 20-21. 
539 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 22. 
Sao Id at 23. 
541 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 23. 
542 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Corporate Governance: International Experience, Greek Reality 
(in Greek) (Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 2003), at 327-328. 
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potentials of the provisions on non executive and independent non executive 
members. '', 
Finally, although the appointment of independent non executive 
directors is the centrepiece for the protection of the general interest of the 
company, the application of the following exception creates concerns on its 
correctness. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 
stipulates that `in case where representatives of the minor shareholders are 
explicitly appointed in the Board and participate therein as members, the 
participation of independent members is not obligatory'. 
Beyond the debate on the appropriateness of this exception and the 
extent to which and it undermines the significance of the appointment of 
independent non executive members in the Board of Directors, the findings of 
the 2005 Corporate Governance Survey are revealing. The survey shows that 
only a small proportion of companies (24%) have a Board member that is 
representing the minority shareholders. 
543 This finding is important, since it 
reveals that the interests of the minority shareholders in the Greek corporate 
market are not effectively protected. The latter is in conformity with the 
findings of La Porta et. al, 544 who showed that civil law countries give 
shareholders the weakest protection. 
To sum up, the above findings, which are closely associated with the 
ones relating to the independence at the highest levels of Greek corporations, 
support the main proposition of the thesis. Greek corporate governance, 
although in recent years it has shown signs of remarkable improvement, still 
543 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 24. 
544 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, `Law and 
Finance' (1998) 106 J Pol Econ 1113,1127-1133. 
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falls short compared to the efficiency of other governance systems. Hence, it 
seems more prudent to admit the fact that the Greek corporate governance is 
getting better, yet more effort is still needed so as to ensure that a truly 
efficient and strong system is in place. 
Remuneration Policy for Board Members 
The Board of Directors assumes full responsibility to set and 
implement the general remuneration policy of the company and is prohibited 
from transferring this right to third parties. As this is stipulated by Article 3, 
paragraph 2, of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, high levels of 
compliance are expected, an expectation that is to a large extent confirmed 
since of the total companies enquired in 2005 and in 2006,97% and 90.5% of 
them, respectively, claim that their Board of Directors determines the 
remuneration policy. 545 
However, when it comes to the number of companies that have 
established a Remuneration Committee, statistics are significantly lower (in 
2005,15.5% of companies and in 2006,29.2% of companies comply with 
such soft law requirement) 
546 Such low compliance on that issue reflects two 
country-specific issues. One, it is the practice of Greek corporations not to' 
comply -to a large extent- with best practices and recommendations. Despite 
the Mertzanis Report recommendation that `it is a good practice that a review 
committee is established, which would review management compensation' 
545 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 25; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 25. 
sae See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 26; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 26. 
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still only a small minority of Greek companies has set up a Remuneration 
'" Committee empowered to review management compensation. 547 Two, it is the 
small size of Greek corporations due to which the latter decide in practice to 
set aside time at Board meetings to specifically address matters that would 
ordinarily fall to a remuneration committee. In this setup, the small size of 
Greek corporations may render the option of a separate remuneration 
committee as expensive. 
Furthermore, a paradox is documented with regard to the factors that 
determine management compensation. The Mertzanis Report recommends 
that management compensation shall be tied to corporation's general level of 
profitability and overall performance. 
548 Notwithstanding that partial 
compliance is expected with such soft law principle, on the contrary the 
majority of the companies relate management compensation with performance 
elements (e. g. achievement of company's goals, firm performance, and firm 
549 
profitability). 
On the other side, Greek companies are not in the right direction with 
regard to requirements on the transparency and disclosure of total 
compensation of management. In 2006, whereas improved statistics are 
recorded compared to the previous year, almost six out of ten companies 
547 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 26; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 26. 
548 'It is a good practice that management compensation be tied to corporation's general level 
of profitability and overall performance. It is a good practice that the total compensation of 
management be disclosed and justified in the financial statements of the corporation. It is a 
good practice that concrete determination procedures be adopted for management 
compensation. ' See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance 
in Greece (under the 
coordination of the HCMC) 'Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: 
Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, 
Greece, at 16 (§ 7.1). 
549 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 27; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 27. 
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550 (from five out of ten, in 2005) report management compensation separately 
and with the required justification in the company's annual report. ssi 
Internal Control and Risk Management Systems 
Efficient governance should also take into account the development of 
appropriate internal control systems and the set up of an Internal Audit 
Committee, which would review the internal control systems. More 
particularly, internal control system is the set of all those mechanisms 
designed to provide reasonable assurances with regard to the achievement of 
corporate objectives. Effective internal control system is such system that can 
timely identify all those threats endangering the control environment and can 
develop adequate control procedures in order to minimize or eliminate those 
risks. 552 
According to the findings of both the 2005 and the 2006 Corporate 
Governance Survey, almost 3/4 of companies have established an Internal 
Audit Committee. 553 However, the surveys do not depict statistics on whether 
the board of directors of Greek corporations truly rely on the work of the audit 
committee to enhance its monitoring ability. 
554 Rather an audit committee that 
550 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 30. 
551 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 30. 
552 See, e. g., Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2577/2006 on the Framework Principles for the 
Operation and Evaluation Criteria of Systems of Internal Controls of Credit Institutions and 
Financial Institutions and relevant responsibilities of their administrative bodies (in Greek) 
Official Government Gazette A59/ 09.03.2006. 
553 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 36; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 36. 
554 See, e. g., Menon, K., and J. D. Williams, 'The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring' 
(1994) 13 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 121,121. 
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intends to play a major role in oversight would need to maintain a high level 
of activity in that a sufficient number of meetings are held. 
Beyond such strong compliance with this Mertzanis 
Recommendation, 555 nearly 3 out of 10 companies556 satisfy the 
recommendation that the Internal Audit Committee should consist of at least 3 
non executive members of the Board of Directors. 557 On the contrary, the 
overall figure relating to the independence of the audit committee of the 
British companies shows improvement (88.5% in 2006 from 86% in 2005)558, 
which indicates further that the authority and influence of the audit committee 
continues to grow, in line with the provisions of the Combined Code. 559 
Furthermore, an efficient corporate governance framework should 
ensure the conditions for best corporate performance and long-term 
sustainability. For achieving this objective, it is important that the internal 
controls of a company evolve and are kept continuously under review in that 
to adapt to the changing nature of risks and ensure that all risks are properly 
and promptly identified. 
55s The establishment of an Internal Audit Committee should be encouraged, which will 
consist of non executive members of the Board of Directors. See, e. g., Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the HCMC) 'Principles on 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation' 
ghe Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece, at 12 (§ 4.7). 
See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 36; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 36. 
557 See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) 'Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece. 
558 See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fourth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2005), at 14; and Grant Thornton 
(UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: 
Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 16. 
5"' According to Principle C. 3.1., 'The board should establish an audit committee of at least 
three members, who should all be independent non executive directors'. See, e. g., Financial 
Reporting Council - (FRC), 'The Combined Code on Corporate Governance' (2006) June, at 
C. 3 'Audit Committee and Auditors'. 
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As risk identification is an important issue pertaining to the efficiency 
of the corporate governance framework, it is very encouraging that the vast 
majority of Greek corporations (81.3% in 2006 from 73.3% in 2005) have 
placed great attention to effective and up-to-date risk management structures 
so as to ensure stability and continuity in their businesses. 560 In a similar vein, 
UK public limited corporations show positive statistics in that 98.1% of them 
have recognized the Turnbull guidance in managing their risk. 561 
Finally, the analysis of the level of compliance with regard to issues of 
organisation and the set of internal regulations reveals with the most 
prominent way the tendency of Greek corporations to comply with the letter 
of the corporate governance rules but not with the spirit of them. In this setup, 
the vast majority (the statistic raised from 97.1% in 2005 to 98.5% in 2006) of 
Greek corporations are recorded to satisfy the legal requirement of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 with regard to approving a set of internal 
regulations 562 
It is very positive that a considerable improvement has been 
documented with regard to compliance on `one-to-one' basis with the 
specified minimum contents of the set of internal regulations. More 
particularly, in 2005 only 28.7% of the companies complied, on a `one-to- 
one' basis, with the minimum content of the Internal Regulation, as 
560 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 38; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 38. 
561 See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 350 Corporate 
Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 25; and Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales - (ICAEW), `Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code' (1999) September (The Turnbull Report). 
562 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 31; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 31. 
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determined by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002.563 This last statistic, in 
2006 has been increased to 51.5% 564 This is very encouraging to the extent 
that Greek corporations make serious efforts to improve governance 
efficiency. 
The reasons that can explain the strong compliance with regard to 
internal control and risk management practices can be summarised to be the 
following. First, the requirements on the establishment of adequate systems of 
internal control and risk management mechanisms are envisaged by existing 
ASE rules. These are key prerequisites for corporations that are in the process 
of being listed in the stock exchange, and stringent obligation for all listed 
companies to follow. Second, a large number of the listed corporations in the 
ASE are financial and credit institutions, which operate under a strict 
regulatory framework on the system of internal controls and risk management. 
Such framework has been imposed by the Bank of Greece Governor's Act 
565 2577/2006. 
However, Greek corporations need to focus more effort in truly 
internalising the corporate governance requirements into their daily 
operations, and avoid dealing with corporate governance obligations merely 
as a checklist of requirements. 
563 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 31. 
56' See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 31. 
565 See, e. g., Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2577/2006 on the Framework Principles for the 
Operation and Evaluation Criteria of Systems of Internal Controls of Credit Institutions and 
Financial Institutions and relevant responsibilities of their administrative bodies (in Greek) 
Official Government Gazette A59/ 09.03.2006. 
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Participation of Shareholders in the Governance Processes 
Efficient governance should also take into account the rights and 
responsibilities of shareholders in that it should satisfy a wide range of 
requirements for disclosure of information to shareholders. Such requirements 
include, inter alia, the dissemination of information regarding the effects of 
economic and non economic events expected to affect the performance of the 
company. In a similar vein, the publication of financial statements and the 
protection of shareholders' rights to participate in the governance processes 
(e. g. in the case of Greek corporations, the General Shareholders' Meeting) 
are of significance for an efficient governance system. 
For those reasons, the Mertzanis Report recommended that 
`shareholders should have the right to participate equitably and efficiently in 
the General Shareholders' Meeting and be sufficiently, timely, and properly 
informed on the decisions that need to be made regarding fundamental 
changes in the corporation'. 
566 In that regard, there are strong and positive 
results documenting that the majority of Greek corporations (from 86.4% in 
2005, to 93.9% in 2006) have recognised the importance of disclosing 
567 information to shareholders on all material matters. 
Specifically, the findings of the 2005 and 2006 Corporate Governance 
Survey reveal a paradox. High percentage of Greek companies that recognise 
the importance of facilitating the participation of shareholders in the 
s" See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) `Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece, at 8 (§ 1.2). 
567 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 42; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 42. 
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governance processes568 contrasts with the considerable low statistics on the 
range of actions that corporations indeed take to ensure shareholders' 
participation. In 2005,98.1% of the enquired companies claimed that they 
endorse the participation of shareholders in the decision making process, 
whereas only 65.3% of them give shareholders the right to vote via 
representative. 569 A similar trend is noted in 2006.570 
All in all, Greek corporations should focus their efforts more on 
providing shareholders with the right of voting via representatives, distance 
voting, or voting by using electronic means (email, fax, etc. ), which will 
further enhance shareholders' participation in the corporation's decision- 
making mechanisms. 571 To that direction will help the implementation in the 
Greek legal order of the Shareholders Rights Directive. 572 
Concluding Remarks 
From the above analysis, it is confirmed that although good 
compliance levels are demonstrated with specific corporate governance 
requirements, overall there remains a discrepancy between the objectives of 
the corporate governance rules, actual compliance, and governance efficiency. 
568 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 44; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 44. 
569 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 45. 
570 From the companies enquired, all of them (100%) claimed to endorse shareholders' 
participation in the decision making process, yet only 63.6% of them facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders' voting rights. See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics 
and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 45. 
571 Significantly, the most recent amendments of the Corporations' Law serve to that 
direction. More in particular, one of the main provisions that have been amended is the right 
of shareholders to vote via representatives and the establishment of teleconference meetings. 
See, e. g., 'The Lifting of the Law on Public Limited Companies' (in Greek) Ethnos (14 
June 2006). 
572 See, e. g., Council Directive (EC) 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain 
Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies [2007] OJ L184/17. 
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In this vein, it is admitted that the lack of a true internalisation of corporate 
governance principles, which are not to be treated as a checklist of 
requirements, restricts the achievement of the aims of the corporate 
governance rules and best practice recommendations. This is so mainly 
because Greece is a country, which besides the considerable amount of 
corporate governance principles that are in place, the efficiency of its 
governance seems to be circumscribed due to a number of country-specific 
conditions. 
In an attempt to link such country-specific conditions with those 
indicators that are to ensure governance efficiency (e. g. the independence at 
the highest level of corporations to be fostered; the Board effectiveness to be 
secured; appropriate risk management and internal control systems to be set 
up; and enhanced transparency to be achieved) the following conclusions are 
reached. 
First, the family origins and the personal character of Greek 
corporations makes it difficult for them to ensure compliance with a wide 
range of independence requirements (such as for instance, the separation of 
roles between the CEO and the Chairman of the Board of Directors; the 
development of nomination policy for the appointment of new members of the 
Board; or the elimination of the degree by which the CEO is company's major 
shareholder). 
Second, the small size of the Greek market makes the adoption of ` 
some best practices very difficult and costly (such as the application of the 
principle of `comply or explain', the set up of separate remuneration 
committee, or the facilitation of shareholders' participation in the decision 
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making process using alternative means to exercise their voting rights). In 
addition, in the context of such a small market, the pool of high level I'`. 
executives is limited and shallow, explaining in turn the phenomenon of `busy 
directors'. 
Third, the limited external exposure of Greek corporations explains to 
some certain extent the low compliance with international prevailing 
corporate governance principles. A higher level of compliance with corporate 
governance principles is recorded, for instance, in corporations that have or 
are in the process of attracting foreign financing (e. g. listed in foreign stock 
exchanges). On the contrary, those corporations that are primarily operating 
within the boundaries of the Greek market show limited interest on good 
governance. This can be further explained on accounts of the fact that the 
domestic investors are not financially and corporate governance literate, since 
they have only seen investment in stock exchanges as a good opportunity for 
`easy money'. 
Fourth, the significant differences between the Greek and the UK 
statistics in certain independence and efficiency indicators reveal two 
important facts. First, that Greek corporations fail to be informed about other 
best practices (here the UK ones), which would offer a good example for 
governance efficiency. Second, the low compliance at corporations' level is 
documented in that the latter do not follow international best practices at their 
own initiative or based on their own interest for good governance. 
Fifth, beyond the recorded high levels of compliance with the 
requirements on the representation of non executive and independent non 
executive members in the Board of Directors, there seems to be a discrepancy 
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between meeting those requirements and ensuring in practice the 
independence of those directors. This is so mainly due to the poorly drafting 
of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. This Law has determined the 
concept of independent non executive directors upon the use of qualitative 
criteria and has not provided a definition of independence. Such definition gap 
creates interpretational problems and limits the range of potentials of this 
provision. 
Sixth, the effects of securities legislation (e. g. ASE Rules) are so 
pervasive that related requirements (such as for instance with regard to the 
development of adequate internal controls systems and effective risk 
management processes) are associated with strong compliance. This in turn 
reveals the restricted effects of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. 
Overall, a steady increase year-on-year is recorded, which suggests 
that Greek companies are demonstrating greater acknowledgment of the 
consideration of governance efficiency. Beyond such signs of progress, Greek 
corporations still fall short of certain corporate governance rules. Hence, it is 
important that the above findings are taken into serious consideration by those 
charged to truly embrace the spirit of good governance and are empowered to 
internalise corporate governance requirements so that governance efficiency is 
ensured. 
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3. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS DETERMINING 
GOVERNANCE EFFICIENCY 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding that the issue of corporate governance has climbed up 
the agenda of listed companies, the public authorities, and other stakeholders 
in the Greek market, yet most companies tend to `comply with the letter of the 
law without fully capturing the essence of efficient governance'. 
573 
Notably, the findings of the 2005 and 2006 Corporate Governance 
Surveys reveal the Greek situation, where moderate levels of compliance are 
recorded not only with the non binding recommendations but also with the 
binding rules. 574 This is particularly interesting on five counts. 
First, in that it confounds one's initial expectation that binding rules 
would be coupled with total compliance. Second, in that it confirms the fact 
that the specific structures of Greek corporations have set corporate 
governance obligations as exogenous ones. Third, in that internal corporate 
structures and penalty systems play a significant role in how corporations 
address corporate governance compliance internally or react to external 
enforcement stimulus. Fourth, in that it explains Greek companies' early 
rejection and conservatism against corporate governance rules that are 
perceived as `another layer of regulation'. Fifth, in that it demonstrates the 
low levels of awareness of Greek companies for the benefits of good 
corporate governance. 
573 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, `2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 3. 
574 jd at3-5. 
245 
A 
Additionally, such a situation seems to have become a status quo that 
is preserved due to the lack of enforcement actions and weak supervision. 
This is confirmed by measuring the total number of non-compliant 
corporations, as recorded by the surveys, with the total number of fines 
imposed by the competent supervisory bodies. Alongside the recorded 
discrepancy between the total number of non-compliant companies and the 
fines imposed against those non-compliant behaviours, supervisory gaps and 
lack of enforcement actions are fundamentally implied. 
All the above considerations support the main claim at the core of this 
study that the objectives of the Greek corporate governance regime are not 
fully achieved due to a number of context-dependent variables. Therefore, the 
real benefits and positive efficiencies from the existence of a good corporate 
governance framework, as envisaged by the Greek corporate governance 
universe, seem not to be reaped. 
The focus of the analysis now shifts to further identify those country- 
specific factors (such as the weak supervisory regime, lack of enforcement 
actions, the overly bureaucratic corporate governance framework, etc. ) that 
have not only contributed to the aforementioned discrepancy but they have 
also affected the overall governance efficiency. Finally, this part concludes 
with an examination of the level and the key determinants of the 'corporate 
governance compliance behaviour within firms, which helps in generating 
more effective enforcement policies and regulations. 
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The Legal System 
An efficient legal system not only facilitates the setting of the 
corporate governance standards but also ensures their proper implementation. 
In essence, the country's legal environment can influence the articulation and 
protection of shareholders' rights and the norms of transparency and 
disclosure. Whereas efficient legal frameworks are not a guarantee for strong 
corporate governance standards, yet, to a certain extent, a robust legal 
framework is a positive indication for efficient and strong governance. 575 
On the premises of the main conclusion of La Porta et. al. 576 that legal 
rules differ greatly and systematically across countries depending on the legal 
origin, a discussion on the legal family origin as an important determinant for 
governance efficiency is undertaken. Specifically, it is argued that the legal 
family origin shapes to a certain extent the degrees of procedural formalism 
and complexity, which both are key determinants for enforcing the law. For 
instance, England developed a common law tradition characterised by 
independent judges and juries. In this tradition, comparatively low importance 
is paid to regulation, whereas private litigation is preferred as a means of 
addressing social problems. By contrast, civil law traditions, including the 
Greek legal system, are characterised by state-employed judges, a preference 
for state regulation over private litigation and emphasis on legal and 
procedural codes. 
577 Therefore, it is admitted that civil law countries tend to 
show a comparatively high degree of complexity and procedural formalism, in 
575 See, e. g., Cornelius, P., `Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: What Do 
Country Rankings Tell Us? ' Deutsche Bank, Research Notes No. 16 (19 November 2004). 
576 See, e. g., La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, `Legal 
Determinants of External Finance' (1997) NBER Working Paper 5879, at 3. 
577 See, e. g., Cornelius, P., `Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: What Do 
Country Rankings Tell Us? ' Deutsche Bank, Research Notes No. 16 (19 November 2004), at 
5. 
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contrast with common law countries that tend to have less complex 
procedures. 578 
Against this background, it is important to note that in the particular 
situation of Greece, the legal family origin, in civil law, is of great gravity. 
Beyond the inherent rigidity of the civil law system, the overly bureaucratic 
legal framework that features the Greek market further limits governance 
efficiency. 
Characteristics of the Greek Corporate Governance Universe 
The analysis of the Greek corporate governance universe in the 
previous chapter has clearly established, inter alia, three important sets of 
facts that are relevant to take into consideration as efficiency parameters in the 
governance assessment exercise. 
First, the Greek corporate governance universe has, inter alia, the 
following characteristics: (a) it entails a wide range of similar obligations and 
requirements, which are spread in several legal documents; (b) due to such 
regulatory overlapping, compliance confusion is created that further gives rise 
to weak regulatory compliance in that regard; (c) some corporate governance 
rules and principles create legal ambiguities, uncertainty and give rise to 
problems of interpretation; and (d) especially given the small size of the 
Greek capital market and the medium participation of foreign capital in the 
Greek market, it can be argued that an overly bureaucratic framework has 
been developed. 
s'g See, e. g., Cornelius, P., `Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: What Do 
Country Rankings Tell Us? ' Deutsche Bank, Research Notes No. 16 (19 November 2004), at 
8. 
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Second, corporate governance matters are governed not only by 
numerous legal documents, as aforementioned, but most importantly by legal'`', 
texts that move between the boundaries of capital market law and company 
law. This gives rise, inter alia, to supervisory problems in that no clear public 
body is responsible for monitoring the compliance with corporate governance 
obligations. Therefore, the existence of blurred supervisory roles results in 
poor monitoring of corporations' compliance with binding rules. 
Third, as envisaged by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, the 
Board of Directors stands at the apex of the Greek corporate governance 
system. This further explains why some other important corporate governance 
matters have been left unregulated (such as for instance the conflicts between 
shareholders and the management). 
The above characteristics of the Greek market, added to the inherently 
rigid legal system, profoundly explain the reasons that the Greek governance 
is not as efficient as the aims of the corporate governance rules and principles 
have envisaged them to be. This is further manifested due to the recorded 
discrepancy between corporate governance rules and their implementation. 
Quality of Law Enforcement and the Judicial System 
In view of the aforementioned particularities of the Greek legal 
framework, it is documented that indeed more than half of the Greek public 
limited corporations comply with the binding corporate governance rules, 579 
579 Totally, in Greece, three out of ten companies consider themselves to be fully compliant 
with the corporate governance requirements, (e. g. 30.3% in 2006 from 32.7% in 2006). See, 
e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 Corporate 
Governance Survey' (2005), at 6; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics 
and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 6. For the sake of 
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while the remaining fall short of complying. In further discussing those 
country-specific variables affecting the overall governance efficiency of the'', 
Greek system, we were confronted with the following situation. Although one 
would expect full compliance with the stringent and binding corporate 
governance rules, as stipulated by the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, yet 
the findings of the recent Corporate Governance Surveys describe a rather 
sao moderate level of compliance. 
On explaining such situation, the following analysis relies on two 
strongly interrelated issues. First is the fact that in Greece there is a 
considerable amount of corporate governance rules, usually scattered in 
several different legal documents. Second, having good corporate governance 
rules alone is not enough. It is not only the laws, but also their proper 
enforcement that determines the overall efficiency of the legal system. 
Given that the first issue referring to the overly bureaucratic 
framework that prevails in the Greek market has been the subject of extended 
discussion of the previous chapter, the focus here rests on examining the 
conditions of law enforcement. In other words, the main issue concerns the 
conditions of law enforcement as key determinants on explaining why not all 
Greek companies comply with the binding corporate governance rules. 
comparison, strong compliance of UK corporations is recorded with regard to corporate 
governance requirements. Although, the statistics show a decline of the number of companies 
that consider themselves to be fully compliant (34.1% in 2006 from 57.8% in 2004), this 
deterioration shows that UK companies appear to be taking time to adapt to the revisions 
made to the Combined Code in 2003. See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management 
Services, 'Third FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review: Highlighting Trends in 
Compliance' (2004), at 6; and Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth FTSE 
350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), at 8. 
580 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 6; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 6. 
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More particularly, in the debate of governance efficiency, empirical 
evidence shows, for instance, that it is not the presence of insider trading laws'". 
but rather actions taking against insider trading that help explain the 
development of securities markets. 581 In this vein, it is important to clarify that 
it is not the intention of the writer to admit that laws are not important but 
rather to support Lopez-de-Silanes conclusion that `the development of capital 
markets depends crucially on laws that facilitate enforcement and the 
improvement of court procedures that allow for a more efficient dispute 
resolution'. 82 
Therefore, effective enforcement is recognized as a key determinant 
for governance efficiency to the extent that enforcement actions aim to restrict 
rules from being broken. In the more specific context of the Greek 
enforcement regime, the level of enforcement of Greek corporate governance 
rules ranges between moderate to low. One possible explanation for such state 
of affairs might be the absence of strong institutional shareholders that can 
take legal action against Greek companies for wrongdoings, as is the case in 
the US. On the contrary, in Greece, enforcement actions are the solely 
responsibility of regulatory and supervisory authorities. 
Second, the effectiveness of the enforcement regime is also 
determined upon the efficiency of the competent body empowered to monitor 
any breaches of existing regulations and impose sanctions or administrative 
511 See, e. g., Bhattacharya, U., and H. Dauk, `The World Price of Insider Trading' (2002) 57 
(1) J Fin 75,76 [The authors in their paper test whether the presence and enforcement of 
insider trading laws by a country decreases its costs of capital. After collecting information on 
all countries that have stock markets, 103 in 1998, they find that 87 have laws banning insider 
trading but only 38 of them have ever enforced them. All their models find that the cost of 
capital is unaffected by the presence of insider trading laws, but is strongly affected by the 
enforcement of these]. 
582 See, e. g., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., `A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement' (2004) 
Wld Bank Pol Res Working Paper 3405, at 28. 
251 
. ý-. mmý+-vrt- ., ý-1 
ý' 
. r. 
k: 
ý- '' # 
fines in that regard. More particularly, pursuant to article 10 of the Corporate 
Governance Law of 2002,583 the Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
(HCMC) assumes its enforcement and investigative powers, as the main 
supervisory body in the securities markets. Given that the HCMC is the sole 
enforcer of corporate governance rules, then the total enforcement actions 
initiated by the HCMC will determine the overall efficiency of enforcement. 
For the purposes of demonstrating the effectiveness of enforcement of 
the Greek regime, the statistics of the 2006 Corporate Governance Survey are 
used. 584 Specifically, the effectiveness of enforcement is measured by 
calculating the ratio of the total number of companies that were in breach of 
corporate governance rules, according to the survey's statistics, and the total 
fines imposed by the HCMC for breaches of corporate governance 
requirements. 
According to available data, the HCMC, for the year 2006, imposed 
sanctions and administrative fines for breach of the obligation relating to non 
executive directors and independent non executive directors to six listed 
compariies. 585 Notably, the statistics from the 2006 Corporate Governance 
Survey show that for the same period, twenty-one corporations were in breach 
583 `If the Hellenic Capital Market Commission detects that anyone performing Board 
responsibilities does not comply with the provisions ofArticles three through eight (3-8) and 
eleven (11) of the present Law, it imposes administrative sanctions in accordance with §4b of 
Article 1 of Law No. 2836/ 2000, as amended'. Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate 
Governance, Board Remuneration and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 
17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, (Official Government Gazette A330/ 
24.12.2002). 4 
584 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006). 
585 See, e. g., Hellenic Capital Market Commission, (Press Release), `Board of Directors 396`h 
Meeting of 31 August 2006' (in Greek) (31 August 2006). 
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of the same provisions. 586 Therefore, it appears that fifteen non compliant 
companies escaped being sanctioned by the HCMC. 
Such enforcement situation, as pictured from the ratio of the fines 
imposed by the HCMC to corporations in breach of the Corporate Governance 
Law of 2002 (6 to 21 companies), demonstrate the following facts. First, the 
usual small size of Greek firms in association with the lack of effectiveness of 
the penalty system determines to some certain extent the compliance 
behaviour of Greek corporations. Corporations choose not to comply with 
corporate governance requirements if the compliance cost outweighs the 
penalty imposed to them in case that they are caught. Further, corporations' 
decision to be non compliant is validated by the limited possibility of being 
caught due to the inefficient enforcement system. 
Second, the fines' scope is limited covering only breaches of corporate 
governance requirements relating to the appointment of non executive 
directors and independent non executive directors. This is paradoxical if one 
considers that the supervisory mandate of the HCMC relates to all the 
provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. 
Third, due to lack of data on fines with regard to breaches of other 
provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002, it can be assumed that 
in the past the HCMC has not investigated such breaches. This confirms the 
fact that the HCMC is in the process of structural and operational re- 
organisation in order to assume wider responsibilities on corporate 
governance matters. 
$86 See, e. g. Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, `2006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 6. 
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Fourth, the impetus for the debate over the narrow scope of the 
HCMC's supervisory responsibilities comes from the existing blurring of '. 
distinctions of corporate governance obligations that move around the 
boundaries of capital market and company law. Fifth, the number of 
companies that fail to comply with the corporate governance rules is 
considerable because the HCMC lacks the staff to enforce compliance with 
the Corporate Governance Law of 2002. 
An important factor that further impedes the enforcement of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 is the efficiency of the judicial system. In 
essence, an efficient enforcement regime will need some backing up from the 
judicial system. 587 In Greece, recourse to the court system is an extremely 
time-consuming process and most recently people have lost their trust on the 
judicial system primarily due to scandals with regard to complex hedge funds 
issued for national insurance funds. In addition, congestion of cases in Greek 
courts and slow pace of court proceedings usually take their share of blame in 
the problems associated with the law enforcement. This has in turn hampered 
speed and timely prosecution of cases. 
Furthermore, the influence of corruption among Greek judges is 
evident in that cases of corruption among judges in Greece are not rare. Most 
recently, in 2005, a documented case of corruption involving a court justice 
occurred when a judge, for the period 2000-2004, released under no profound 
... See, e. g., Berglöf, E., and S. Claessens, `Corporate Governance and Enforcement' in I. M. 
Millstein, S. G. N. Bajpai, E. Bergiöf and S. Claessens (eds. ), Enforcement and Corporate 
Governance: Three Views (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005) Focus 3,27-63, at 46. 
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reasons drug dealers; modified the formation of the court in order to reach 
favourable decisions in return of some financial benefit from accused, etc. 588 
In practice, Greek judges can be said not to have earned a good 
reputation for integrity from the Greek society. The main reasons that can 
explain the phenomenon of corrupt judges in Greece can be the following. 
The first factor is the level of independence of the judiciary in Greece. 
Although it is firmly established by the Greek Constitution and through a 
number of laws; in reality constitutional and legal stipulations for the 
independence of judiciary powers are not rigorously observed. The second 
reason for corrupt judges in Greece relates to the level of transparency of the 
judicial procedures. Through trials are conducted in a public in that openness 
of trials is guaranteed, yet false and misleading evidence undermine the 
transparency of the process. 
As explained above, the existence of cases of corruption among judges 
in Greece may also explain the level of enforcement and governance 
efficiency. Especially after the revelations of the recent cases of corruption 
among judges, the trust in Greek courts has been limited. This in turn has 
served as an obstacle for protecting shareholders' rights and ensuring 
successful business development. 
Compliance at a Firm's Level 
Companies play an integral role in the corporate governance wheel to 
the extent that they should ensure that corporate governance rules are 
ssa See, e. g., Kari, K., and P. Stathi, `Shedding Light on the Corruption Machine' (in Greek) 
Eleutherotypia (16 June 2007); and 'Pleading Innocent: Mrs. Antonia Ilia for the Case 
of Corruption Among Judges' (in Greek) www. in. Qr (04 February 2005). 
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understood not only as concept but most importantly as a practical tool of 
good management and shareholder value enhancement. Given that companies 
themselves can be partially responsible for the overall governance 
performance, rules and regulations shall be complemented by the adoption 
and promotion of good governance at a firm level, self regulation, self 
discipline, together with a commitment to the spirit of corporate governance 
principles. 
It is important that attention to good corporate governance at the firm 
level is ensured in that any weaknesses in the legal framework to be partially 
compensated. Otherwise rules alone cannot prevent corporate wrongdoings or 
promote an efficient governance system. Further, the discussion that follows 
on the level of Greek firms' compliance with soft law on corporate 
governance matters has two main purposes. First is to examine the main 
drivers of firms' compliance behaviour. Second, examination of those 
influential factors helps the generation of more effective enforcement policies 
and regulations. 
In terms of governance efficiency, there is a strong interrelationship 
between the level of compliance with the corporate governance principles and 
fully understanding their essence. Such relationship is revealed by the 
statistics of the Corporate Governance surveys, which show, inter alia, that 
among those companies that comply with the binding corporate governance 
rules, only a large minority of them complies with soft law international best 
practices589 and the recommendations of the Mertzanis Report. 590 
511 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 14,17-19, and 37. 
590 Id. at 8,12, and 26. 
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Further, such patterns of compliance are most prominently 
documented by the following statistics. First, the recommendations of the i" 
Mertzanis Report suggest that corporations that do not comply with those 
recommendations can release a report of compliance. 
591 Despite the existence 
of this option, only 18.8% of the enquired companies in 2006 (from 16.1% in 
2005) are cognizant of the possibility to report on how they comply with 
corporate governance principles. 592 Second, similar low levels of compliance 
are recorded with regard to the recommendation on establishing a 
Remuneration Committee for determining directors' compensation. Only 
29.2% in 2006 (from 15.5% in 2005) of companies have established a 
committee to review management compensation. 
593 
Third, although international best practice considers the adoption of 
performance evaluation procedures crucial for good corporate governance, 594 
still only four out of ten companies in 2006 (from two out of ten in 2005) have 
adopted the relevant practice. 
595 Fourth, another indication of the level of `lip 
service' paid by Greek corporations to international best practice relates to 
"I See, e. g., Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the 
HCMC) 'Principles on Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation' (The Mertzanis Report) 1999 Athens, Greece, at 7. 
592 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 8; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 8. 
593 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 26; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 26. 
594 According to the Principle A. 6.1., `The board should state in the annual report how 
performance evaluation of the board, its committees, and its individual directors has been 
conducted'. See, e. g., Financial Reporting Council - (FRC), 'The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance' (2006) June. 
595 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 14; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, `2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 14. By 
contrast, the statistics show that there has been an overall reduction in the number of UK 
corporations, who gave no disclosure (only 10%) at all on performance evaluation and a 
greater number of companies (40% in 2006 from 31% in 2005) provided `more' than minimal 
levels of explanation. See, e. g., Grant Thornton (UK), Risk Management Services, 'Fifth 
FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2006: Highlighting Trends in Compliance' (2006), 
at 15. 
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transparency on how new Board members are appointed. Greek companies 
fall short of this international best practice, since the majority does not 
disclose their procedures on appointing new members of the Board. 596 
Such patterns of compliance with non binding corporate governance 
principles can be explained on the following grounds. First is the tendency of 
Greek companies to comply only with the letter of the law and not with the 
spirit of corporate governance rules. Second is the initial rejection of Greek 
companies of the introduction of corporate governance rules as `another layer 
of regulation'. 597 Third is the low awareness of companies of the positive 
efficiencies of good corporate governance. 
Last but not least, the firm size impacts on the compliance behaviour, 
in that small size of firms tend to inhibit compliance with corporate 
governance rules. This is mainly due to the allocation of limited resources 
within the firm to address corporate governance issues and to ensure 
awareness of corporate governance requirements. In view of such resource 
restrictions, smaller firms are less likely to implement a comprehensive 
corporate governance plan. 
Notwithstanding that good corporate governance at the company level 
may compensate for weak framework conditions, still a strong legal 
framework is a necessary pre-condition for good governance. Ultimately, in 
order for a strong and credible corporate governance system to be developed, 
both the regulators and the market, specifically companies, must fully 
596 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 17; and Grant Thornton and Athens University of 
Economics and Business, '2006 Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 17. 
597 See, e. g., Mouzoulas, S., Law 3016/2002 on Corporate Governance: Article by Article 
Analysis - Evaluation from Institutional Investors' Perspective (in Greek) (Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens, 2003), at 6. 
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discharge their respective roles and responsibilities. Therefore, each party is 
an integral component of the corporate governance system and shall bear full 
responsibility in setting and implementing the corporate governance standards 
within their own environment. 
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PART THREE 
RECOMMENDA TIONS FOR IMPRO VING 
GREEK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING GREEK 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WEAKNESSES TOWARDS 
GREATER EFFICIENCY 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The Purposes and the Structure of this Chapter 
This chapter seeks to discuss a wide range of proposals for improving 
the Greek corporate governance framework so that greater governance 
efficiency may be achieved. Good governance is essential for the successful 
long term development of Greece. Moving to good governance from its 
deeply rooted, country specific deficiencies, will inevitably be a long run, on 
going, perhaps never ending process in which both the substance and the 
sequencing of policies will be important. The shift from governance 
weaknesses to efficiency provides a special opportunity and challenge for 
policy makers and indeed for Greek society. 
The key claim of this chapter is that the establishment of a strong, 
efficient, honest governance system is an ongoing, priority for both firms and 
the Greek market, as a whole. It is admitted that the Greek corporate 
governance, already not bad but inefficient, can be further improved through 
mechanisms internal to the firm and external, as well. 
More particularly, mechanisms internal to the firm are those 
procedures and initiatives that are undertaken at the firm level, e. g. by the 
management or the Board of Directors, in an attempt to ensure greater firm 
261 
k; 
transparency and accountability. However, for such procedures to be initiated 
a key precondition is firms' awareness of the importance of introducing and 
applying good corporate governance practices. Therefore, the scope of the 
first recommendation covers mainly those steps in raising such awareness 
(such as the increased participation in international fora discussing corporate 
governance matters, the wider use of governance rating systems, etc. ). 
Furthermore, the role of internal auditors and the audit committee in 
improving the governance process are also discussed as internal mechanisms 
in that procedures initiated by management include accountability reinforced 
and verified by credible auditing procedures. 
External mechanisms are regarded those exogenous pressures to 
introduce and apply good corporate governance practices within the firm in 
order to legitimate and improve its governance efficiency. In this vein, 
recommendations on five dimensions are advanced. First, from a supervisory 
point of view the focus relies on strengthening the supervisory and monitoring 
capacity of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), as the 
competent body that is empowered to monitor and check compliance with 
corporate governance rules. Second, from a legal review perspective, 
codification and review of existing corporate governance rules is discussed in 
an attempt to eliminate the overly bureaucratic legal framework, obscurity, 
and inefficiency of those rules. Third, from a regulatory point of view, the 
increasing involvement of the ASE in the corporate governance regulatory 
process (listing requirements) is discussed. Fourth, from an enforcement 
perspective, the discussion focuses on the possible reforms mainly for the 
improvement of the judicial system so that enforcement and implementation 
of rules is enhanced. Fifth, on the shareholders' view, a discussion takes place 
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on those measures that could ensure enhanced shareholders' rights and 
activism. 
Further, within the framework to promote the positive efficiencies of 
good governance and enhance governance efficiency, the following 
recommendations are also discussed as a means to further advance the 
potential of the Greek corporate governance. First is the encouragement of the 
more active participation of business associations and unions. Second is the 
establishment of a Corporate Governance Association of Greece. Third is 
consideration of establishing a shareholders' association. Fourth, it is 
recommended that an Institute of Directors be established. 
A corporate governance system must achieve a sensible balance 
among company managers' need for flexibility to meet rapidly changing 
business conditions, companies' need for low transaction cost access to capital 
markets, investors' need to monitor what managers do with their money, and 
small shareholders' need for protection against self-dealing practices and 
opportunism. The ultimate purpose is to develop a system that would ensure 
the accomplishment of the corporate governance objectives in that 
shareholders' rights are rigorously protected while the business development 
is ensured. 
The following recommendations are intended to achieve that balance, 
against the specific background of Greece's current conditions. Essentially, 
the range of recommendations discussed goes beyond those that could merely 
help mitigate the country-specific obstacles, in that a greater corporate 
governance reform is imperative. Such reform aims at developing corporate 
governance structures and institutions that would allow Greek firms to 
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become fully world class competitors, able to achieve world scale by 
partnering with companies from around the world. 
2. SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Internal Mechanisms 
Raising Firms' Awareness of the Strategic Benefits of Good 
Governance 
As established in the previous analysis, the Greek compliance paradox 
rests on the state of affairs where moderate level of compliance is recorded 
not only with the non binding recommendations but also with the binding 
rules. 598 Such a state of affairs confirms the following propositions. 
First, the specific corporate structures of Greek corporations have set 
corporate governance obligations as exogenous ones. Second, Greek 
companies' initial rejection of corporate governance rules is established. 
Third, there are the low levels of awareness of Greek companies for the 
benefits of good corporate governance. Last but not least, firm size impacts on 
the compliance behaviour in that small size of firms tend to inhibit 
compliance with corporate governance rules. This is mainly due to the 
allocation of limited resources within the firm to address corporate 
governance issues and to ensure awareness of corporate governance 
requirements. In view of such resource restrictions, smaller firms are less 
likely to implement a comprehensive corporate governance plan. 
The above conditions are particularly important to be brought to the 
fore of the discussion given that companies themselves are to some certain 
598 See, e. g., Grant Thornton and the Athens University of Economics and Business, '2005 
Corporate Governance Survey' (2005), at 3-5. 
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extent responsible for the governance performance and for compensating any 
possible deficiencies of the current legal framework. In this sense, good 
corporate governance at the firm level shall be raised as a crucial element for 
companies' governance agenda and for corporate governance reforms. 
Raising awareness of the strategic benefits of corporate governance, 
especially in family owned and non-listed companies is important for two 
reasons. First, companies need to realize that a well-functioning company has 
comparative advantages in a competitive business world. Second, that it is 
important that companies start considering corporate governance as a 
company investment leading to long term growth. 
Important challenges that the Greek capital market faces are market 
transparency and instilling investor confidence. If the proper and profitable 
operation of the Greek securities and capital markets is to be achieved, it is 
important that Greek companies overcome their traditional mistrust of 
corporate governance principles. This can be achieved through proper 
information about the positive effects of good corporate governance. 
Essentially, Greek corporations should move away from a mere notional 
application of the provisions of the Corporate Governance Law of 2002 and 
seek their full internalization in the operations of their corporations, so as to 
reap the full range of benefits of good corporate governance. 
Therefore, for further strengthening the Greek corporate governance 
framework, it is necessary that initiatives be taken in an attempt to sharpen the 
understanding of Greek corporations on the positive efficiencies of corporate 
governance. This can be done, inter alia, by corporations' active participation 
in international fora discussing corporate governance issues; by the 
encouragement of the participation of business unions and associations in the 
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governance reform process; by the wider use of governance rating systems; 
and by educating future managers on the importance and role of good ý' . 
corporate governance. 
Participation in International Corporate Governance Fora 
Given that corporate governance is not just a box ticking exercise, 
corporations need an exchange of experience and cross pollination of ideas on 
corporate governance matters. For fully internalizing the essence of corporate 
governance requirements, it is important that corporations have access to 
practical guidance on efficiently implementing corporate governance 
mechanisms and institutions. To this end, their participation in international 
corporate governance fora should be encouraged. 
More particularly, the importance of such fora rests on the fact that 
there participate business leaders from around the world and through 
discussions and roundtables priorities in corporate governance are identified. 
Such fora bring together business and government representatives, as well as 
international investors and companies, and have been proven successful in 
identifying practical ways to advance effective corporate governance 
programs. In addition, they give the opportunity to corporations to get 
together and talk together to find solutions on corporate governance matters 
that are better if they are not addressed by means of governmental 
regulation. 599 Good corporate governance shall allow concrete business-to- 
business dialogue on key corporate governance issues. 600 
S" See, e. g., International Chamber of Commerce, 'Improving Corporate Governance 
Practices: Roundtable Report' (2005) International Chamber of Commerce Roundtable on 
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In sum, international corporate governance fora are a valuable tool that 
can be used by corporations, business practitioners, or policy makers in better 
understanding the essence of corporate governance; to address challenges that 
may face; to provide concrete recommendations; and most importantly to 
learn from other companies through their corporate stories and to be informed 
about corporate governance developments worldwide 
601 The latter is 
particularly important for Greek corporations, since as documented in the 
Corporate Governance Surveys, they fall short of being informed on corporate 
governance practices of other countries. 
Developing Corporate Governance Rating Systems 
Complementary to the above, another effective means for raising 
companies' awareness on good corporate governance and for further 
promoting governance efficiency is the introduction of a governance rating 
methodology. The best governance framework does not guarantee acceptance 
and implementation if the companies themselves are not complying with the 
spirit of the corporate governance rules, The development of governance 
rating systems can provide a positive incentive structure for individual firm 
improvement 602 
Corporate Governance, Istanbul (21 April 2005), speech by J. Sullivan, Executive Director of 
the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). 
600 See, e. g., International Chamber of Commerce, 'Improving Corporate Governance 
Practices: Roundtable Report' (2005) International Chamber of Commerce Roundtable on 
Corporate Governance, Istanbul (21 April 2005), speech by J. L. Bravard, Electronic Data 
Systems Corporation (EDS) financial services leader. 
601 See, e. g., International Chamber of Commerce, 'Improving Corporate Governance 
Practices: Roundtable Report' (2005) International Chamber of Commerce Roundtable on 
Corporate Governance, Istanbul (21 April 2005), at 29. 
602 See, e. g., Dallas, G., `Country Influences on Individual Company Governance' in G. 
Dallas (ed. ), Governance and Risk (New York, McGraw Hill, 2004), at 138-163. 
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Against this backdrop, a need is created to devise mechanisms and 
systems that would make companies do more than the minimum. One such 
practical tool has been recognised to be the development of governance rating 
systems that would facilitate companies to monitor the areas for governance 
reforms. Such self-assessment exercises, based on survey questionnaires that 
assess the governance performance via scorecard, opens the way to more 
systematic analysis and publication of the governance situation of a specific 
company. In turn, investors have an important tool in their hands in order to 
identify good corporate governance with a well-run and well-managed 
company. 
More particularly, the benefits of such governance rating systems are, 
inter alia, that the work of analysts and investors through a systematic and 
easy overview of all relevant issues of good governance is significantly 
facilitated; companies are able to assess the quality of their governance 
situation and the level of compliance; the aggregate score of the participating 
companies will demonstrate strengths and weaknesses to be taken into 
account by regulatory authorities for policy making; there is an important 
objective measuring tool of the level at which companies' corporate 
governance compares with other companies' system; and finally, the credit 
ratings are a very useful management tool for chief financial officers and their 
superiors. 603 
For instance, in Germany, in order to encourage a wider understanding 
through the application of good governance in financial markets, a working 
603 See, e. g., Drakos, P. G., (presentation in the Standard & Poor's event, Union of Listed 
Companies, Athens, 25 October 2005). 
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group of the `German Society of Financial Analysts'604 developed a 
`Scorecard for German Corporate Governance' based on the Code of Best 
Practice. 605 Such scorecard model has found good reception also in other 
countries, including Russia and some Asian states. 606 
In Greece, an important initiative by the University of Athens, 
Department of Economic Sciences, took place relating to the development of 
a methodology on corporate governance rating. Such an initiative was 
undertaken for the first time in 2002 and was applied to family firms. 607 More 
particularly, its objectives are to provide an independent and reliable tool for 
all investors; to provide a comprehensive and specific rating regarding all 
corporate governance criteria for each company; to produce useful results of 
aggregated data for supervisory authorities; and to provide a basis for 
comparison. 608 
Notwithstanding the significance of the initiative of the Athens 
University to develop a corporate governance rating methodology to assess 
the corporate governance framework for Greek companies, still its restricted 
application only to family firms reflects an important limitation. Although 
such limited scope is well explained by the fact that family firms are an 
important and common form of business organization in Greece, yet, it is 
important that such rating methodology be applied to a broader group of listed 
604 Deutsche Vereinigung far Finanzanalyse und Asset Management' (DVFA). For more 
information, visit the official website http: //www. dvfa. com/home/dok/35613. php. 
605 See, e. g., Berlin Initiative Group, `German Code of Corporate Governance', June 2000, as 
last amended by Government Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code, 
`Amendment to the German Code of Corporate Governance' (The Cromme Code) 25 October 
2006. 
606 See, e. g., Bassen, A., D. Pupke, and C. Zöllner, `Corporate Governance Rating auf Basis 
der DVFA-Scorecard' Finanz Betrieb No. 9 (2006) (in German). 
607 See, e. g., Spanos, L., L. Tsipouri, and M. Xanthakis, `Corporate Governance Rating of 
Family Firms at the Athens Exchange Market' (2008) 34 (7) Managerial Finance 
forthcoming. 
608 1d. 
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companies. In this context, the rating results and the aggregated scores for the 
Greek listed companies will more accurately represent the strengths and '" 
weaknesses of the corporate governance framework. This is so because it has 
be generally argued that family firms lack efficient corporate governance 
mechanisms and they demonstrate poor governance compared to non family 
firms. 609 
It is estimated that the use of such governance rating systems will be a 
key tool for institutional investors to consider when making investment 
decisions and reviewing existing portfolios. The need for in-depth corporate 
governance research and for general and specific comparative data on 
corporate governance practices in all major companies will be important 
especially due to the increasing role of institutional investors in the Greek 
market. 610 
Fostering Corporate Governance Education 
Until recently, little emphasis has been given in management 
education to corporate governance matters and only a few schools taught 
corporate governance. However, in view of the recent corporate scandals and 
the increased need for greater governance efficiency, enhanced corporate 
governance education has assumed growing importance. 
More particularly, it is argued that management degree programs 
should also offer a solid background in corporate governance. In this sense, 
topics, such as the role and responsibilities of the board of directors, the audit 
609 See, e. g., Spanos, L., L. Tsipouri, and M. Xanthakis, `Corporate Governance Rating of 
Family Firms at the Athens Exchange Market' (2008) 34 (7) Managerial Finance 
forthcoming. 
610 ld. 
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committee and the importance of internal controls, shall be extensively 
discussed. 
The importance of such targeted education is highly recognized to the 
extent that there is an increasing consensus on the fact that educating on 
corporate governance matters will help current or future business leaders to 
better detect corporate wrongdoings and deter corporate fraud in the future. In 
addition, corporate governance education will broaden risk management 
knowledge, as well, and enable managers to fully capture the essence of good 
corporate governance. 
Promoting the Role of Auditors: Enhancing the Work of the Hellenic 
Institute of Internal Auditors (HIIA) 
To continue with another avenue for boosting Greek corporate 
governance, the focus shifts to the role of internal auditors. Corporate 
governance requires strong internal mechanisms to ensure day to day 
compliance with legal requirements aiming to avoid loss or collapse. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that there is a general consensus on the 
importance of effective internal mechanism of governance. " The role of 
internal auditors is one important internal function that has acquired the 
position of possibly being the `insider' that can act as a `policeman' from 
61I See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
96. 
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within. "' Further, it is admitted that the work of the internal auditor 
complements the work of the supervisor and external auditor. 613 
The utility of the internal auditor forms part of the senior management 
arrangements and controls614 and its importance is reflected from its four main 
roles. First, the role of supervision, prevention, and protection in that internal 
auditors supervise corporations in order to achieve compliance with existing 
laws and regulations. Further, their monitoring role captures also the objective 
to avoid significant faults so that integrity to be safeguarded. 
615 Second, the 
role of promotion in that the internal audit function strengthens management, 
it advances the production of information technology, and the flow of 
information. 616 Third, the evaluation and certification of corporations' 
financial disclosures is the centrepiece of internal auditors' mandate. The 
verification of management's assertions about the effectiveness of companies' 
internal controls is vital in that it enables the organisation to utilise its own 
617 
resources to correct its deficiencies, as and when they are identified. 
Fourth is the role of consultancy. This last function of internal auditors 
has been the subject of immense debate and regulatory reform in the US, 
especially after the Enron scandal. Although it exceeds the scope of this 
section to discuss the criticism advanced against such role, it is important to 
612 See, e. g., Morgan, G., `Internal Audit Role Conflict: a Pluralist View' (1979) 5 (2) 
Managerial Finance 160. 
6'3 See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
99. 
6141d at 97. 
615 See, e. g., Karagiorgos, T., G. Drogalas, P. Christodoulou, and M. Pazarskis, 'Conceptual 
Framework, Development Trends and Future Prospects of Internal Audit: Theoretical 
Approach' (5th Annual Conference of the Hellenic Finance and Accounting Association, 15 - 
16 December 2006, Thessaloniki, Greece), at 4. 
6161d. at 5. 
617 See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
97. 
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note that internal auditors are in a good position, more often than not, to 
provide management with accurate and sufficient information assisting them 
in decision-making. 
For the effective performance of the abovementioned roles of internal 
auditors it is important that corporations themselves arrange that appropriate 
internal structures are in place. In this setup, the following arrangements are 
deemed important. First, internal auditors in order to be able to communicate 
their findings to those that can act upon their conclusions and 
recommendations within the organization, a gateway to the board of directors 
must be set up. In practice, the chief internal auditor shall have the power to 
report their findings to the appropriate levels of management. This is 
important to ensure that its findings and recommendations are given due 
attention and consideration and that they can be acted on. 618 Second, the 
organization must define the purpose and the authority of the internal audit by 
providing a charter for its role. This is mainly to give the internal audit the 
`assurance' that its work is given a high degree of importance in the 
organization. 619 
In addition to the actions that must be taken from corporations 
themselves, a key. recommendation on further improving the role of internal 
auditors rests on the increased involvement of the Hellenic Institute of Internal 
Auditors (HIIA). Particularly, its mission should be advanced so as to pursue 
two targets: first, promoting the role of internal auditors in the governance 
process; and second, ensuring that appropriate professional standards are met. 
618 See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
98. 
619 1d 
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Therefore, the role of the HIIA shall be further enhanced given especially the 
fact that today the HIIA performs a very limited role in those areas. The 
objective will be to restructure the HIIA so that it is transformed into a body 
specializing on internal auditing. Its main mission shall be the support, 
promotion, and the training of audit professionals. 
More particularly, through a range of open courses, technical 
guidance, seminars, networking opportunities, and tailored in-company 
training programs, the HIIA can help internal auditors in reaping their full 
potentials and in achieving professional excellence. Additionally, the role of 
the HIIA shall be also enhanced in the area of publications by issuing 
professional guidance to define, inter alia, the standards of the profession of 
internal auditing. Such publications shall aim to become the profession's 
quality benchmark and be adopted by organizations. 
In addition, such enhanced role of the HIIA should be mainly 
dedicated to the following areas of interest. First, through the focused role of 
the HIIA on the profession of internal auditing, the importance of audit 
professionals to acquire business qualifications should be set as a minimum 
standard to carry out audit checks. Second, the HIIA should issue codes 
attempting to delineate a clear set of criteria to evaluate the services provided 
by an internal auditor. Such criteria should point out the importance of 
independence and objectivity in auditors' work, which is developed through 
ethical framework to govern its work. 62° Third, the HIIA should raise the 
620 For instance, according to the Code issued by the Institute of Internal Auditing - UK and 
Ireland, the internal auditor is required to comply with the following principles whilst 
undertaking its work. First, integrity in its decision-making. Second, objectivity in its 
assessment. Third, confidentiality of information. Fourth, competence to undertake the task. 
These principles are then fleshed out with further guidance to ensure the principles and 
standards are achieved. See, e. g., Institute of Internal Auditing - UK and Ireland, 'Codes of 
Ethics and International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing' (2006). 
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awareness of Greek corporations on the importance for the internal audit 
function to be more risk focused. 
Fourth, given that the size of corporations is a key determinant for the 
size of the audit function and the technical expertise in house, 621 the issue of 
outsourcing the audit functions becomes a relevant one. In this context, the 
role of the HIIA is significant mainly for three reasons. First, although for cost 
reasons, and the lack of expertise in certain cases, such as information 
technology, corporations decide to outsource audit functions, the HIIA, 
through its guidance, should make corporations aware of the risks and benefits 
of such option. Second, it should remind corporations of their responsibility to 
ensure that in cases that the audit function is outsourced it shall nevertheless 
be closely monitored. Third, similarly in case that outsourcing seems to be the 
only way, the HIIA should define the framework for such outsourcing, aiming 
to ensure that the' main objectives and the functions of internal audit are 
appropriately performed. 
Complementary to the above recommendations in promoting and 
developing professional practices of internal auditing, another key 
recommendation is discussed. It is recommended that a stricter approach be 
adopted with respect to non-qualified audit professionals, in that they should 
not be permitted to carry out audit checks. This can be achieved by enhancing 
the role of the audit function by accrediting to internal auditors a professional 
status. This is important in order to ensure that internal auditors have the 
required competence to undertake their tasks. In turn, their final reports that 
62' See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
99. 
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include their main audit findings will enjoy greater recognition, in that they 
will have been the product of well-qualified and experienced professionals. '''. 
Such recommendation is particularly significant for the particular case 
of Greece, given that although there are certain professional qualifications that 
internal auditors need to acquire in order to perform audits, yet there are many 
cases where the number and professional quality of auditors are not fully 
suited to work requirements. 622 Therefore, it is highly recommended that non- 
qualified professionals shall not be permitted to carry out audit checks. 
Such a recommendation serves to the fulfilment of the key corporate 
governance objectives and it further ensures higher levels of governance 
efficiency. First, it is to ensure the high quality of the internal audit function in 
that an appropriately resource internal audit function is in place, able to report 
to the audit committee and senior management. Second, it is to provide more 
accurate and reliable information to shareholders and investors in order to 
make informative decisions. Third, and most importantly, it is to safeguard the 
continuation of business activities, based on the timely identification from 
competent and experienced audit professionals of possible deficiencies. 
Enhancing the Role of the Audit Committee 
The previous analysis discussed a number of key recommendations in 
further promoting the role of internal auditors in an attempt to improve the 
Greek corporate governance framework in that greater governance efficiency - 
is achieved. Building on this discussion, the enhancement of the role of the 
622 See, e. g., Karagiorgos, T., G. Drogalas, P. Christodoulou, and M. Pazarskis, `Conceptual 
Framework, Development Trends and Future Prospects of Internal Audit: Theoretical 
Approach' (5th Annual Conference of the Hellenic Finance and Accounting Association, 15 - 
16 December 2006, Thessaloniki, Greece), at 5. 
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Internal Audit Committee in an attempt to achieve greater governance 
efficiency is also examined. 
In principle, the audit committee acts on behalf of the board of 
directors to provide additional assurance and credibility to the corporation's 
financial report to shareholders 623 In view of the role of overseeing the affairs 
of a company, the audit committee also assists in the review of the internal 
controls, internal-audit programmes, and the findings of audit assignments 
624 
More importantly, the existence of audit committees reduces incidences of 
error, irregularity and of other accidents that produce unreliable financial 
reporting 625 
The move towards an enhanced audit committee is by no means new 
nor is the focus, which refers to `auditor independence', `integrity', `monitor', 
`review', `improvement'. 626 Notwithstanding that the literature on audit 
committees is rather vague when it comes to the effectiveness of them to 
avoid corporate failures627 guidelines should be provided aiming to 
reinvigorate the audit committees potential to reduce the likelihood of 
corporate failure. Such guidelines must address the Greek-specific governance 
variations in an attempt to reduce the current excessive burden with high 
levels of details and voluminous reports. 
6" See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
100. 
624 Id. 
625 See, e. g., McMullen, D. A., `Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the 
Consequences Associated with Audit Committees', (1996) 15 (1) Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory 87. 
626 See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
103. 
627 A reason that makes the research on the Audit Committee's actual effectiveness rests on 
the high degree of confidentiality that surrounds the meetings. See, e. g., Spira, L., 'An 
Evolutionary Perspective on Audit Committee Effectiveness' (1998) 6 (1) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 29; and Spira, L., `Audit Committees: Begging the 
Question? ' (2003) 11 (3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 180. 
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First and foremost, all Greek corporations shall be encouraged to form 
an audit committee as part of their senior management arrangements to ensure ''" 
the effectiveness of their internal control systems. More importantly, the audit 
committee has been an established part of the governance of the majority of 
listed companies in Greece since 2002, yet there are some companies that fall 
short of complying. 628 
Second, it is important that Greek corporations rely extensively on the 
work of the audit committee. The mere formation of an audit committee does 
not necessarily mean that the board of directors relies on the work of the audit 
committee to enhance its monitoring ability. 629 Rather an audit committee that 
intends to play a major role in oversight would need to maintain a high level 
of activity in that a sufficient number of meetings are held. 
However, the problem behind this consideration rests mainly on two 
aspects. First, that the board of directors is likely to be willing to incur the cost 
of an active committee, which meets frequently, only if they feel it is 
necessary to monitor management. 630 Second, the frequency of meetings of 
the audit committee as a measure of the committee's activity is associated 
with firm size and the presence of independent directors in the board . 
631 Those 
issues can be thrown down as a challenge for Greek regulators and policy 
makers to address. 
628 According to the Corporate Governance Survey, in 2005,73.5% (75.4% in 2006) of the 
enquired companies had established an audit committee, as stipulated by Article 7 of the 
Corporate Governance Law of 2002 (See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3016/2002 on Corporate 
Governance, Board Remuneration and Other Issues, Official Government Gazette 110/ 
17.05.2002 as amended by Law 3091/2002, Official Government Gazette A330/ 24.12.2002). 
See, e. g., Grant Thornton and Athens University of Economics and Business, 12006 
Corporate Governance Survey' (in Greek) (2006), at 36; and Grant Thornton and Athens 
University of Economics and Business, `2005 Corporate Governance Survey', 2005, at 36. 
629 See, e. g., Menon, K., and J. D. Williams, `The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring' 
(1994) 13 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 121,121. 
630 Id at 124. 
631 Id. at 137. 
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Third, besides the fact that the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) has 
endorsed the establishment of an audit committee as a listing requirement in 
2002, the scope of the committee's activities is rather limited to determining 
whether directors discharge their statutory duty in the matter of financial 
statements. Therefore, it is suggested that a much wider role should be granted 
for the audit committee to focus on systems and controls and to assess a 
regulated firm's compliance with the regulatory regime. This will further 
enhance the role of the audit committee and will give it a new will to 
undertake its work with a greater degree of vigilance. 
Fourth, for ensuring the effective operation of the audit committee it is 
imperative that the cooperation with the board of directors rests on a `frank, 
open, and robust' manner with management pro-actively providing it with 
information it needs. 632 Therefore, it is recommended that the ASE should 
issue reports on further providing guidance to corporations on how to fully 
reap the full range of potentials from the proper operation of their audit 
committees. 
Fifth, all listed corporations, under the auspices and the coordination 
of the ASE, should make sure that they provide all necessary support 
mechanisms (such as access to corporate information, IT systems, etc. ) that 
will work as the foundation for audit committee to review and monitor the 
financial affairs of a company. Sixth, the audit committee needs to have in 
place a formal policy to carry out its review and assessment of audit work. -. 
Although such policy should be set within the spirit of corporations' strategic 
plans, it needs to be formulated in conjunction with the ethical guidelines 
632 See, e. g., Financial Reporting Council - (FRC), `Audit Committees: Combined Code 
Guidance' (2003) January (The Smith Report). 
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published by the accountancy profession (e. g. the Hellenic Institute of Internal 
Auditors - HIIA). 
Overall, while the general purpose of an audit committee may seem to 
be a panacea against incompetence and increased risk, an audit committee is 
only as effective as the reliance placed on it in an organisation. 633 Therefore, 
the focus of policy makers and regulators shall be directed towards raising 
corporations' awareness on the efficiencies and the vigilance of the work of 
audit committees. 
External Mechanisms 
Strengthening the Capacity of Supervisory Authorities 
The central objective of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
(HCMC), as the main securities market regulatory and supervisory authority 
in Greece, is to promote transparent and efficient financial markets, and 
facilitate the adequate protection of investors. The HCMC is responsible for 
supervising the Greek securities markets and market participants, namely all 
listed companies, including but not limited to investment firms, mutual funds 
management firms, portfolio investment companies, the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) (with both stock and derivative markets and a derivatives 
clearing house), and the Central Depository Company and Guarantee Fund. 
It issues statutory rules and regulations aiming at investor protection; 
the safeguarding of capital market's normal operation; the improvement of 
market transparency; the enhancement of efficiency of the trading, clearing 
633 See, e. g., Singh, D., `Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision' in D. Singh (ed. ), 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, London 2007), at 
102. 
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and settlement systems; and the efficient operation of capital market agencies 
and institutions. The HCMC not only sets standards that they must be met by 
regulated firms, but most importantly it can take action against firms if they 
fail to meet the required standards. 
The HCMC has been given its statutory powers by the Law 
3152/2003,634 which transfers certain duties from the Athens Stock Exchange 
and the Ministry of Economy and Finance to the HCMC. By virtue of this 
Law, the scope of the HCMC's work has been increased to include the 
granting and revocation of licenses for the operation of securities markets and 
the issue of rules concerning the minimum capital required by market 
participants. 
In terms of operational independence, the HCMC is subject to the 
supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance in that the President and 
the two vice-Presidents of the nine-seat Board are directly appointed by the 
Ministry. This means that the HCMC is not a sufficiently independent body, 
given the governmental influence on the appointment at the top of the board 
of directors. 
Further, the HCMC is accountable to the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance and through them to the Greek Parliament. Under the Greek 
legislation, the HCMC must report on its achievements to the Parliament and 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance every year. In addition, the HCMC is 
634 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 3152/2003 on the Establishment and Supervision of the New Stock 
Exchange Market, New Responsibilities of the HCMC, Amendments to Stock Exchange 
Legislation and Other Provisions, Official Government Gazette A152/ 19.06.2003, as last 
amended by Law 3371/2005 (Official Government Gazette A178/ 14.07.2005). 
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called, at least twice a year, to give evidence to a specialised Parliamentary 
Committee 635 
The recorded lack of enforcement of legal rules and weak compliance 
of Greek corporations with corporate governance requirements, gives rise to a 
discussion of establishing an optimal framework where the regulatory 
responses and laws will be combined with adequate enforcement, incentives 
for stronger compliance and full internalization of rules and processes that 
will ensure the achievement of the objectives of the laws. Towards achieving 
such an objective, it is imperative that policy makers and supervisory bodies 
recognize that if good corporate governance is to work, corporations and other 
stakeholders must know that they are likely to be held accountable for 
wrongdoing and failure to comply with corporate governance rules. In other 
words, the issuance of corporate governance rules must be backed up with 
fines and sanctions to send a clear message to non compliant corporations. 
In terms of restructuring and improving the HCMC, 1997 is 
considered as the benchmark year. This is when the Delta scandal occurred, 
revealing significant capital market supervisory, and monitoring 
deficiencies. 636 Following this scandal a wide range of reforms and 
modifications in the operation of the main supervisory body of the Greek 
capital markets were initiated. Beyond those pervasive reforms, the persistent 
635 See, e. g., Hellenic Capital Market Commission, `Annual Report 2006' (in Greek) (2007), 
at 13. . 636 The revelations for abuse of privilege information by several securities firms, but mainly 
DELTA Securities, with dramatic effects to the ASE performance, urged HCMC to conduct 
rigorous checks and controls on all securities firms, only to find out that all 65 securities firms 
operating in Greece in 1997 were found to operate with significant irregularities. The Delta 
scandal underlined the importance of adequate supervision to securities firms and this is a 
significant benchmark for the transformation of the HCMC. See, e. g., Mandrou, I., `The High 
Confidential Judgments' (in Greek) TO VIMA (23 March 1997) D02; and `The HCMC 
Files a Lawsuit against DELTA Securities' (in Greek) TO VIMA (23 March 1997) D03. 
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weak law enforcement with regard to the corporate governance requirements, 
demands for further and more focused solutions. 
First and foremost, it is important that enforcement regulators and 
supervisors are operationally and financially independent. In many countries, 
securities exchange regulators have their own sources of income, such as for 
instance the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) 637 However, in case that 
the FSA has to transfer some parts of its sources of income to the general 
budget or otherwise have to get their budget approved by the Parliament or 
other governmental agencies, then their de facto independence is reduced. 
If the HCMC is operationally and financially independent then it is 
more likely to resist political pressure. However, in the case of the HCMC, 
although it does not receive any funding from the Greek government, since its 
budget comes from fees charged to authorized firms, nonetheless, its budget 
must be approved by the Minister of Economy and Finance. 638 
Second, an effective supervisory body should be comprised of 
adequate, competent, and experienced staff. The HCMC should be 
considerably enlarged to include more supervisory experts and experienced on 
site inspectors, so as to fulfil its extended mandate of responsibilities. Such 
enlargement shall make sure that high quality people are attracted. Alongside 
the recruitment of experienced people, the HCMC shall consider establishing 
a graduate scheme. Through such scheme, the HCMC will be in position to 
hire highly promising graduates from prominent academic institutions and ` 
637 The UK FSA is an independent non governmental body that does not receive any funding 
from the UK government. In order to finance its work, fees are charged to all authorised firms 
that carry out activities that the FSA regulates. More in particular, the FSA charges firms 
periodic fees (paid yearly); application fees; and special project fees. For more information, 
visit http"//www. fsa. gov. uk/Pages/AboutVho/Funded/index. shtmi. 
638 See, e. g., Hellenic Capital Market Commission, `Annual Report 2006' (in Greek) (2007), 
at 13. 
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train them according to the set principles, objectives, and the mission of the 
organisation. Further, it is important that competitive remuneration and 
reward packages are offered to HCMC staff, mainly for two reasons. First, to 
attract the best qualified professionals, who more often than not come from 
the private sector where salaries are highly competitive. Second, to maintain 
low levels of turnover statistics. Finally, a targeted personnel development 
program should be developed in order to support staff in meeting high 
standards. Managers shall set clear objectives, motivate their staff, strengthen 
their sense of responsibility, and recognise their achievements. 
Third, the HCMC should consider the creation of a specialised 
Corporate Governance Division. This will enable the HCMC to make more 
effective use of its expertise on corporate governance with more specialist 
resources. In a similar vein, heads of divisions and principal supervisors 
should receive appropriate training to improve their analysis and excel their 
perspective on corporate governance issues. 
Fourth, the effectiveness of the HCMC depends on its degree of 
specificity. If HCMC's investigative powers are stronger and more dedicated 
to sanctioning misconducts, the behaviour of financial markets will be more 
disciplined. Similarly, greater enforcement actions against firms and 
individuals for breaches of regulation are important in order for the HCMC to 
send a clear message to the market about what standards must be met to 
achieve governance efficiency. 
Fifth, the HCMC should define a clear plan upon which its range of 
activities will take place. This is an important ingredient so that greater 
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efficiency in HCMC's operations to be achieved. There should be a consistent 
set of policy objectives and strategy. 
Sixth, the HCMC in order to improve its effectiveness in preventing 
and detecting breaches with current rules shall make considerable investment 
in improving its technical infrastructure. More particularly, the development 
of automated monitoring systems will significantly enhance HCMC's 
capability to detect non compliance behaviours. 
Seventh, it is recommended that the HCMC should proceed with a 
review of existing regulations to identify whether there is room for 
eliminating regulations in case that they seem to be unnecessary. Such review 
will facilitate greater regulatory efficiency on two accounts. First, specific 
rules might be identified that they need be replaced by principles. Second, the 
adoption of more risk based and proportionate policies might be possible. 
Eighth, in further raising appropriate standards, alongside such review, 
the HCMC should pursue working more closely with industry to find 
solutions to corporate governance deficiencies. This can be accomplished, for 
instance, by the publication of discussion papers on corporate governance 
matters, seeking to receive comments from market participants. In turn, a 
proportionate level of consultation, prior to regulatory initiatives, with market 
participants should be established. 
Overall, the focus of the HCMC should be directed towards becoming 
a transparent organisation with a wide range of rule making, investigatory, 
and enforcement powers in order to facilitate corporations and the market to 
promote governance efficiency. The HCMC should attach great importance to 
the continuous refinement and upgrade of its structures and processes. This 
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will enable the HCMC effectively to respond to the rapidly evolving financial 
challenges. 
Codification of Corporate Governance Rules 
A characteristic of Greek corporate governance is that the relevant 
rules and requirements are dispersed in legal documents. This inconvenient 
state of things creates an overly bureaucratic framework and confusion to 
corporations as to their compliance obligations. A major development in the 
area of Greek corporate governance would be the codification of all 
substantive corporate governance rules in one easily accessible legal 
document. More specifically, codification should be viewed from its 
expansive form in that it would not only mean the task of collecting the 
existing rules and stating them concisely and clearly, but also to improving the 
substance of the rules (which in some cases that work would also involve 
some elements of law creating). 639 Such expansive approach is important to be 
adopted by codifiers in the case of Greece for three reasons. First is to choose 
between competing and overlapping corporate governance rules. Second is to 
fill up gaps on points on which the existing rules are uncertain, or altogether 
silent. Third, to give precision to abstract general principles. 
To that end, a statutory committee should be established to oversee the 
preparation and the activities of such a project. As a first step in fulfilling its 
work, an Experts Group shall also be established to consider the possible 
approaches to codification and to advise on the scope and the extent of such 
"See, e. g., Brierly, J. L., `The Codification of International Law' (1948) 47 Mich LR2,2. 
.. 
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approaches, particularly, in identifying any areas where the Group considers 
codification may give rise to policy or implementation difficulties. 
The recommended codification of Greek corporate governance rules is 
a demanding, time-consuming, and resource intensive project. Similar 
important codification projects have successfully been completed in Greece. 
First is the codification of the Corporations' Law and the second is the 
Bankruptcy Law. The result of those codification projects has been to tidy up 
the law on those topics. The success of the codification process requires the 
extensive participation of legal experts with expertise, good knowledge of 
both capital market law and company law, and excellent drafting skills. An 
important part of this process are reckoned to be the role of the ASE, the 
HCMC, and other bodies (such as the FGI or the recommended Corporate 
Governance Association of Greece, etc. ). 
Among the benefits to be realised by such codification are the 
following. First is the ease with which corporate governance rules can be 
found in an important area of law that impinges on every corporation. Second 
is the opportunity to make the law accessible and easily understood. Third is 
the fact that corporate governance will become even more recognised. Fourth 
is the opportunity to eliminate obscurity, inefficiencies, and lack of clarity, 
since a more uniform spirit would reflect the corporate governance rules. Fifth 
is the opportunity to erase unnecessary or overlapping corporate governance 
rules therefore eliminating the overly bureaucratic legal framework. Sixth is 
the fact that by reviewing and eliminating excess obligations, corporations 
would be able to increase their levels of compliance with those rules from 
moderate to satisfactory. 
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The Role of the Athens Stock Exchange 
Stock exchanges can be an effective means to enforce corporate 
governance standards and promote governance efficiency, even where legal 
and judicial institutions are less efficient. More particularly, the efficacy of 
stock exchanges as enforcers is demonstrated, for instance, by the adoption of 
listing rules, which require companies to comply with certain governance 
requirements or explain publicly why they have not done so. 640 In many 
respects this `comply or explain' approach has proved to be an effective 
mechanism for enforcing corporate governance because companies are 
reluctant to disclose their failure to adhere to such standards. 
In Greece, it can be argued that the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) is a 
high performing stock exchange. Further, in terms of corporate governance, a 
number of initiatives, such as the sponsoring of corporate governance 
assessment exercises, and the establishment of qualitative criteria on corporate 
governance, manifest the ASE's interest in corporate governance. However, 
there is still room for more initiatives to be taken and greater activism to be 
shown in further boosting its role in promoting good governance. 
First, the ASE should be aware of its importance as an agency in 
promoting a thorough understanding of corporate governance matters and how 
to achieve best practice. For instance, through the organisation of workshops 
and seminars, alongside the sponsoring of events and publications on 
corporations, the ASE can establish to corporations and market participants 
the benefits of improved corporate governance. 
640 See, e. g., Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance 
Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States - Final Report & Annexes 
(January 2002), 16,19. 
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Second, the ASE can contribute to a better corporate governance 
system by issuing listing requirements including at its core corporate 'A , 
governance components. Reforming exchange listing rules is often easier than 
reforming general securities or company statutes 641 In this context, the threat 
of delisting or of the possibility of a rejection to enter their shares into the 
stock exchange provides exchanges with a unique ability to compel 
compliance with the rules they set. In this sense, stock exchanges enjoy 
special self-enforcement abilities. 642 
Third, by effectively implementing the existing rules that set the 
minimum standard of transparency, focusing mainly in reporting 
requirements, in that such rules are backed up with fines and/or suspensions 
from trading. It is important that the ASE devotes sufficient resources to 
ensure that companies adhere to specific rules and make clear that non 
compliance would bear penalties. 
Fourth, the role of the ASE is important in facilitating listed 
companies to comply with current transparency requirements. This can be 
through the development of automated, web based systems to make disclosure 
of corporations easier. For instance, it is recommended that such a web based 
filling system be developed in an attempt to accelerate filling and replace 
paperwork (e. g. paper form or fax submissions). 
Fifth, it is important that the ASE's interest in good corporate 
governance should also be focused on education and training. It is important - 
that the ASE initiates, or sponsors training solutions to fulfil listed companies' 
641 See, e. g., Millstein, I. R., `Non Traditional Modes of Enforcement' in I. M. Millstein, S. G. 
N. Bajpai, E. Berglöf and S. Claessens (eds. ), Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Three 
Views (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2005) Focus 3,1-15,12. 
642 Id. 
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training requirements. For instance, by organising open courses or executive 
training programs aiming to assist listed companies in their continuing ý''. 
professional development and specialisation in corporate governance. 
Reforming the Greek System of Courts 
As in all countries, likewise in Greece the rule of law is essential for 
governance efficiency. As analyzed above, although good laws are important, 
even more essential is their effective implementation. However, as often 
seems to be the case in Greece, the existing mechanisms and rules of 
behaviour are reasonable and good, but the process of implementation is 
opaque and the likelihood of effective implementation is low. Part of the 
blame for Greece's ineffective implementation of rules can be accredited to 
the lack of an honest, independent, and well-functioning judicial system, 
alongside the moderate performance of the Greek courts. 
The process of improving governance efficiency raises as a top 
priority the need for reforms of the judicial system, with particular emphasis 
on mitigating the deficiencies of the Greek system of courts. Addressing such 
deficiencies demand well-designed measures and appropriate actions to be 
taken within the framework of a comprehensive strategy for the reform of the 
judicial system. Further, the success of such strategy demands political will 
and strong commitment of policy makers, the business world, and the society 
at large, to change deeply rooted decision making structures and societal -' 
balances favourable to corruption and injustice. 
At the core of the recommended reform stand four key targets. First is 
to ensure the independence of the Greek court system aiming further to 
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increase impartial court decisions to be reached. Second is to increase its 
efficiency in an attempt to mitigate, for instance, the problems of slow court 
procedures, or the prolonged execution of decisions. Third is to increase 
judicial accountability in that instances of unprofessional and corrupted 
behaviour of judges is eliminated. Fourth is to ensure that cases relating to 
violation of shareholders' rights are brought before the courts, contributing in 
turn to further strengthening management's accountability and opening the 
way for improved governance efficiency. 
To start with ensuring the independence and enhancing the efficiency 
of the court system, recommendations are mainly directed to redefining the 
position and the competencies of courts in that efficient, stable, independent, 
and accountable courts are set up. Essentially, recommendations encompass 
those actions that need to be taken in further strengthening the independence 
of courts from political influence and eliminating corruption of judges. These 
can be achieved, inter alia, by means of reviewing the status of judges (and 
other public prosecutors), their selection procedures, their salary schemes, and 
their training and expertise. 
More particularly, with regard to the status and the position of the 
judges, in an attempt to reduce instances of political pressure, conflict of 
interest, and corrupt judges behaviour, it is important that a somehow stricter 
implementation of the current prohibition on judges holding other public 
functions or professions or be members of political parties be achieved. The 
success of this prohibition heavily depends on two conditions. First, the extent 
to which incompliant behaviours with such prohibition are couched with strict 
and high fines. Second, the efficiency and the independence of investigation 
proceedings in that corrupted investigators tend to conceal such behaviours 
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against a personal gain. Therefore, the above conditions should be addressed 
if the court system is to assume its efficiency and credibility. 
Consideration should be also given to the creation of specialised units 
responsible for handling the investigation and enforcement of corporate and 
securities laws. The importance of such specialised benches or courts is 
twofold: First is the reduction of backlogs of cases, permitting speedier 
resolution. Second is the development of specialised knowledge, in that 
judges or prosecutors sitting in these units shall demonstrate solid 
understanding of the relevant laws, alongside knowledge of market practices. 
In addition to the creation of such specialised benches to deal with corporate 
governance matters, it is recommended that a specialised career path is created 
within such units. This will further help prosecutors or judges to pursue or 
advance their specialisation in corporate, securities, and financial cases. 
In terms of judicial accountability, in order to enhance the 
performance of courts, it must be set clear that judges have a right and 
obligation to continuously improve their professional knowledge in the course 
of performing the function of a judge. It is recommended that a scheme of 
continuing legal education be designed for judges and prosecutors that would 
include issues on Greek corporate governance. 
From an information technology perspective, so as to simplify and 
accelerate court procedures and manage court cases more efficiently, a 
comprehensive justice information system project needs to be initiated. Such 
project that can also include sub-projects related to all judicial segments as 
part of the general information technology project facilitates the courts' 
computerization and the development of software applications in the courts. In 
addition, for further boosting the efficiency of the judicial system it is 
ýýýý 
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recommended that a complete electronic network is developed in order to link 
all information systems of each institution (e. g., the courts, the Ministry of 
Justice, Public Prosecutor, etc. ). This network will be designed to ensure, inter 
alia, that an electronic database is developed showing more precise statistics 
on the inflow of new cases, cases pending in each body, department, and 
employee separately. 
Enhanced Shareholders' Rights and Activism 
It is important that initiatives be taken to enforce shareholders' rights 
and to ensure remedies for violations of shareholders' rights. The success of 
such initiatives depends on a reasonable level of shareholder activism. In 
Greece, there are few signs of such activism. Most importantly, the problem 
with the level of protection of shareholders' rights seems to rest on the fact 
that the Greek law does not provide a reasonably broad range of 
administrative, criminal, and private litigation sanctions against violations by 
corporations or directors. In view of such lack of effective remedies for 
violations of shareholders' rights, it is recommended that laws should be 
amended to enable shareholders to pursue claims. 
First and foremost, consideration shall be given to the adoption of 
class action lawsuits to permit shareholders to pursue violation of rules 
relating to corporate governance. The permit to class action lawsuits will 
foster management's accountability and make shareholder litigation more - 
frequent. Such class action procedure or another efficient way to enable the 
claims of shareholders to be brought before the court, is an essential 
component of well functioning and efficient corporate governance system. 
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Second, in further strengthening the protection of shareholders' rights 
the option of arbitration appears as an effective mechanism to resolve disputes".. 
between shareholders and the company. More specifically, the Greek legal 
framework (e. g. the Greek Corporations Law643) should be amended so as to 
allow corporations to provide in their articles of association that disputed 
between shareholders and the company can be also redressed by arbitration. 
The benefits of arbitration (such as the expertise of arbitrators chosen, the low 
cost, and the speed of disputes' resolution) underline the significance of 
considering such an approach in further safeguarding shareholders' rights. 
Third, another important suggestion that can motivate shareholders to 
take action to enforce their rights relies on the reimbursement of litigation 
costs in case that shareholders prevail in a suit. Full reimbursement of 
litigation costs is a significant incentive for shareholders to initiate litigation. 
On the contrary, even in cases that there has been a clear violation of laws, 
shareholders are discouraged from starting litigation procedures in view of the 
increased cost. 
All the above recommendations are important mechanisms to increase 
shareholders' activism. Increased activism, in turn, ensures that corporate 
governance deficiencies and breaches of corporate governance regulations are 
not left unnoticed and most importantly unpunished. Therefore, provided that 
an efficient and transparent system of courts is established, as aforementioned, 
the above recommendations work towards enhancing governance efficiency. 
643 See, e. g., Hellenic Law 2190/1920 on Public Limited Liability Companies (socidtes 
anonymes), Official Government Gazette A37, as codified. 
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Other Recommendations 
The Role of Business Associations and Unions 
Complementary to the importance of corporations' own realization for 
the positive efficiencies of good corporate governance, the active role of 
business associations and unions is important in further raising the 
corporations' awareness and for providing incentives for greater compliance. 
In this context, the role of the Federation of Business and Industries 
(FBI), the former Federation of Greek Industries, 644 is recognized and should 
be further encouraged. More particularly, the renaming of the Federation 
reflects and confirms its readiness to face the new demands of the economy 
and society, at large. In a historic setup, the Federation and the Union of listed 
companies in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) issued, in August 2001, the 
voluntary `Principles of Corporate Governance', as a means to demonstrate 
their preference in self-regulation. 645 One of the main recommendations 
included the establishment of board level committees consisting of a majority 
of non-executive directors and the implementation of internal control by a 
specific department or individual. Such initiative revealed the strong interest 
of the Federation in good governance, yet it was not followed up by other 
initiatives in the same field. 
644 It is important to note that this is the third time that the Federation of Business and 
Industries has been re-baptised. From the original Federation of Greek Industries and Crafts in 
1907, in 1946 it became the Federation of Greek Industrialists, and then in 1979 the 
Federation of Greek Industries. These name changes mirror strategic developments in the 
nature of Greek business, the economy and society, and point to the Federation's desire to 
move along with these developments and play a leading role within them. The new Statute 
aims to allow more flexibility to the Federation. See, e. g., Daskalopoulos, D., (speech by the 
President of the Federation of Greek Industries - SEV- at the afternoon session of the Annual 
General Assembly, Athens, Greece, 24 May 2007) (in Greek). 
645 See, e. g., Federation of Greek Industries (FGI), 'Principles of Corporate Governance' (in 
Greek) (2001) Athens, Greece. 
i' 
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Furthermore, the Union of listed companies in the ASE is an important 
forum, which promotes the interests of listed companies and develops best ý`'. 
practices in several areas that are crucial to their operation. In a similar vein, 
the Union of Societe Anonymes and Limited Liability Companies through the 
publication of surveys and reports on corporate governance can significantly 
contribute to the objective of fostering and establishing an efficient 
governance system. In this setup, it is encouraged that both unions should 
assume greater roles, be more active by taking up new initiatives so as to 
further raise companies' awareness of good corporate governance. It is, 
however, unfortunate that since the establishment of both unions, no 
initiatives have been recorded to the direction of promoting good governance. 
Therefore, it is necessary that both unions divert their mission by switching 
their focus towards good corporate governance, so as to play a leading role in 
that regard and manifest that well run corporations are the assurance of better 
functioning markets. 
Establishment of a Corporate Governance Association of Greece 
In principle, the recommended establishment of a Greek Corporate 
Governance Association may play a significant role in the development of 
good corporate governance in Greece. The key aim of such an association will 
be to become the pioneer organisation in Greece for bringing corporate 
governance from textbooks and laws to boardrooms agendas. 
In practice, the promotion of good governance within the context of 
the operation of such association could be achieved through the following 
means. First, the organisation of training programs that would take place 
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across the country aiming to develop the corporate governance culture and 
assisting corporations in implementing governance requirements. 
Second, the conduct of research on important corporate governance 
topics, such as for instance the effectiveness of corporate directors. Such 
research and its follow ups would facilitate depicting governance weaknesses 
and trends to eliminate such deficiencies. 
Third, such an association could also issue codes of best practice in 
further raising corporations' awareness on good governance. 
Fourth, through the organisation of panels and seminars cross 
pollination of ideas and exchange of information on important corporate 
governance issues would be accomplished. During such events, executives, 
academics and other key players of the business world would get together to 
discuss and be informed on governance trends and how to achieve best 
practice. 
Fifth, alongside the publication of books and articles that could 
become the reference point for those interested on corporate governance, such 
an association could also release newsletters. Such newsletters, the frequency 
of which could be monthly, would help corporations become aware of 
corporate governance developments both in Greece and abroad. In addition 
through such newsletters corporations would be kept informed of main events 
and training programs. 
Establishment of Shareholders' Association 
Given the absence of strong shareholders' activism it is recommended 
that interest groups be set up to initiate, inter alia, lawsuits, class actions, and 
other important litigation tools in strengthening enforcement of shareholders' 
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rights. More particularly, consideration should be given to the establishment 
of shareholders' associations aiming to protect and promote shareholders' ý'', 
interests. After the example of a number of European countries, such as for 
instance Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, etc., Greece 
shall move forward on establishing its national shareholders' association. 
The purposes of such associations can be numerous. First is to educate 
their members on various financial and securities markets' issues, including 
on corporate governance matters, through the organisation of workshops and 
courses. Second is to support and represent private investors' rights by taking 
legal action against the company or the officers to protect the interests of its 
members. Third is to serve, as a channel of communication for corporate 
information by making various publications (such as for instance magazines, 
email newsletters, guides, etc. ) and the provision of regular updating of prices 
and financial data on companies listed on stock exchanges. Fourth is to 
facilitate shareholders to monitor themselves the developments in 
corporations' financial data by the development of software for analysing 
stocks. . 
Alongside the protection of shareholders' rights, such associations 
should work towards improving the standards of corporate governance and 
ensuring a fair market for private investors. 
646 Shareholders' associations 
encourage shareholder activism and are reckoned significant for strengthening 
management accountability and fostering governance efficiency. 
646 For more information on the purpose and the services provided by the United Kingdom 
Shareholders Association visit http: //www. uksa. org. uk 
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Establishment of an Institute of Directors 
Finally, the establishment of an institute of directors, either as a private 
initiative or by the Greek government, is recommended mainly for two 
reasons. First is to foster the work and help the professional development of 
directors (including both independent and executive) by providing training 
courses, practical seminars, research and technical support to company 
directors. Second is to set standards and principles that all directors shall 
respect at a minimum (such as for instance, to ensure that appropriate internal 
structures are in place so that shareholders to have access to corporate 
information). Third is to provide a professional network through which 
directors can receive advice on difficult topics. Cross pollination of ideas and 
sharing of experience also can be encouraged. Fourth is to lead effective 
lobbying in influencing government's policies and speak out clearly whenever 
change is needed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The corporate governance discussion has only lately started in the 
Greek landscape and there are relatively few scholarly accounts of corporate 
governance in Greece. This thesis is one of only a small number of studies, 
which undertakes an in-depth and critical examination of the dynamics of the 
Greek corporate governance framework. 
The initial motivation to conduct a research on corporate governance 
was driven by the heated debate on the collapse of Enron. At that time, being 
a master's student and not that familiar with corporate governance issues, I 
only had one question in my mind. why is there so big a discussion about 
corporate governance? To find answers, I started researching the concept of 
corporate governance and aiming to understand its significance. Some of this 
research is included in chapter one. I decided to start this thesis (chapter one) 
with the question that put me on the first line for embarking on this PhD 
thesis. 
In the course of the research, three main objectives were pursued. 
Firstly, to understand the nature and the necessary components of the Greek 
corporate governance system. Secondly, to discuss the discrepancy between 
the objectives of the corporate governance standards, compliance, and actual 
governance efficiency. Thirdly, to suggest alternative means and measures 
that need be taken to ensure that the objectives of the corporate governance 
are fulfilled and governance efficiency is strengthened. 
Corporate governance is a dynamic and interdisciplinary concept that 
describes those mechanisms aiming to align the interests of the principal and 
the agent in order to enhance the business development and ensure the 
protection of shareholders' rights. The original principal-agent theory 
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provided the key theoretical foundation upon which it was later understood 
that the varying agency concerns needed to be explained in a more 
contextualised approach. There was a need to adopt an approach that explains 
the many different corporate governance structures around the globe, to focus 
our analysis later on the characteristics of the Greek corporate governance 
system. 
To understand the shape of the Greek corporate governance system, it 
was important to thoroughly study the Greek capital markets law and 
securities legislation, the OECD corporate governance principles, and the EU 
capital market law. Those legal sources have provided the legal background 
for defining numerous corporate governance standards in the Greek domain. 
Their impact has been so pervasive that to discuss Greek corporate 
governance framework otherwise than in the light of those legal sources 
would be tantamount to disregarding an essential ingredient in the formation 
of its corporate governance universe. 
To determine that there is a discrepancy between the objectives of the 
corporate governance standards, compliance, and actual governance 
efficiency, it was necessary to rely on the statistics of two corporate 
governance surveys conducted by Grant Thornton International. Those 
surveys measured the level of compliance of Greek listed companies with 
corporate governance requirements and international best practices. 
Significantly, the contribution of the present thesis is that it explained the 
numbers upon country specific attributes. For instance, although the statistic 
that in about 6 out of 10 companies the CEO and the Chairman of the Board 
are the same person is important information, it is more valuable for policy 
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makers to know that this statistic is due to the family origin of most Greek 
corporations. 
In this vein, the explanation of the above statistics upon situational 
variables is a key innovation of the thesis, which further contributes to the 
following. First, particularly in the Greek literature this is the first full length 
study that not only outlines the characteristics of the Greek corporate 
governance system, but also goes further in discussing the effects of such 
attributes in terms of compliance behaviour and governance efficiency. 
Second, by identifying what country specific factors are responsible for 
certain compliance behaviours, it helps policy makers, and the corporations 
themselves, to better design realistic and appropriate measures to mitigate 
problematic aspects of compliance, in further enhancing governance 
efficiency. 
The thesis concludes with a number of proposals, which are to be part 
of a general corporate governance reform strategy aiming to improve 
governance efficiency. The conclusions of this study are relevant for students, 
academics, policy makers, Greek corporations, and Greek regulators. 
Legal material with regard to the Greek laws, Presidential Decrees and 
other explanatory notes from the Parliamentary meetings necessary to sketch 
the Greek corporate governance framework were drawn from a large number 
of visits to the Greek Parliament and the National Printing Agency of Greece. 
Given the fact that those resources are only available at the premises of these 
national bodies, following special visiting arrangements, the collection of the 
material on its own right makes the present study a- difficult and challenging 
one and useful tool for further future research. 
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Data used in order to assess the level of compliance of Greek 
corporations with the corporate governance rules were drawn from the ''. 
Corporate Governance Surveys conducted by the Grant Thornton 
International in Greece and my reflections as an observer-participant in both 
Grant Thornton conferences for the presentation of the main findings of the 
surveys. Those conferences were held in Athens, Greece, on 24 November 
2005 and 18 April 2006, respectively. 
Essentially, the present study is a synthesis of theoretical and empirical 
insight, bringing theory and empirical evidence together in an effort to support 
its claims. At a theoretical level, the main contribution of the present thesis 
rests on the fact that it provides the central theoretical resource, which is 
essential for explaining other empirical studies that have been conducted for 
the specific context of the Greek corporate governance. The study aims to 
provide the main starting point that will facilitate further research on the 
Greek corporate governance and advance the awareness of Greek corporations 
1 on corporate governance issues. 
More particularly, given the interdisciplinary and dynamic nature of 
the concept of corporate governance, it interacts and its ends meet with a 
number of interesting research topics. Three areas have been identified where 
further research will be significant to advancing international, and likewise 
Greek, corporate governance literature. First, research on the corporate 
governance issues with respect to non-listed firms, financial and credit , 
institutions, financial conglomerates, and not for profit organisations that play 
important role in the Greek capital market. Second, the recent hedge fund 
scandal that had shaken the Greek capital market, when pension funds were 
invested under dubious terms and conditions, gave rise to concerns on the 
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proper governance structures of pension funds' organisations and of those 
government bodies that monitored their investment policies and activities. 
Third, in the post 9/11 era good governance structures of financial and credit 
institutions are reckoned important for promoting a strong framework so that 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and/or 
financing of terrorism will be eliminated. Therefore, another important area 
for future research has been identified the examination of the correlation 
between good corporate governance and compliance with money laundering 
restrictions. 
The corporate governance literature is quite extensive covering the 
varying aspects of the concept, which can be approached from different 
theoretical, social, legal, disciplinary, and economic angle. This thesis is 
hoped to become a comprehensive reference point for Greek corporate 
governance, a valuable academic tool to teach students and professionals, and 
stimulation for meaningful governance reforms. 
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